Robert Cummins (cummins-r)
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Bibliography
Ariew, André, Cummins, Robert and Perlman, Mark, eds. 2002. Functions. New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1975a. “Truth and Logical Form.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 4(1): 29–44.
Cummins, Robert. 1975b. “Functional Analysis.” The Journal of Philosophy 72: 741–764. Reprinted in Block (1980, 185–190).
Cummins, Robert. 1975c. “Epistemology and the Cartesian Circle.” Theoria 41(3): 112–124.
Cummins, Robert. 1975d. “Two Troublesome Claims about Qualities in Locke’s Essay.” The Philosophical Review 84(3): 401–418.
Cummins, Robert. 1977a. “Programs in the Explanation of Behavior.” Philosophy of Science 44: 269–287.
Cummins, Robert. 1977b. “Reply to Hugly and Sayward (1977).” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 6(3): 353–354.
Cummins, Robert. 1978. “Explanation and Subsumption.” in PSA 1978: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part I: Contributed Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Ian Hacking, pp. 163–175. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Cummins, Robert. 1981. “What Can be Learned from Brainstorms?” Philosophical Topics 12(1): 83–92.
Cummins, Robert. 1982. “The Internal Manual Model of Psychological Explanation.” Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 257–268.
Cummins, Robert. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1985. “The Mind of the Matter: Comments on Paul Churchland [Churchland (1985)].” in PSA 1984: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Philip Kitcher, pp. 791–798. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Cummins, Robert. 1986. “Inexplicit information.” in The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, edited by Myles Brand and Robert M. Harnish, pp. 116–126. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1988. “Comments on Dretske (1988).” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 44–54. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1989b. “Representation and Covariation.” in Rerepresentation: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, edited by Stuart Silvers, pp. 19–38. Philosophical Studies Series n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Cummins, Robert. 1990. “The Introspectionism of Titchener.” in Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by John-Christian Smith, pp. 235–242. Philosophical Studies Series n. 46. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Cummins, Robert. 1991a. “Form, Interpretation, and the Uniqueness of Content: A Response to Morris.” Minds and Machines 1: 31–42.
Cummins, Robert. 1991b. “Mental Meaning in Psychological Explanation.” in Dretske and his Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 102–118. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Cummins, Robert. 1991c. “Methodological Reflections on Belief.” in Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 53–70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1991d. “The Role of Representation in Connectionist Explanation of Cognitive Capacities.” in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, edited by William M. Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich, and David E. Rumelhart, pp. 91–114. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Cummins, Robert. 1991e. “Cross-Domain Inference and Problem Embedding.” in Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface, edited by Robert Cummins and John L. Pollock, pp. 23–38. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Cummins, Robert. 1992. “Conceptual Role Semantics and the Explanatory Role of Content.” Philosophical Studies 65: 103–127.
Cummins, Robert. 1995. “Connectionism and the Rationale Constraint on Cognitive Explanation.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 105–125. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Cummins, Robert. 1996a. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/5887.001.0001.
Cummins, Robert. 1996b. “Systematicity.” The Journal of Philosophy 93(12): 591–614.
Cummins, Robert. 1997. “The LOT of the Causal Theory of Mental Content.” The Journal of Philosophy 94(10): 535–542.
Cummins, Robert. 1998. “Reflections on Reflective Equilibrium.” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 113–127. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Cummins, Robert. 2000a. “Reply to Millikan (2000b).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 113–127.
Cummins, Robert. 2000b. “ ‘How Does It Work?’ versus ‘What Are the Laws?’: Two Conceptions of Psychological Explanation.” in Explanation and Cognition, edited by Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson, pp. 117–144. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Cummins, Robert. 2002a. “Neo-Teleology.” in Functions. New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by André Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman, pp. 157–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 2002b. “Truth and Meaning.” in Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 175–196. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Proceedings of the Eastern Washington University and the University of Idaho Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Meaning.
Cummins, Robert. 2002c. “Haugeland on Representation and Intentionaltiy.” in Philosophy of Mental Representation, edited by Hugh Clapin, pp. 122–137. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 2002d. “Comments on Smith (2002) on Cummins.” in Philosophy of Mental Representation, edited by Hugh Clapin, pp. 191–197. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 2006. “Berkeley on Minds and Agency.” in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, pp. 190–229. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cummins, Robert. 2010. The World in the Head. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199548033.001.0001.
Cummins, Robert. 2013. “Measuring Happiness and Subjective Well-Being.” in The Oxford Handbook of Happiness, edited by Susan David, Ilona Boniwell, and Amanda Conley Ayers, pp. 185–200. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert, Blackmon, Ji, Byrd, David, Lee, Alexa and Martin, Roth. 2006. “Representation and Unexploited Content.” in Teleosemantics. New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham F. Macdonald and David Papineau, pp. 195–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cummins, Robert and Dellarosa Cummins, Denise, eds. 1999. Minds, Brains, Computers: The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Cummins, Robert and Gottlieb, Dale V. 1972. “On an Argument for Truth-Functionality.” American Philosophical Quarterly 9(3): 265–269.
Cummins, Robert and Gottlieb, Dale V. 1976. “Better Total Consequences: Utilitarianism and Extrinsic Value.” Metaphilosophy 7(3–4): 286–306.
Cummins, Robert, Lee, Alexa, Roth, Martin, Byrd, David and Poirier, Pierre. 2002. “Review of Millikan (2000a).” The Journal of Philosophy 99(2): 102–108.
Cummins, Robert and Pollock, John L., eds. 1991. Philosophy and AI: Essays at the Interface. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Cummins, Robert and Roth, Martin. 2010. “Traits have not evolved to function the way they do because of a past advantage.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Biology, edited by Francisco José Ayala and Robert Arp, pp. 72–85. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 12. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444314922.
Cummins, Robert and Roth, Martin. 2012. “Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 365–382. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Cummins, Robert, Roth, Martin and Harman, Ian. 2014. “Why It Doesn’t Matter to Metaphysics What Mary Learns.” Philosophical Studies 167(3): 541–555.
Cummins, Robert and Schwartz, Grigori. 1988. “Radical Connectionism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 43–61. Reprinted as “Connectionism, Computation, and Cognition” in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 60–73).
Roth, Martin and Cummins, Robert. 2017. “Neuroscience, Psychology, Reduction, and Functional Analysis.” in Explanation and Integration in Mind and Brain Science, edited by David Michael Kaplan, pp. 29–43. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199685509.001.0001.
Further References
Block, Ned, ed. 1980. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Churchland, Paul M. 1985. “Subjective Qualia from a Materialist Point of View.” in PSA 1984: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Philip Kitcher, pp. 773–790. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Dretske, Fred I. 1988. “The Explanatory Role of Content.” in Contents of Thought, edited by Robert Grimm and Daniel D. Merrill, pp. 31–43. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hugly, Philip and Sayward, Charles. 1977. “Theories of Truth and Semantical Primitives.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 6(3): 349–349.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2000a. On Clear and Confused Ideas – An Essay about Substance Concepts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 2000b. “Representations, Targets and Attitudes.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 103–111.
Smith, Brian Cantwell. 2002. “Cummins – Or Something Isomorphic to Him.” in Philosophy of Mental Representation, edited by Hugh Clapin, pp. 170–190. New York: Oxford University Press.