Two recent arguments draw startling and puzzling conclusions about relations and 2nd-order logic (2OL). The first argument concludes that 2nd-order quantifiers can’t be interpreted as ranging over relations. This conclusion is puzzling because it calls into question the traditional understanding of 2OL as a formalism for quantifying over relations. The second argument, which concludes that unwelcome consequences arise if relations and relatedness are analyzed rather than taken as primitive, utilizes premises that imply that 2OL faces the very same consequences. This is puzzling because relations and predication are taken as primitive in 2OL, and so the latter should be immune to the problems raised for the analysis of relations. I consider these two arguments in light of a precise theory of relations. In particular, I show that object theory [@zalta:1983; @zalta:1988], which is an extension of 2OL, provides systematic existence and identity conditions for relations, properties, and states of affairs that forestall the two arguments.
1 Setting Up the Problems
I take relations to be a fundamental kind of entity, and in this paper I investigate some of the principles needed to characterize them. Recently, philosophers have raised puzzling questions about converse and non-symmetric relations and about the states of affairs in which they play a role (Williamson 1985; Dorr 2004). In addressing these and other questions, some philosophers and philosophical logicians have attempted to analyze relations and the manner in which they relate. Such analyses, which sometimes appeal to other fundamental notions, raise questions of their own, such as whether or not there are positions (argument places, slots, or thematic roles) in a relation (Fine 2000; Gilmore 2013; Dixon 2018; and Orilia 2014, 2019); what it is for the relata to bear or stand in a relation; and whether there is an order of application or a manner of completion that connects relations and their relata.
In this paper, however, I take the notions of relation and relation application (i.e., predication) to be so fundamental that they can’t be further analyzed and so must instead be axiomatized. This starting point is analogous to that of the mathematics of set theory—the notions of set and set membership are considered so fundamental that the best we can do is axiomatize them. As with set theory, an axiomatic theory of relations has to state, at the very least, conditions under which the entities being axiomatized exist and conditions under which they are identical. In what follows, I’ll reprise just such a theory. It was first proposed in 1983 and was couched in a relatively simple extension of second-order logic (‘2OL’). The resulting system gives us the framework we need to address the most important questions that have been raised about relations, including some of the questions that arise when relations are analyzed.
My defense of relations is focused on two recent arguments
that draw rather puzzling conclusions for relations considered as
primitive, axiomatized entities. The first argument appears in a recent
paper by MacBride (2022, 1),
where he concludes, by way of a dilemma, that “we cannot interpret
second-order quantifiers as ranging over relations.” MacBride is not
claiming that relations don’t exist or that some other (e.g.,
ontologically more neutral) interpretation of 2nd-order quantifiers is
to be preferred, but rather that 2nd-order quantifiers can’t be
interpreted unproblematically as ranging over relations.1
This conclusion is startling because it calls into question the
traditional understanding of 2OL as a formalism for quantifying over
relations. Philosophers and logicians since Russell have supposed that
relational statements of natural language of the form ‘
The second argument and puzzling conclusion appear in MacBride (2014). On
the one hand, MacBride argues that relations, predication (relation
application), and relatedness should be taken as primitive (2014, 1, 2,
15), on the grounds that any analysis leads to unwelcome
consequences. On the other hand, the unwelcome consequences he describes
for the analysis of relations are already present in 2OL with identity
(2OL
I will argue that the capacity of a non-symmetric relation
to apply to the objects and it relates so that rather than must be taken as ultimate and irreducible. […] It’s a familiar thought that we cannot account for the fact that one thing bears a relation to another by appealing to a further relation relating to them—that way Bradley’s regress beckons. To avoid the regress we must recognize that a relation is not related to the things it relates, however language may mislead us to think otherwise. We simply have to accept as primitive, in the sense that it cannot be further explained, the fact that one thing bears a relation to another [citations omitted]. But it is not only the fact that one thing bears a (non-symmetric) relation to another that needs to be recognized as ultimate and irreducible. How applies—whether the way or the way—needs to be taken as primitive too. (MacBride 2014, 2, italics in original)
While this seems correct, the argument that MacBride gives for this
conclusion ensnares 2OL
(1) Every (binary) non-symmetric
relation
MacBride argues that any analysis of relations and relation
application that endorses (1) gives rise to
“unwelcome consequences,” namely, (a) a multiplicity of converse
relations3 and (b) “the profusion of states
that arise from the application of these relations” (2014, 4).
