James Andow (andow-j)
Auf folgenden Portalseiten erwähnt
Articles of Dialectica, Intuitional Learning, How Existential Dependence Can Ground Existential Grounding, Dispositions and Token Identity, In Defense of the Content-Priority View of Emotion, Spacetime FunctionalismZitiert in den folgenden Artikeln
If Philosophers Aren't Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch
Bibliography
Andow, James. 2015a. “Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable.” Dialectica 69(2): 205–220.
Andow, James. 2015b. “How Distinctive is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?” Metaphilosophy 46(4–5): 515–538, doi:10.1111/meta.12151.
Andow, James. 2015c. “A Semantic Solution to the Problem with Aesthetic Testimony.” Acta Analytica 30(2): 211–218.
Andow, James. 2015d. “How ‘Intuition’ Exploded.” Metaphilosophy 46(2): 189–212, doi:10.1111/meta.12127.
Andow, James. 2016a. “Intuitions.” Analysis 76(2): 232–246.
Andow, James. 2016b. “Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics.” Philosophia 44(1): 53–62.
Andow, James. 2016c. “Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology.” Metaphilosophy 47(3): 353–370, doi:10.1111/meta.12191.
Andow, James. 2017a. “Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue?” Philosophia 45(2): 523–531.
Andow, James. 2017b. “Do Non-Philosophers Think Epistemic Consequentialism is Counterintuitive?” Synthese 194(7): 2631–2643.
Andow, James. 2017c. “A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism about Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux (2014).” Metaphilosophy 48(1–2): 183–195, doi:10.1111/meta.12225.
Andow, James. 2021. “If Philosophers Aren’t Using Intuitions as Evidence, What Are They Doing?” Dialectica 75(2), doi:10.48106/dial.v75.i2.02.
Andow, James. 2023. “Intuitions about Cases as Evidence (for How We should Think).” Inquiry 66(6): 1036–1068, doi:10.1080/0020174X.2020.1767199.
Further References
Molyneux, Bernard. 2014. “New Arguments that Philosophers Don’t Treat Intuitions as Evidence.” Metaphilosophy 45(3): 441–461, doi:10.1111/meta.12094.