Gareth Evans (evans-g)

Cited in the following articles

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Evans, Gareth. 1973. “The Causal Theory of Names.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 74: 187–208. Reprinted in Schwartz (1977, 192–215), in Davis (1983), in Evans (1985a, 1–24), in Moore (1993, 208–227) and in Ludlow (1996, 609–655).
Evans, Gareth. 1975. “Identity and Predication.” The Journal of Philosophy 72(13): 343–363. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 25–48).
Evans, Gareth. 1976. “Semantic Structure and Logical Form.” in Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by Gareth Evans and John Henry McDowell, pp. 199–221. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 49–75) and in Ludlow (1996, 233–256), doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250074.001.0001.
Evans, Gareth. 1977a. “Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (I).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7(3): 467–536. Reprinted in Platts (1980, 255–317) and in Evans (1985a, 76–152).
Evans, Gareth. 1977b. “Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (II).” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 777–797. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 153–175).
Evans, Gareth. 1978. “Can there be Vague Objects?” Analysis 38: 208. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 176–177) and in Keefe and Smith (1996, 317).
Evans, Gareth. 1979. “Reference and Contingency.” The Monist 62(1): 161–189. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 178–213).
Evans, Gareth. 1980a. “Pronouns.” Linguistic Inquiry 11(2): 337–362. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 214–248).
Evans, Gareth. 1980b. “Things Without the Mind: A commentary on chapter two of Strawsons Individuals.” in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson, edited by Zak van Straaten, pp. 76–116. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 249–290).
Evans, Gareth. 1980c. “Commentary on Fodor (1980).” in Collected Papers, pp. 400–404. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1981a. “Understanding Demonstratives.” in Meaning and Understanding, edited by Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse, pp. 280–303. Berlin: de Gruyter. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 291–321) and in Ludlow (1996, 717–744).
Evans, Gareth. 1981b. “Reply [to Wright (1981)]: Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge.” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, edited by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, pp. 118–140. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Evans (1985a, 322–342), doi:10.4324/9781315823249.
Evans, Gareth. 1982. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John McDowell.
Evans, Gareth. 1985a. Collected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1985b. “Does Tense Logic Rest upon a Mistake?” in Collected Papers, pp. 343–363. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1985c. “A Further Reflection on Semantic Structure and Logical Form.” in Collected Papers, pp. 405–408. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 1985d. “Molyneux’s Question.” in Collected Papers, pp. 364–399. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, Gareth. 2004. “Comment on Davies and Humberstone (1980).” Philosophical Studies 118(1–2): 11–16. Reprinted in Garcı́a-Carpintero and Macià (2006, 176–180).
Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John Henry, eds. 1976a. Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250074.001.0001.
Evans, Gareth and McDowell, John Henry. 1976b. “Introduction.” in Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics, edited by Gareth Evans and John Henry McDowell, pp. vii–xxii. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250074.001.0001.

Further References

Boyd, Richard N., Gasper, Philip and Trout, J. D., eds. 1991. The Philosophy of Science. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Davies, Martin Kinsey and Humberstone, I. Lloyd. 1980. “Two Notions of Necessity.” Philosophical Studies 38(1): 1–30.
Davis, Steven, ed. 1983. Causal Theories of Mind. Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference. Grundlagen der Kommunikation und Kognition. Berlin: Springer.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1980. “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63–73. Reprinted in Fodor (1981, 225–255), in Haugeland (1981, 307–338) and Boyd, Gasper and Trout (1991).
Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Harvester Studies in Cognitive Science n. 13. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Garcı́a-Carpintero, Manuel and Macià, Josep, eds. 2006. Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199271955.001.0001.
Haugeland, John, ed. 1981. Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Keefe, Rosanna and Smith, Peter, eds. 1996. Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/7064.001.0001.
Ludlow, Peter J., ed. 1996. Readings in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Moore, Adrian W., ed. 1993. Meaning and Reference. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Platts, Mark, ed. 1980. Reference, Truth, and Reality: Essays on the Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Schwartz, Stephen P., ed. 1977. Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Wright, Crispin. 1981. “Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning.” in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, edited by Steven H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, pp. 99–117. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, doi:10.4324/9781315823249.