Consequence (a) is puzzling because 2OL
What vexes the understanding is […] an analysis of the fundamental fact that
for non-symmetric . […] Anyone who wishes to give an analysis of the fact that faces a dilemma. […] Since neither […] [of the] analyses are satisfactory, this recommends our taking the fact that to be primitive. (MacBride 2014, 8, italics in original)
[The full quote is provided later in the paper.] When we examine this (second) dilemma, we’ll see that there is an analysis that is immune to the dilemma and that MacBride doesn’t consider. One can unproblematically analyze the identity of states of affairs within a theory on which the fact that a state of affairs obtains is primitive.
My plan is as follows. In section 2, I lay out the first puzzling argument and conclusion, i.e., the dilemma used to establish that the 2nd-order quantifiers don’t range over relations. The argument begins by suggesting that if they do, then pairs of converse predicates either refer to the same relation or they don’t. Each disjunct leads to a horn of the dilemma. I then spend the remainder of section 2 showing that the first disjunct fails, so that we need not worry about the first horn. In section 3, I examine the argument that leads from the second disjunct to the second horn and narrow our focus to an issue on which the conclusion rests, namely, a question about the identity of certain states of affairs. In section 4, I examine the second puzzling argument and conclusion from MacBride’s (2014) paper and connect the argument there with the issue on which we focused in section 3. Then in section 5, I review a theory of relations and states of affairs that MacBride doesn’t consider but which has consequences for the issues we’ve developed. In section 6 and section 7, I use the theory in section 5 to develop two alternative analyses of the issue (about the identity of states of affairs) on which both of MacBride’s puzzling conclusions rest. I show that these answers undermine the main lines of argument that MacBride uses to establish his conclusions.
From this overview, it should be clear that in sections 2–4, we’ll extend 2OL in known ways that systematize the language that MacBride uses in his arguments. However, starting in section 5, I’ll appeal to the theory of abstract objects developed in Zalta (1983, 1988, 1993), which I henceforth refer to as ‘object theory’ (‘OT’).4 OT extends 2nd-order logic in a way that allows us to state unproblematic identity conditions for relations and states of affairs. So my goal throughout will be to show that 2OL has been deployed and extended to formulate a theory of relations, predication, and states of affairs that forestalls the puzzling conclusions.
Before we begin, however, it is important to review some terminology
and notation. ‘2OL’ refers only to the formal, axiomatic system of
second-order logic under an objectual interpretation (i.e., where the
quantifiers range over domains of entities). My arguments don’t require
that we interpret 2OL in terms of full models (where the domain
of properties has to be as large as the full power set of the domain of
individuals); instead, general models (where the domain of
properties is only as large as some proper subset of the power set of
the domain of individuals) suffice. The only requirement is that the
models validate the axioms of 2OL. In what follows, I’ll represent a
binary atomic predication as ‘
No explicit notion of order is required here; we only
require that ‘
In the next few sections, we shall extend 2OL in various ways, in
part to systematize the language that MacBride uses in his arguments.
We’ll start with 2OL
It is also important to spend some time explaining how we plan to use the technical term predicate. First, we shall almost always be discussing the predicates of 2OL that serve to represent the predicates of natural language sentences. But the predicates of 2OL are not the same kind of expression as the predicates of natural language. When speaking of natural language sentences, it is traditional to distinguish the “subject” of a sentence from the “predicate.” For example, in the sentence ‘John is happy’, ‘John’ is the subject and ‘is happy’ is the predicate; and in the sentence ‘John loves Mary’, ‘John’ is the subject and ‘loves Mary’ is the predicate. In the case of the latter sentence, one could also say that ‘loves’ is the predicate, while ‘John’ and ‘Mary’ are the subjects (though ‘Mary’ is often called the direct object). Thus, natural language predicates are not usually thought of as names or as nominalized expressions, for there is a sense in which these predicates are incomplete expressions.
