J.C. Beall (beall)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C. 2004. “Minimalism, Epistemicism, and Paradox.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 85–96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C., eds. 2005a. Deflationary Truth. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C. 2005b. “Deflationism: The Basics.” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 1–29. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Beall, J. C. 1999a. “Completing Sorensen’s Menu: A Non-Modal Yabloesque Curry.” Mind 108(432): 737–739.
Beall, J. C. 1999b. “From Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism.” Philosophia Mathematica 7(3): 321–325.
Beall, J. C. 2000a. “Is the Observable World Consistent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(1): 113–118.
Beall, J. C. 2000b. “On Truthmakers for Negative Truths.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(2): 264–268.
Beall, J. C. 2000c. “Fitch’s Proof, Verificationism and the Knower Paradox.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(2): 241–247.
Beall, J. C. 2000d. “On the Identity Theory of Truth.” Philosophy 75(291): 127–130.
Beall, J. C. 2000e. “Minimalism, Gaps, and the Holton Conditional.” Analysis 60(4): 340–351.
Beall, J. C. 2000f. “On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50(200): 380–382.
Beall, J. C. 2000g. “A Neglected Response to the Grim Result [on Grim (1984)].” Analysis 60(1): 38–41.
Beall, J. C. 2001a. “Curry’s Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2001/entries/curry-paradox/.
Beall, J. C. 2001b. “Is Yablo’s Paradox Non-Circular?” Analysis 61(3): 176–187.
Beall, J. C. 2001c. “A Priestly Recipe for Explosive Curry.” Logical studies 7.
Beall, J. C. 2001d. “A Neglected Deflationary Approach to the Liar.” Analysis 61(2): 129–136.
Beall, J. C. 2001e. “Dialetheism and the Probability of Contradictions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(1): 114–118.
Beall, J. C. 2001f. “Review of Soames (1999).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 304–306.
Beall, J. C. 2001g. “Review of Villanueva (1997).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 309–310.
Beall, J. C. 2001h. “Review of Humphreys and Fetzer (1998).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 308–309.
Beall, J. C. 2001i. “Existential Claims and Platonism.” Philosophia Mathematica 9(1): 80–86.
Beall, J. C. 2002a. “Deflationism and Gaps: Untying ‘Not’s in the Debate.” Analysis 62(4).
Beall, J. C. 2002b. “Review of Sørensen (2000).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8(13).
Beall, J. C., ed. 2003a. Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. 2003b. “On the Singularity Theory of Denotation.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 253–261. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. 2003c. “Introduction.” in Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 1–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. 2003d. “Review of McGinn (2000).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(4).
Beall, J. C. 2003e. “Review of Field (2001).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(3): 437–439.
Beall, J. C. 2004a. “True and False – As If.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 197–216. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2004b. “Introduction: At the Intersection of Truth and Falsity.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 1–21. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2004c. “Transparent Disquotationalism.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 7–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2006a. “Modelling the ‘Ordinary View’ .” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 61–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2006b. “Introductory Remarks.” The Monist 89(1): 3–8.
Beall, J. C. 2006c. “True, False and Paranormal.” Analysis 66: 102–114.
Beall, J. C. 2006d. “Negation’s Holiday: Aspectival Dialetheism.” in A Logical Approach to Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon, edited by David DeVidi and Timothy Kenyon, pp. 169–192. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 69. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/1-4020-4054-7.
Beall, J. C., ed. 2007a. Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2007b. “Prolegomenon to Future Revenge.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 1–30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2007c. “Truth and Paradox: A Philosophical Sketch.” in Philosophy of Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, 1st ed., pp. 325–410. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Beall, J. C. 2008a. “ ‘Unsettledness’ in a Bivalent Language: A Modest, Nonepistemic Idea.” in From Truth to Reality. New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Heather Dyke, pp. 17–28. London: Routledge.
Beall, J. C. 2008b. “Curry’s Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/curry-paradox/.
Beall, J. C. 2009a. Spandrels of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. 2009b. “Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities.” in, pp. 105–127.
Beall, J. C. 2010a. “Vague Intensions: A Modest Marriage Proposal.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 187–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2010b. “On Truth, Abnormal Worlds, and Necessity.” in The Logica Yearbook 2009, edited by Michal Peliš, pp. 17–32. London: College Publications.
Beall, J. C. 2011. “Dialetheists against Pinocchio.” Analysis 71(4): 689–691.
Beall, J. C. 2012a. “Why Priest’s Reassurance is Not Reassuring.” Analysis 72(3): 517–525.
Beall, J. C. 2012b. “Future Contradictions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(3): 547–557.
Beall, J. C. 2012c. “A Neglected Reply to Prior’s Dilemma.” in Rationis Defensor. Essays in Honour of Colin Cheyne, edited by James MacLaurin, pp. 203–208. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 28. Dordrecht: Springer.
Beall, J. C. 2012d. “Deflated Truth Pluralism.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 323–338. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2013a. “Shrieking against Gluts: The Solution to the ‘Just True’ Problem.” Analysis 73(3): 438–445.
