Brian P. McLaughlin (mclaughlin-bp)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Beckermann, Ansgar, McLaughlin, Brian P. and Walter, Sven, eds. 2009. The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Cohen, Jonathan, Hardin, Clyde Laurence and McLaughlin, Brian P. 2007. “The Truth about ‘The Truth about True Blue’ .” Analysis 67(2): 162–166.
Fodor, Jerry A. and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1990. “Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky’s Solution Doesn’t Work [on Smolensky (1988)].” Cognition 35: 183–204. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 331–355), in Macdonald and Macdonald (1995, 199–222) and in Fodor (1998, 90–111).
Goldman, Alvin I. and McLaughlin, Brian P., eds. 2019. Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780190639679.001.0001.
Hill, Christopher S. and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1998. “There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’ Philosophy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58.
LePore, Ernest and McLaughlin, Brian P., eds. 1985a. Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
LePore, Ernest and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1985b. “Actions, Reasons, Causes, and Intentions.” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 3–13. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1995. “Distinctions without a Difference.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(suppl.): 203–251. Spindel Conference 1994: Vagueness, ed. Terry Horgan.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 1998. “Review of Williamson (1994).” Linguistics and Philosophy 21(2): 221–235.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 2000. “The Lessons of the Many.” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 129–151.
McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian P. 2004. “Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson (2004).” Linguistics and Philosophy 27(1): 123–136.
McLaughlin, Brian P., ed. 1982a. What? Where? When? Why? Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1982b. “Invention and Appraisal.” in What? Where? When? Why? Essays on Induction, Space and Time, Explanation, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 69–100. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1983. “Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 22(suppl.): 71–91.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1984. “Perception, Causation, and Supervenience.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: Causation and Causal Theories, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 569–591. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1985. “Anomalous Monism and the Irreductibility of the Mental.” in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 331–368. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1987. “What is Wrong with Correlational Psychosemantics.” Synthese 70: 271–286.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1988a. “Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief.” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 29–62. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1988b. “Tye on Connectionism [on Tye (1988)].” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 185–193.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1989a. “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical.” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 109–135. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1989b. “Why Perception is not Singular Reference.” in Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C.B. Martin, edited by John Heil, pp. 111–120. Philosophical Studies Series n. 47. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
McLaughlin, Brian P., ed. 1991a. Dretske and his Critics. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1991b. “Belief Individuation and Dretske on Naturalizing Content.” in Dretske and his Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, pp. 157–179. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1992. “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism.” in Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, edited by Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim, pp. 49–93. Berlin: de Gruyter.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1993a. “On Punctate Content and on Conceptual Role.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 653–660.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1993b. “On Davidson’s Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.” in Mental Causation, edited by John Heil and Alfred R. Mele, pp. 27–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1993c. “The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls.” Philosophical Studies 71.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1993d. “Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution.” in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, edited by Christopher Hookway and Donald M. Peterson, pp. 217–234. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures n. 34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1995a. “Varieties of Supervenience.” in Supervenience: New Essays, edited by Elias E. Savellos and Ümit D. Yalçin, pp. 16–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1995b. “Disposition.” in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, 1st ed., pp. 121–124. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Page references are to the second edition.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1996. “Lewis on What Distinguishes Perception from Hallucination.” in Perception, edited by Kathleen A. Akins, pp. 198–231. Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science n. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1997a. “Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 209–230. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1997b. “Emergence and Supervenience.” Intellectica 25(2): 25–43.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 1997c. “Classical Constituents in Smolensky’s ICS architecture.” in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science X: Logic and Scientific Methods – Volume Two of the Tenth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Florence, 1995, edited by Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Kees Doets, Daniele Mundici, and Johan van Benthem, pp. 331–344. Synthese Library n. 260. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2000a. “Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism about Belief and Desire.” Protosociology 14: 145–157.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2000b. “Herméneutique cosmique.” Philosophiques 27(1).