But in what follows, we will be representing natural language predicates in terms of formal expressions that denote relations, and we’ll be calling those formal expressions ‘predicates’. Before I give the definition, however, let me mention that we shall not adopt the definition of predicate that MacBride introduces in the following passage (citing Dummett 1981, 38–39), in which he gives examples in terms of the expressions in a formal language:
[W]hat is a second-order predicate? A first-order predicate (say of the form ‘
’) results from the extraction of one or more names (‘ ’) from a closed sentence (‘ ’) in which it occurs and inserting a variable in the resulting gap. A second-order predicate (say, of the form ‘ ’) results from the extraction of a first-order predicate (‘ ’) from a closed sentence (‘ ’) and inserting a variable into the resulting gap. (MacBride 2022, 2–3)
In a footnote to this passage, MacBride makes it clear that open
formulas, such as ‘
I shall use the term ‘predicate’ to refer to a relation term
Thus, the predicates of 2OL and 2OL
Similarly, we shall not say that the open formulas ‘
2 The First Horn
We can now outline and investigate MacBride’s argument about the interpretation of the 2nd-order quantifiers. It proceeds under the reasonable assumption that 2nd-order quantification is a straightforward generalization of 1st-order quantification (MacBride 2022, 2). So let’s suppose that the 1st- and 2nd-order quantifiers range over (mutually exclusive) domains and that the axioms and inference rules of the 2nd-order quantifiers mirror those of the 1st-order quantifiers. MacBride’s argument, to the conclusion that we cannot interpret 2nd-order quantifiers as ranging over relations, goes by way of a dilemma. Let’s call this the Dilemma for Converses. He presents the dilemma as follows (MacBride 2022, 1–2):
Dilemma for Converses
Either pairs of mutually converse predicates, such as ‘is on top of ’ and ‘ is underneath ’, refer to the same underlying relation or they refer to distinct converse relations. If they refer to the same relation, then we lack the supply of the higher-order predicates required to interpret second-order quantifiers as ranging over a domain of relations. […] If, by contrast, mutually converse predicates refer to distinct converse relations, then whilst we can at least make abstract sense of the higher-order predicates required to interpret quantifiers as ranging over a domain of relations, the implausible consequences for the content of lower-order constructions render this interpretation of higher-order quantifiers a deeply implausible semantic hypothesis
We need not state the full argument for each horn of the dilemma now
because it can be shown that, given the reasonable assumption that
non-symmetric relations exist, the condition leading to the first horn
of the Dilemma for
Converses doesn’t hold in 2OL
Since MacBride’s argument in the Dilemma for Converses involves claims about converse relations, let us define:
is a converse of if and only if, for any objects and , and exemplify iff and exemplify , i.e.,
(2)
In addition, the argument in the Dilemma for Converses concerns the identity
and distinctness of converses and so involves statements of the form
‘
(3)
Any predicates that witness this claim will show that not all predicates for converses denote the same underlying relation.
Though (3) is not a theorem of 2OL
is non-symmetric if and only if it is not the case that for any objects and , if and exemplify , then and exemplify , i.e.,10
(4)
Given this definition, the assumption and theorem needed to establish (3) may be represented as follows:
(5)
(6)
As mentioned above, (5) is a reasonable
assumption that MacBride adopts in his paper. So if we can show that (6), i.e., the formal representation of (1), is a theorem of 2OL
2.1 The Reasoning
Two facts about 2OL
Second, where
Comprehension Principle for Relations
(CP)
We may read this as: there exists an
Before we show how 2OL
(Any given property) has a negation.
(Any given properties) and have a conjunction.
There is a property that objects exemplify whenever a binary relation is projected into its first argument place.
And in the binary case, (CP) has instances like the following:
(Any given relation) has a converse.
