Christopher Menzel (menzel-c)

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Bibliography

Andersen, William and Menzel, Christopher. 2004. “Modal Rigidity in the OntoClean Methodology.” in Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the Third International Conference (FOIS-2004), edited by Achille C. Varzi and Laure Vieu, pp. 119–127. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Bueno, Otávio, Menzel, Christopher and Zalta, Edward N. 2014. “Worlds and Propositions Set Free.” Erkenntnis 79(4): 797–820, doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9565-x.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986a. “On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds [on Bringsford (1985)].” Analysis 46(2): 68–72.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986b. “On the Iterative Explanation of the Paradoxes.” Philosophical Studies 49(1): 37–61.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986c. “A Complete, Type-free ‘Second-order’ Logic and Its Philosophical Foundations.” CSLI-86-40. Stanford, California: Center for the Study of Language; Information, http://web.stanford.edu/group/cslipublications/cslipublications/TechReports/CSLI-86-40.pdf.
Menzel, Christopher. 1990. “Actualism, Ontological Commitment and Possible World Semantics.” Synthese 85(3): 355–389.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991a. “The True Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 20(4): 331–374.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991b. “Structuralism and Conceptual Change in Mathematics.” in PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine, Micky Forbes, and Linda Wessels, pp. 397–401. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991c. “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge.” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 475–507. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993a. “Singular Propositions and Modal Logic.” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 113–148.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993b. “The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 61–87. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214116.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993c. “Possibilism and Object Theory.” Philosophical Studies 69(2–3): 195–208.
Menzel, Christopher. 1997. “Logic for an Objective Conception of Context.” in, pp. 136–145.
Menzel, Christopher. 1999. “The Objective Conception of Context and Its Logic.” Minds and Machines 9(1): 29–56.
Menzel, Christopher. 2000a. “Review of Copeland (1996).” The Philosophical Review 109(2): 281–286.
Menzel, Christopher. 2000b. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2000/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2005. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2008. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2011. “Knowledge Representation, the World Wide Web, and the Evolution of Logic.” Synthese 182(2): 269–295.
Menzel, Christopher. 2012. “Sets and Worlds Again.” Analysis 72(2): 304–309.
Menzel, Christopher. 2013. “Possible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/possible-worlds/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2014a. “Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception.” The Journal of Philosophy 111(2): 57–83.
Menzel, Christopher. 2014b. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2015. “Review of Hale (2013).” Philosophia Mathematica 23(3): 407–428.
Menzel, Christopher. 2016a. “Problems with the Bootstrapping Objection to Theistic Activism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(1): 55–68.
Menzel, Christopher. 2016b. “Possible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/possible-worlds/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2021. “Modal Set Theory.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 292–307. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Menzel, Christopher. 2022. “The Possibilism-Actualism Debate.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/possibilism-actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2024a. “Pure Logic and Higher-Order Metaphysics.” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 421–459. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0013.
Menzel, Christopher. 2024b. “The Possibilism-Actualism Debate.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/possibilism-actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher and Zalta, Edward N. 2014. “The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(2): 333–363, doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9265-z.

Further References

Bringsford, Selmer. 1985. “Are there Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?” Analysis 45(1): 64.
Copeland, B. Jack, ed. 1996. Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, Bob. 2013. Necessary Beings. An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.001.0001.