James Andow (andow-j)
Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale
Articles of Dialectica, Intuitional Learning, How Existential Dependence Can Ground Existential Grounding, Dispositions and Token Identity, In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion, Spacetime FunctionalismCitato nei seguenti articoli
If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?Contributi a Philosophie.ch
Bibliography
Andow, James. 2015a. “Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable.” Dialectica 69(2): 205–220.
Andow, James. 2015b. “How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?” Metaphilosophy 46(4–5): 515–538, doi:10.1111/meta.12151.
Andow, James. 2015c. “A Semantic Solution to the Problem with Aesthetic Testimony.” Acta Analytica 30(2): 211–218.
Andow, James. 2015d. “How ‘Intuition’ Exploded.” Metaphilosophy 46(2): 189–212, doi:10.1111/meta.12127.
Andow, James. 2016a. “Intuitions.” Analysis 76(2): 232–246.
Andow, James. 2016b. “Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics.” Philosophia 44(1): 53–62.
Andow, James. 2016c. “Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology.” Metaphilosophy 47(3): 353–370, doi:10.1111/meta.12191.
Andow, James. 2017a. “Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?” Philosophia 45(2): 523–531.
Andow, James. 2017b. “Do Non-Philosophers Think Epistemic Consequentialism is Counterintuitive?” Synthese 194(7): 2631–2643.
Andow, James. 2017c. “A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism about Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux (2014).” Metaphilosophy 48(1–2): 183–195, doi:10.1111/meta.12225.
Andow, James. 2021. “If Philosophers Aren’t Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?” Dialectica 75(2), doi:10.48106/dial.v75.i2.02.
Andow, James. 2023. “Intuitions about Cases as Evidence (for How We should Think).” Inquiry 66(6): 1036–1068, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2020.1767199.
Further References
Molyneux, Bernard. 2014. “New Arguments that Philosophers Don’t Treat Intuitions as Evidence.” Metaphilosophy 45(3): 441–461, doi:10.1111/meta.12094.