Since these claims hold for any relations
But in fact, the smallest models of 2OL and 2OL
So if we don’t add any distinguished, theoretical properties and
relations, 2OL
Of course, (6) can still be true even if there
are no non-symmetric relations, by failure of the antecedent. But the
key fact is not that (6) is true independently of
the existence of non-symmetric relations, but that it is derivable as a
theorem. The proof doesn’t depend on the existence of non-symmetric
relations, doesn’t employ any analysis of predication, and doesn’t
require any particular semantic interpretation of the domain over which
the relation variables range. I’ve put the proof in a footnote.13 So the formal representation of (1), namely, (6), is a theorem
of 2OL
But the combination of (6) with the reasonable
assumption (5) yields the conclusion that there
are mutually converse predicates that don’t refer to the same underlying
relation. For let ‘
2.2 Simplifying the Reasoning
Before we turn to the second horn of MacBride’s Dilemma for
Converses in section 3, it is
relevant, and of significant interest, that (1)
can be represented, and its proof developed much more elegantly, if we
add
By adding
This asserts:
To see how this works, instantiate this theorem to an arbitrary
binary relation
As previously mentioned, (
We can use
(7)
Note how this definition immediately implies that every relation has
a converse, where this is expressible as
(8)
Again, I’ve put the proof in a footnote,21
and I encourage the reader to compare the proof of (8) in footnote 21 with the
proof of (6) in footnote 13
to confirm how
Thus, when we add
3 The Second Horn
MacBride’s Dilemma for
Converses concludes that the quantifiers of 2OL don’t range
over relations, and we’ve now seen that the first horn of the dilemma
fails in 2OL
But even if pairs of mutually converse relations are admitted, thus avoiding the difficulties that arose from dispensing with them, higher-order predicates of the form ‘
’ are still required for the intelligibility of quantification into the positions of converse predicates, i.e., higher-order predicates capable of being true or false of a relation belonging to the domain independently of how that relation is specified. […] [D]o we have an understanding of higher-order predicates of the form ‘ ’ which will enable us to interpret second-order quantification as quantification over a domain of relations? I will argue that we don’t. (2022, 14)
Before we look at the specific way in which MacBride argues for this conclusion, let’s first make the language that MacBride needs to present his argument a bit more precise.
3.1 Third-Order Language and Logic (3OL)
I shall suppose that MacBride’s language is 3rd-order, since he wants
to formulate higher-order predicates capable of being true or false of
relations. If we use
In 3OL,
(Monadic) Third‑Order
I.e.,
(9)
With this formalization in mind, we can return to MacBride’s argument.
MacBride argues that in order for ‘
3.2 The First Argument for the Second Horn
The first proposal that MacBride considers, and rejects, appeals to
the determinate-determinable distinction. Earlier in his paper, he
defined ‘
[1] Alexander is on top of Bucephalus.
[8]
He says, in connection with these sentences:
If ‘Alexander
Bucephalus’ has purely determinable significance, then ‘Bucephalus Alexander’ does too, but they will mean the same. The latter will stand for a property that a relation has if it relates Bucephalus and Alexander in some manner or other. But a relation has the property of relating Bucephalus and Alexander in some manner or other iff it has the property of relating Alexander and Bucephalus in some manner or other—because the property of relating some things in some manner or other is order-indifferent. (2022, 15)
He then draws the conclusion that we can’t explain the valid inference from [1] to [8] given this analysis, for whereas [1] says that on top of has the order-indifferent property of relating Alexander and Bucephalus in some manner or other, [8] says that this relation doesn’t have that property.
MacBride quite rightly rejects the suggestion that ‘
Instead, we can see that ‘
(10)
(11)
(12)
These are not schemata. (10) says:
relation
Thus, ‘Alexander
3.3 The Second Argument for the Second Horn
The next proposal that MacBride considers and rejects is the
suggestion that we understand ‘
Let’s grant that the entailment holds. Then we can respond to the
argument by showing that we do have a grasp of the higher-order
predicates required to understand quantification over relations.
