Paul Horwich (horwich)
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Bibliography
Horwich, Paul. 1975. “A Formalization of ‘Nothing’ .” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15: 363–368.
Horwich, Paul. 1982a. Probability and Evidence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horwich, Paul. 1982b. “How to Choose Between Empirically Equivalent Theories.” The Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 61–77. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 45–66).
Horwich, Paul. 1982c. “Three Forms of Realism.” Synthese 49: 181–201. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 7–31).
Horwich, Paul. 1983. “Explanations of Irrelevance.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume X: Testing Scientific Theories, edited by John S. Earman, pp. 55–66. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Horwich, Paul. 1986. “A Defence of Conventionalism.” in Fact, Science, and Morality: Essays On A.J. Ayer’s “Language, Truth, and Logic” , edited by Graham F. Macdonald and Crispin Wright. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horwich, Paul. 1991. “On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment.” Philosophy of Science 58(1): 1–14. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 86–104).
Horwich, Paul. 1992a. “Bayesian Problem-Solving and the Dispensability of Truth.” in Philosophical Issues 2: Rationality in Epistemology, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 205–214. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1992b. “Chomsky versus Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 95–108.
Horwich, Paul, ed. 1993a. World Changes – T. Kuhn and the Nature of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Horwich, Paul. 1993b. “Scientific Conceptions of Language and their Philosophical Import.” in Philosophical Issues 3: Science and Knowledge, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 123–133. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1993c. “Wittgensteinian Bayesianism.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18: Philosophy of Science, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 62–77. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 128–134).
Horwich, Paul. 1993d. “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 22(1): 67–78. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 135–148).
Horwich, Paul. 1993e. “Deflating the Direction of Time [Review of Lucas (1989)].” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 579–583. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 105–127).
Horwich, Paul. 1993f. “Meaning and Metaphilosophy [on Katz (1990)].” in Philosophical Issues 4: Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 153–158. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul, ed. 1994a. Theories of Truth. Aldershot, Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing.
Horwich, Paul. 1994b. “The Essence of Expressivism.” Analysis 54: 19–20.
Horwich, Paul. 1994c. “What is it like to be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning?” in Philosophical Issues 5: Truth and Rationality, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 133–154. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1995a. “Meaning, Use and Truth.” Mind 104(414): 355–368. Reprinted in Miller and Wright (2002, 260–273) and iin Horwich (2004a, 67–85).
Horwich, Paul. 1995b. “Closed Causal Chains.” in Time’s Arrow Today. Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time, edited by Steven F. Savitt, pp. 259–267. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horwich, Paul. 1995c. “Disquotation and Cause in the Theory of Reference.” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 73–78. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1996a. “Realism and Truth.” in Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 187–197. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 32–44).
Horwich, Paul. 1996b. “Realism Minus Truth [Review of Wright (1992)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56(4): 877–881.
Horwich, Paul. 1996c. “Comment on Dretske (1996).” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 167–170. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1997a. “Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Apriori Knowledge.” Noûs 31(4): 423–440.
Horwich, Paul. 1997b. “The Composition of Meanings.” The Philosophical Review 106(4): 503–532.
Horwich, Paul. 1997c. “Deflationary Truth and the Problem of Aboutness.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 95–106. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1997d. “Response to the Comments on Horwich (1997c) [Price (1997), Voltolini (1997) and Kovach (1997)].” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 139–140. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1997e. “The Nature of Vagueness [review of Williamson (1997)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4): 929–936.
Horwich, Paul. 1997f. “Realism and Truth.” in Realism and Quantum Mechanics, edited by Evandro Agazzi, pp. 29–39. Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities n. 55. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Horwich, Paul. 1998b. Truth. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First edition: Horwich (1990), doi:10.1093/0198752237.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 1998c. “Concept Constitution [on Fodor (1998b)].” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 15–19. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Horwich, Paul. 1999a. “Davidson on Deflationism.” in Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning, and Knowledge, edited by Urszula M. Żegleń, pp. 18–22. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 2. London: Routledge.
Horwich, Paul. 1999b. “Deflationary Truth, Aboutness and Meaning.” in Truth and its Nature (if any), edited by Jaroslav Peregrin, pp. 163–172. Synthese Library n. 284. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Horwich, Paul. 2000a. “Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority.” in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by Paul Artin Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, pp. 150–169. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241279.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2000b. “Steven Schiffer’s Theory of Vagueness [on Schiffer (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 271–281. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Horwich, Paul. 2000c. “The Sharpness of Vague Terms.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 83–91. Reprinted in expanded form in Horwich (2005a, 85–103).