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2000c. “Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 74: 93–117.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2001. “In Defense of New Wave Materialism.” in Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by Carl Gillett and Barry C. Loewer, pp. 319–330. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2003a. “Colour, Consciousness, and Colour Consciousness.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 97–155. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2003b. “A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response to Block’s Harder Problem.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 163–204. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2003c. “The Place of Colour in Nature.” in Colour Perception. Mind and the physical world, edited by Rainer Mausfeld and Dieter Heyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2003d. “Vitalism and Emergence.” in The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945, edited by Thomas Baldwin, pp. 631–639. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2004a. “Computationalism, Connectionism, and the Philosophy of Mind.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information, edited by Luciano Floridi, pp. 135–151. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757017.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2004b. “Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs’ Puzzle.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 427–440. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2005a. “Mental Causation.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2005b. “Mind-Body Problem.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2005c. “Self-Knowledge.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2005d. “Supervenience.” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert, 2nd ed. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2007a. “On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 200–224. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2007b. “Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization.” Erkenntnis 67: 149–172.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2009. “Monothematic Delusions and Existential Feelings.” in Delusion and Self-Deception. Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation, edited by Tim[othy John] Bayne and Jordi Fernández, pp. 139–164. London: Routledge.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2010a. “Consciousness, Type Physicalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation.” in Philosophical Issues 20: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 266–304. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2010b. “The Representational vs. the Relational View of Visual Experience.” in The Metaphysics of Consciousness, edited by Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein, and Pauline Phemister, pp. 239–262. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2012a. “On Justifying Neurobiologism for Consciousness.” in New Perspectives on Type Identity. The Mental and the Physical, edited by Simone Gozzano and Christopher S. Hill, pp. 207–229. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2012b. “Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism [on Tye (2009)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84(1): 206–214.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2013. “Anomalous Monism.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 410–442. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2015. “Does Mental Causation Require Psychophysical Identities?” in Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World. Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim, edited by Terence E. Horgan, Marcelo Sabatés, and David Sosa, pp. 64–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139939539.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2016a. “The Skewed View from Here: Normal Geometrical Misperception.” Philosophical Topics 44(2): 231–299.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2016b. “Hill on Phenomenal Consciousness [on Hill (2014)].” Philosophical Studies 173(3): 851–860.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2017. “Mind Dust, Magic, or a Conceptual Gap Only?” in Panpsychism. Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, pp. 305–333. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199359943.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2019a. “Could an Android Be Sentient?” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 335–374. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2019b. “British Emergentism.” in The Routledge Handbook of Emergence, edited by Sophie C. Gibb, Robin Findlay Hendry, and Tom Lancaster, pp. 23–35. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
McLaughlin, Brian P. 2021. “Colour, Colour Experience, and the Mind-Body Problem.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 25–41. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
McLaughlin, Brian P., Beckermann, Ansgar and Walter, Sven, eds. 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Bennett, Karen. 2005. “Supervenience.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/supervenience/.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Bennett, Karen. 2011. “Supervenience.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/supervenience/.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Bennett, Karen. 2018. “Supervenience.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/supervenience/.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Bennett, Karen. 2023. “Supervenience.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/supervenience/.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Cohen, Jonathan, eds. 2007. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Cohen, Jonathan, eds. 2023. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2007), doi:10.1002/9781394259847.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Hawthorne, John. 1994. “Dennett’s Logical Behaviorism.” Philosophical Topics 22(1–2): 189–258.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Kornblith, Hilary, eds. 2016. Goldman and His Critics. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, eds. 1988a. Perspectives on Self-Deception. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg. 1988b. “Introduction.” in Perspectives on Self-Deception, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, pp. 1–9. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Rose, David. 2018. “On the Matter of Robot Minds.” in Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, volume II, edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, pp. 270–312. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815259.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998a. “Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge.” in Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 285–320. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998b. “Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?” The Philosophical Review 107(3): 349–380.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Tye, Michael. 1998c. “The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency.” in Externalism and Self-Knowledge, edited by Peter J. Ludlow and Norah M. Martin. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Warfield, F. 1994. “The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined.” Synthese 101: 365–400.

Further References

Fodor, Jerry A. 1998. In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Hill, Christopher S. 2014. Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199665822.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Tienson, John L., eds. 1991. Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Studies in Cognitive Systems n. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Macdonald, Cynthia and Macdonald, Graham F., eds. 1995. Connectionism – Debates on Psychological Explanation. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Smolensky, Paul. 1988. “The Constituent Structure of Connectionist Mental States: A Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 137–161. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 281–308).
Tye, Michael. 1988. “Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26(suppl.): 163–183. Reprinted in Horgan and Tienson (1991, 309–330).
Tye, Michael. 2009. Consciousness Revisited. Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 1994. Vagueness. Problems of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Williamson, Timothy. 2004. “Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy. A Reply to McGee and McLaughlin (1998).” Linguistics and Philosophy 27(1): 113–122.