Fortunately, we don’t have to go through the extended argument in detail
because we can demonstrate that our grasp of these higher-order
predicates is embodied by (3
Clearly, (3
MacBride does seem to recognize that (3
Might there be an alternative interpretation of higher-order predicates of the form ‘
’ over which we have more control and which will facilitate an interpretation of second-order quantifiers as ranging over a domain of relations? The ordinary language construction ‘—bears---to___’, as it figures in [14] Alexander bears a great resemblance to Philip,
might appear to be a promising candidate for a construction in which our understanding of a predicate of the form ‘
’ might be rooted. Roughly speaking, the idea is that a relation satisfies the predicate ‘ ’ just in case bears to , whereas satisfies ‘ ’ just in case bears to . (2022, 22–23)
MacBride then argues against this idea (2022, 23–24). But I will not examine the
details of this particular argument, for it appears to challenge the
intelligibility of a well-known logical principle, namely,
Note that one can’t reject (3
By systematizing the distinction between an open formula such as
‘
So if (3
Now in the present paper, we’re not committed to reading the
formula ‘
Since second-order logic permits existential quantification into the positions of symmetric predicates, it follows—assuming the proposed interpretation of higher-order predicates—that atomic statements in which symmetric predicates occur attribute to symmetric relations the property of applying to the things they relate in an order. But it is far from plausible that they do. Consider, for example,
[9] Darius differs from Alexander
and
[10] Alexander differs from Darius.
If predicates of the form ‘
’ mean what they’re proposed to mean, then [9] says that the relation picked out by ‘ differs from ’ applies to Darius first and Alexander second, whereas [10] says that it applies to Alexander first and Darius second. But, as both linguists and philosophers have reflected, prima facie statements like [9] and [10] don’t say different things but are distinguished solely by the linguistic arrangements of their terms. (2022, 17)
Although MacBride cites a number of authorities for his last claim, he also mentions that Russell (1903, para. 94) argued against it and for the view that statements like [9] and [10] express distinct propositions.
Before I examine this argument, let me return to one issue. I don’t
accept that [9] says what MacBride claims
it says. [9] does not say, nor can
one derive in 2OL or 3OL that it says, “the relation picked out
by ‘
Clearly, the crux of MacBride’s argument in the above passage is his
view that [9] and [10] don’t say different things. But surely
there is at least a sense of ‘says’ in which [9] and [10] do
say different things. If we ignore the particular symmetric relation
involved and consider a non-symmetric relation, then to say ‘John loves
Mary’ is not to say ‘Mary loves John’. So MacBride’s argument must turn
on a notion of ‘says’ in which [9] and [10] say the same thing. For the purposes of
discussion, the notion in question has to be something like “denote the
same state of affairs.” He is convinced that they do, whereas I think
this isn’t at all clear. The point at issue concerns the identity of
states of affairs; if one allows, for example, that necessarily
equivalent states of affairs may be distinct, it is by no means a fact
that [9] and [10] say the same thing.25
Indeed, I hope to show in what follows that as long as we have a clear
theory of relations and states of affairs (something that can be
developed without the resources of 3OL), one can both (a)
challenge the suggestion that [9] and [10] denote the same state of affairs
and (b) argue that even if we leave the question open, we can
still understand the application conditions of ‘
But before we turn to the theory of relations and states of affairs that support this position, the second puzzling conclusion mentioned at the outset of the paper, namely, the conclusion in MacBride (2014), becomes relevant. For the argument in that paper also turns, at least in part, on the question of the identity of states of affairs.
4 The Second Puzzling Conclusion
To state the second puzzling conclusion, which occurs in MacBride (2014), we
have to recall the second of the three degrees of relatedness that
MacBride distinguishes in that paper. He says, where
Let me begin by suggesting that the superfluity of converse relations
is not the main objection of the two. For recall that the conclusion in
MacBride (2014) is
that we should take relations and relation application as primitive.