Horwich, Paul. 2000d. “Norms of Truth and Meaning.” in Philosophy: The Good, the True, and the Beautiful, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 19–34. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Horwich (2005a, 104–133).
Horwich, Paul. 2000e. “On the Existence of Meanings.” in Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine, edited by Alex Orenstein and Petr Kotátko, pp. 151–162. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 210. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Horwich, Paul. 2001a. “Science and Art.” in Die Autonomie in der Kunst, edited by Peter Pakesch, pp. 67–76. Basel: Verlag Kunsthalle. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 149–158).
Horwich, Paul. 2001b. “Deflating Compositionality.” Ratio 14(4): 369–385. Simultaneously published in Kotátko, Pagin and Segal (2001); reprinted in expanded form in Horwich (2005a, 198–222).
Horwich, Paul. 2001c. “A Defense of Minimalism.” Synthese 126(1–2): 149–165. Substantially revised version in Horwich (2010a, 35–56), doi:10.1023/a:1005279406402.
Horwich, Paul. 2002. “Norms of Meaning and Truth.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 133–145. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Horwich, Paul. 2003a. “A Minimalist Critique of Tarski on Truth.” in Philosophy and Logic. In Search of the Polish Tradition. Essays in Honour of Jan Woleński on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, edited by Jaakko Hintikka, Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijania-Placek, Tomasz Placek, and Artur Rojszczak, pp. 3–12. Synthese Library n. 323. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Beall and Armour-Garb (2004, 75–84) and, in substantially revised form, in Horwich (2010a, 79–97), doi:10.1007/978-94-017-0249-2_1.
Horwich, Paul. 2003b. “Meaning and its Place in the Language Faculty.” in Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert H. Hornstein, pp. 162–178. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in revised form in Horwich (2005a, 174–197), doi:10.1002/9780470690024.
Horwich, Paul. 2004a. From a Deflationary Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251266.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2004b. “Wittgenstein’s Meta-Philosophical Development.” in Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, edited by Max Kölbel and Bernhard Weiss, pp. 98–107. London: Routledge. Reprinted in Horwich (2004a, 159–171).
Horwich, Paul. 2004c. “Une critique de la théorie des vérifacteurs.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 115–127. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Reprinted, in substantially revised form, as “Being and Truth,” in Horwich (2010a, 299–322).
Horwich, Paul. 2004d. “A Use Theory of Meaning.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(2): 351–372. Reprinted in revised form in Horwich (2005a, 26–62).
Horwich, Paul. 2005a. Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925124X.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2005b. “The Space of Issues and Options.” in Reflections on Meaning, pp. 1–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925124X.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2005c. “The Pseudo-Problem of Error.” in Reflections on Meaning, pp. 63–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925124X.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2005d. “Meaning Constitution and Epistemic Rationality.” in Reflections on Meaning, pp. 134–173. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925124X.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2005e. “The Frege-Geach Point.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 78–93. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted, in substantially revised form, as “The Motive Power of Evaluative Concepts,” in Horwich (2010a, 167–195).
Horwich, Paul. 2005f. “Truth.” in The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and Michael A. Smith, pp. 454–468. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted, in revised form, in Horwich (2010a, 13–34), as “Varieties of Deflationism” , doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2006a. “The Value of Truth.” Noûs 40(2): 347–360. Reprinted, in substantially revised form, in Horwich (2010a, 57–77).
Horwich, Paul. 2006b. “The Nature of Meaning.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 41–57. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Horwich, Paul. 2006c. “A World without Isms.” in Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Patrick Lynch, pp. 188–202. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Horwich (2010a, 255–279), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288878.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2007. “The Quest for REALITY.” Dialectica 61(1): 5–16. Reprinted, in substantially revised form, in Horwich (2010a, 281–299).
Horwich, Paul. 2008a. “Ungrounded Reason.” The Journal of Philosophy 105(9): 453–471. Reprinted in Horwich (2010a, 197–223).
Horwich, Paul. 2008b. “A New Framework for Semantics.” in Philosophical Perspectives 22: Philosophy of Language, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 233–240. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Horwich, Paul. 2008c. “Being and Truth.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32: Truth and its Deformities, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 258–273. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted in Lowe and Rami (2009, 185–200).
Horwich, Paul. 2008d. “What’s Truth got to do with It?” Linguistics and Philosophy 31(3): 308–322. Reprinted, in revised form, in Horwich (2010a, 143–165), as “Semantics: What’s truth got to do with it?” .
Horwich, Paul. 2008e. “Varieties of Deflationism [on Brandom (2008)].” Philosophical Topics 36(2): 29–43.
