Marian A. David (david-ma)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Antonelli, Mauro and David, Marian A., eds. 2014. Logical, Ontological, and Historical Contributions on the Philosophy of Alexius Meinong. Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien n. 5. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Antonelli, Mauro and David, Marian A., eds. 2016. Existence, Fiction, Assumption. Meinongian Themes and the History of Austrian Philosophy. Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien n. 6. Berlin: de Gruyter.
David, Marian A. 1984. “Review of Kluge (1980).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 21: 210–212.
David, Marian A. 1985a. “Propositionen.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 23: 37–58.
David, Marian A. 1985b. “Non-Existence and Reid’s Conception of Conceiving.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 25–26: 585–599.  “Non-Existence and Predication,” ed. by Rudolf Haller.
David, Marian A. 1986. “Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 28: 3–16.  “Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Chisholm,” ed. by Marian David and Leopold Stubenberg.
David, Marian A. 1991a. “Neither Mentioning ‘Brains in a Vat’ nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 891–896.
David, Marian A. 1991b. “On the Roles of Trustworthiness and Acceptance.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40: 93–107.  “Metamind, Knowledge, and Coherence,” ed. by Johannes Brandl, Wolfgang Combocz and Christian Piller; reprinted in Dretske (2000).
David, Marian A. 1993. “Review of Mulligan (1990).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 229–232.
David, Marian A. 1994. Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
David, Marian A. 1996a. “Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth.” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 281–296. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Lehrer and Marek (1997, 203–220).
David, Marian A. 1996b. “Review of Foley (1993).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 943–952.
David, Marian A. 1997a. “Kim’s Functionalism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 133–148. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
David, Marian A. 1997b. “Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori.” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, pp. 629–652. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 25. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
David, Marian A. 2001a. “Truth as Identity and Truth as Correspondence.” in The Nature of Truth. Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 683–704. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Second edition: Lynch et al. (2021), doi:10.7551/mitpress/4884.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2001b. “Truth as the Epistemic Goal.” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, edited by Matthias Steup, pp. 151–169. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195128923.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2002a. “Content Essentialism.” Acta Analytica 17(28): 103–114.
David, Marian A. 2002b. “Minimalism and the Facts about Truth.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 161–175. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
David, Marian A. 2002c. “Truth and Identity.” in Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 124–141. New York: Seven Bridges Press. Proceedings of the Eastern Washington University and the University of Idaho Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Meaning.
David, Marian A. 2002d. “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/truth-correspondence/.
David, Marian A. 2004. “Don’t Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82(1): 42–47. Reprinted in Jackson and Priest (2004, 43–48).
David, Marian A. 2005a. “Armstrong on Truthmaking.” in Truthmakers. The Contemporary Debate, edited by Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd, pp. 141–159. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2005b. “Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 575–604. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 363–377).
David, Marian A. 2005c. “Some T-Biconditionals.” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 382–420. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
David, Marian A. 2005d. “Künne on Conceptions of Truth [review of Künne (2003)].” Grazer Philosophische Studien 70: 179–191.
David, Marian A. 2005e. “On ‘Truth is Good’ [on Lynch (2004)].” Philosophical Books 46(4): 292–301.
David, Marian A. 2005f. “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/truth-correspondence/.
David, Marian A. 2006a. “A Substitutional Theory of Truth? [on Hill (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(1): 182–189.
David, Marian A. 2006b. “Horwich’s World [on Horwich (2006)].” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 203–207. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Proceedings of the 2004 St.Andrews Conference on Realism and Truth, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2008a. “Quine’s Ladder: Two and a Half Pages from the Philosophy of Logic.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 274–312. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
David, Marian A. 2008b. “Tarski’s Convention T and the Concept of Truth.” in New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy, edited by Douglas Eden Patterson, pp. 133–156. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296309.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2009a. “Truth-making and correspondence.” in Truth and Truth-Making, edited by Edward Jonathan Lowe and Adolf Rami, pp. 137–157. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
David, Marian A. 2009b. “Defending Existentialism?” in States of Affairs, edited by Maria Elisabeth Reicher, pp. 167–208. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 30. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
David, Marian A. 2009c. “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/truth-correspondence/.
David, Marian A. 2012a. “Lehrer on Trustworthiness and Acceptance.” Philosophical Studies 161(1): 7–15.
David, Marian A. 2012b. “Lynch’s Functionalist Theory of Truth.” in Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, pp. 42–68. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387469.001.0001.
David, Marian A. 2013. “How to Take Truth as a Goal?” in Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, edited by Christoph Jäger and Winfried Löffler, pp. 203–214. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 19. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110329018.
David, Marian A. 2015. “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/truth-correspondence/.
David, Marian A. 2018. “The Correspondence Theory of Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 238–258. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
David, Marian A. and Warfield, Ted A. 2008. “Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 137–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.

Further References

Dretske, Fred I. 2000. Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Foley, Richard. 1993. Working without a Net: A Study in Egocentric Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2002. Thought and World. An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic Correspondence. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horwich, Paul. 2006. “A World without Isms.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 188–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Horwich (2010, 255–279), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2010. Truth – Meaning – Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Kluge, Eike-Henner W. 1980. The Metaphysics of Gottlob Frege. An Essay in Ontological Reconstruction. Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library n. 5. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Künne, Wolfgang. 2003. Conceptions of Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241317.001.0001.
Lehrer, Keith and Marek, Johann Christian, eds. 1997. Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 190. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lynch, Michael Patrick. 2004. True to Life. Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Mulligan, Kevin, ed. 1990. Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty. Primary Sources in Phenomenology n. 3. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.