Since these notions are primitive in 2OL
So the real problem about the fact that non-symmetric relations have distinct converses concerns the “profusion” of states of affairs. MacBride rehearses this problem by considering on and under, both of which are asymmetric (and hence non-symmetric if there are objects that stand in those relations):
It’s one kind of undertaking to put the cat on the mat, something else to put the mat under the cat, but however we go about it we end up with the same state. To bring the cat to the forefront of our audience’s attention we describe this state by saying that the cat is on the mat; to bring the mat into the conversational foreground we say that the mat is under the cat. But whether it’s the cat we mention first, or the mat, what we succeed in describing is the very same cat-mat orientation. That’s intuitive but if—as the second degree describes—a non-symmetric relation and its converse are distinct, we must be demanding something different from the world, a different state, when we describe the application of the above relation to the cat and the mat from when we describe the application of the below relation to the mat and the cat. (2014, 4)
The worry is that converse relations commit us to the principle that
if
(13)
This, it is claimed, is counterintuitive, and MacBride cites Fine (2000) in support of his claim.29 If this is the concern, why not adopt the following principle instead:
- For any binary relation
, necessarily, if is non-symmetric, then for any and , the state of affairs x and y exemplify F is identical to the state of affairs y and x exemplify , i.e.,
(14)
The answer MacBride gives is (2014, 4):
We might attempt to defend the second degree by maintaining that the application of
and does not give rise to different states with respect to the same relata but different decompositions of the same state. So whilst above and below are distinct, the relational configuration cat-above-mat is a decomposition of the same state as the configuration mat-below-cat. But these decompositions comprise what are ultimately different constituents—a non-symmetric relation and its converse are supposed to be distinct existences. But now we have the difficulty of explaining how such different decompositions can give rise to a single state.
So, again, the problem being raised is about the identity of states of affairs. In these cases, MacBride is confident that there is a single state involved.
Note that we’ve now connected up the issue on which MacBride’s (2022) paper
turns with the issue on which his (2014) paper turns, namely, the identity
of states of affairs. What gives rise to this problem is that 2OL and
2OL
It is reasonable to suppose that the state of affairs there is a
barber who shaves all and only those who don’t shave themselves
(
So whereas both of the above definitions might be used to explain why
MacBride, as noted at the outset, finalizes this problem for any analysis of the identity (or non-identity) of states of affairs as a dilemma. We earlier provided an edited version of the argument to give the reader the general idea. But the passage posing the dilemma goes as follows, in full:
What vexes the understanding is the difficulty of disentangling one degree of relatedness from another when we try to provide an analysis of the fundamental fact that
for non-symmetric . We can usefully distinguish, albeit in a rough and ready sense, between two analytic strategies for explaining this fundamental fact—that the world exhibits relatedness in the first degree. Intrinsic analyses aim to account for the fact that by appealing to features of those states themselves; extrinsic analyses attempt to account for their difference by appealing to features that aren’t wholly local to them. Anyone who wishes to give an analysis of the fact that faces a dilemma. If they adopt the intrinsic strategy then they will find it difficult to avoid a commitment to either ’s converse or an inherent order in which applies to the things it relates. Alternatively our would-be analyst can avoid entangling the first degree with the second and third by adopting the extrinsic strategy. But this approach embroils us in other unwelcome consequences. Since neither intrinsic nor extrinsic analyses are satisfactory, this recommends our taking the fact that to be primitive. (2014, 8, italics in original)
I think MacBride reaches this conclusion because he doesn’t have a
precise theory of relations and states of affairs to provide an answer.
In the remainder of the paper, I show how object theory (OT) takes
5 The Theory of Relations and States of Affairs
This section can be skipped by those familiar with OT since the
material contained herein has been outlined and explained in a number of
publications (e.g.,
Zalta 1983, 1988, 1993; Bueno, Menzel and
Zalta 2014; Menzel and Zalta 2014, and others). For
those completely unfamiliar with it, OT may be sketched briefly by
saying that it extends 2OL, not 2OL
But the key principle for abstract objects is the comprehension
schema that asserts, for any condition (formula)
(15)
Here are some instances, expressed in technical English:
There exists an abstract object that encodes all and only the properties that
exemplifies.There exists an abstract object that encodes just the property
.There is an abstract object that encodes all the properties necessarily implied by
.There is an abstract object that encodes all and only the propositional properties constructed out of true propositions.