Horwich, Paul. 2009. “Kripke’s Paradox of Meaning.” Polish Journal of Philosophy 3(1): 23–32. Reprinted in Berg (2014, 191–201) and in Horwich (2010a, 99–112).
Horwich, Paul. 2010a. Truth – Meaning – Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2010b. “Review of Williamson (2007).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2): 524–533.
Horwich, Paul. 2010c. “What is Truth?” in Truth – Meaning – Reality, pp. 1–12. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in Japanese in the Journal of the Tokyo University Society of Philosophy, October 2007, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2010d. “Regularities, Rules, Meanings, Truth-Conditions, and Epistemic Norms.” in Truth – Meaning – Reality, pp. 113–141. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Published in Japanese in the Journal of the Tokyo University Society of Philosophy, October 2007; reprinted in Coliva (2012, 77–95), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2010e. “The Nature of Paradox.” in Truth – Meaning – Reality, pp. 225–253. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2010f. “Rorty’s Wittgenstein.” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. A Critical Guide, edited by Arif Ahmed, pp. 145–161. Cambridge Critical Guides. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horwich, Paul. 2012a. Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588879.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2012b. “Against Meaning-Skepticism.” in Prospects for Meaning, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 311–320. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Horwich, Paul. 2013a. “Naturalism, Deflationism and the Relative Priority of Language and Metaphysics.” in Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism, pp. 112–127. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horwich, Paul. 2013b. “Naturalism and the Linguistic Turn.” in Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, edited by Bana Bashour and Hans D. Muller, pp. 37–43. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 13. London: Routledge.
Horwich, Paul. 2014a. “An Undermining Diagnosis of Relativism about Truth.” Mind 123(491): 733–752.
Horwich, Paul. 2014b. “Belief-Truth Norms.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 17–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2015a. “Critical Notice of Sainsbury and Tye (2012).” Mind 124(492): 1123–1139.
Horwich, Paul. 2015b. “Kripke’s Wittgenstein.” in Meaning without Representation. Expression, Truth, Normativity, and Naturalism, edited by Steven A. Gross, Nicholas Tebben, and Michael Williams, pp. 359–376. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722199.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2016a. Probability and Evidence. Cambridge Philosophy Classics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Republication of Horwich (1982a), doi:10.1017/cbo9781316494219.
Horwich, Paul. 2016b. “Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 130–146. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2016c. “The Nature of Paradox.” in Meanings and Other Things. Themes from the Work of Stephen Schiffer, edited by Gary Ostertag, pp. 211–228. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199684939.001.0001.
Horwich, Paul. 2017. “Davidson’s Wittgensteinian View of Meaning.” in Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action, edited by Claudine Verheggen, pp. 28–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316145364.
Horwich, Paul. 2020. “Languages and Idiolects.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 285–298. Cham: Springer.
Further References
Beall, J. C. and Armour-Garb, Bradley, eds. 2004. Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199287116.001.0001.
Berg, Jonathan, ed. 2014. Naming, Necessity and More. Explorations in the Philosophical World of Saul Kripke. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Brandom, Robert B. 2008. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199542871.001.0001.
Coliva, Annalisa, ed. 2012. The Self and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590650.001.0001.
Dretske, Fred I. 1996. “Phenomenal Externalism, or if Meanings Ain’t in the Head, Where are Qualia?” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 143–158. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998a. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1998b. “There are no Recognitional Concepts; not even RED.” in Philosophical Issues 9: Concepts, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–14. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in Fodor (1998a, 34–47).
Katz, Jerrold J. 1990. The Metaphysics of Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kotátko, Petr, Pagin, Peter and Segal, Gabriel M. A., eds. 2001. Interpreting Davidson. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Kovach, Adam. 1997. “Stretching the Truth: Inflated Claims about Deflated Truth and Reference.” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 127–137. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lowe, Edward Jonathan and Rami, Adolf, eds. 2009. Truth and Truth-Making. Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing.
Lucas, John R. 1989. The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality and Truth. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Price, Huw. 1997. “What should a deflationist about truth say about meaning?” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 107–115. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Sainsbury, Richard Mark and Tye, Michael. 2012. Seven Puzzles of Thought. And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695317.001.0001.
Schiffer, Stephen. 2000. “Vagueness and Partial Belief.” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 220–257. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Voltolini, Alberto. 1997. “Intentionality Deflated?” in Philosophical Issues 8: Truth, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 117–126. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Williamson, Timothy. 1997. “Knowledge as Evidence?” Mind 106: 717–741.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williamson (2021), doi:10.1002/9780470696675.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021. The Philosophy of Philosophy. 2nd ed. The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson (2007), doi:10.1002/9781119616702.
Wright, Crispin. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, doi:10.2307/j.ctv1rr6cwg.