Beall, J. C. 2013b. “LP+, K3+, FDE+, and Their ‘Classical Collapse’ .” The Review of Symbolic Logic 6(4): 742–754, doi:10.1017/s1755020313000142.
Beall, J. C. 2014a. “Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism.” Erkenntnis 79(suppl., 2): 301–307.
Beall, J. C. 2014b. “Rapunzel Shaves Pinocchio’s Beard.” in Contradictions. Logic, History, Actuality, edited by Elena Ficara, pp. 27–30. Berlin Studies in Knowledge Research n. 6. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Beall, J. C. 2014c. “Finding Tolerance without Gluts.” Mind 123(491): 791–811.
Beall, J. C. 2014d. “End of Inclosure.” Mind 123(491): 829–849.
Beall, J. C. 2015a. “Non-Detachable Validity and Deflationism.” in Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole Thomassen Hjortland, pp. 276–287. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715696.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. 2015b. “Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts.” Noûs 49(2): 410–423.
Beall, J. C. 2015c. “Trivializing Sentences and the Promise of Semantic Completeness.” Analysis 75(4): 573–584.
Beall, J. C. 2017. “Do Inconsistent Laws Deliver Gluts?” in Law and the New Logics, edited by H. Patrick Glenn and Lionel D. Smith, pp. 199–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316227329.
Beall, J. C. 2018. “The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 30–54. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12133.
Beall, J. C. 2019. “Christ – A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology.” The Journal of Analytic Theology 7: 400–433, doi:10.12978/jat.2019-7.090202010411.
Beall, J. C. 2021. The Contradictory Christ. Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2001. “Can Deflationists be Dialetheists?” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 30(6): 593–608.
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2002. “Further Remarks on Truth and Contradiction.” The Philosophical Quarterly 52(207): 217–225.
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2003. “Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?” Noûs 37(2): 303–324.
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley, eds. 2004a. Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley. 2004b. “A Short Introduction.” in Deflationism and Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 1–6. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. and Bueno, Otávio. 2002. “The Simple Liar without Bivalence.” Analysis 62(1): 22–26.
Beall, J. C. and Colyvan, Mark. 2001a. “Looking for Contradictions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(4).
Beall, J. C. and Colyvan, Mark. 2001b. “Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-ing the Sorites [reply to Hyde (2001)].” Mind 110(438): 401–408.
Beall, J. C. and Cotnoir, Aaron J. 2017. “God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem.” Analysis 77(4): 681–689.
Beall, J. C. and van Fraassen, Bas C. 2003. Possibilities and Paradox – an introduction to modal and many-valued logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C. and Glanzberg, Michael. 2008. “Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 169–198. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Beall, J. C. and Glanzberg, Michael. 2011. “Liar Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/liar-paradox/.
Beall, J. C., Glanzberg, Michael and Ripley, David. 2016. “Liar Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/liar-paradox/.
Beall, J. C., Glanzberg, Michael and Ripley, David. 2018. Formal Theories of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beall, J. C., Hughes, Michael and Vandergrift, Ross. 2014. “Glutty Theories and the Logic of Antinomies.” in The Metaphysics of Logic, edited by Penelope Rush, pp. 224–232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139626279.
Beall, J. C. and Murzi, Julien. 2013. “Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophy 110(3): 143–165.
Beall, J. C., Priest, Graham and Weber, Zach. 2011. “Can U Do This?” Analysis 71(2): 280–286.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2000. “Logical Pluralism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(4): 475–493.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2005. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/logical-consequence/.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2006. Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001.
Beall, J. C. and Restall, Greg. 2013. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/logical-consequence/.
Beall, J. C., Restall, Greg and Sagi, Gil. 2019. “Logical Consequence.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/logical-consequence/.
Beall, J. C. and Ripley, David. 2018. “Non-Classical Theories of Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 739–754. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Priest, Graham, Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley, eds. 2004. The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Shapiro, Lionel and Beall, J. C. 2017. “Curry’s Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/curry-paradox/.
Shapiro, Lionel and Beall, J. C. 2018. “Curry’s Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/curry-paradox/.

Further References

Field, Hartry. 2001. Truth and the Absence of Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199242895.001.0001.
Grim, Patrick. 1984. “There is no Set of all Truths.” Analysis 44: 206–208.
Humphreys, Paul and Fetzer, James H., eds. 1998. The New Theory of Reference: Kripke, Marcus, and Its Origins. Synthese Library n. 270. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hyde, Dominic. 2001. “A Reply to Beall and Colyvan (2001a).” Mind 110.
McGinn, Colin. 2000. Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241813.001.0001.
Soames, Scott. 1999. Understanding Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195123352.001.0001.
Sørensen, Roy A. 2000. “Moore’s Problem with Iterated Belief.” The Philosophical Quarterly 50.
Villanueva, Enrique, ed. 1997. Philosophical Issues 8: Truth. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.