And so on. Intuitively, for any group of properties you can specify to describe an abstract object, there is an abstract object that encodes just those properties and no others.
The other principles of this theory that will play an important role
in what follows are the definitions of identity for individuals and the
principles (existence and identity conditions) for relations. First, the
theory of identity for individuals includes a definition stipulating
that
(16)
Second, the theory of relations consists of existence and
identity conditions for relations. The existence conditions are
derived since OT includes the resources of the relational
Modal
Comprehension for Relations (
When
In other words, any formula free of encoding conditions can be used
to produce a well-formed instance of (
The identity conditions for relations are stated by cases: (a) for
properties
- Properties
and are identical if and only if and are necessarily encoded by the same objects, i.e.,
(17)
-ary relations and ( ) are identical just in case, for any objects, every way of applying and to those objects results in identical properties, i.e.,
(18)
- States of affairs
and are identical whenever (the property) being an individual such that is identical to (the property) being an individual such that , i.e.,
(19)
From these definitions, it can be shown that the reflexivity of
identity holds universally, i.e., that
Since (
6 Asserting the Identity of States
Recall that the puzzling conclusion reached in MacBride’s (2022) paper
turned on the question of whether the states of affairs denoted by [9] and [10] are
the same or distinct. This question can now be posed without discussing
the converses of relations and without invoking 3OL. Let
Does this mean we don’t understand the open formula ‘
Second, OT doesn’t require a formal semantics to be intelligible,
just as ZF is intelligible when we express its primitive notions and
axioms within first-order logic. The axioms and theorems of OT give us
an understanding of the open formula ‘
So if one is inclined to accept MacBride’s view that the states of affairs expressed by [9] and [10] are identical, one should then be inclined to accept the following general principle:
(20)
(20) is consistent with OT. We need not
conclude that the open formula ‘
This generalizes to non-symmetric relations. For recall the objection to (14), which is the claim:
(14)
The problem with (14), according to
MacBride, is to explain how different decompositions can give rise to
the same state (2014, 4; quoted
above). But no such explanation is needed, since the identity of
states of affairs is not a matter of decompositions and constituents. If
Why does this address the difficulty in MacBride (2014, 4)? The answer: because we’re not
attempting to explain how “distinct existences” (i.e., a
non-symmetric relation
By adopting (14), one can use
OT’s theory of identity for states of affairs to give a precise,
theoretical answer to a philosophical question (“Under what conditions
are states of affairs identical?”) which, if left unanswered, would
leave one open to MacBride’s concerns about the intelligibility of 2OL
and 2OL
Before we turn, finally, to the intuition that states of affairs like
those expressed by [9] and [10] are distinct, there is one other way to
formulate the concern that MacBride has raised, given his understanding
of the identity of states of affairs. Consider the property
(A) What is the relationship between
the states of affairs
If you accept MacBride’s view about the identity of states of affairs, then you would answer (A) by adopting the following principles:
(21)
(22)
From these principles, it also follows, by the transitivity of
identity, that
I’m not suggesting that this is the only or best answer to (A) because there may be contexts where one might wish
to distinguish these states of affairs (see section 7). But the general point is clear. Some
precise, axiomatized theories leave open certain questions of identity,
and those questions can be answered by looking for principles rather
than questioning whether the quantifiers of the theory range over the
entities being axiomatized. ZFC has precise identity conditions for sets
but leaves open the Continuum Hypothesis
(‘CH’), and yet we can still interpret the quantifiers in set theory as
ranging over sets. CH can be formulated as the claim
As it turns out, there is an alternative way to respond to the
problems MacBride has raised. It may be of interest to some readers to
consider what happens to his arguments if one instead asserts that
one may alternatively assert these non-identities;
one can account for the intuition that there is one part of the world that makes these distinct states true when they are true; and, consequently,
one can disarm the worry about a “profusion” of states of affairs and clear the path for understanding the quantifiers of 2OL and 2OL
as quantifying over relations.
7 Distinct States, One Situation
What is driving MacBride’s certainty that (a)
(13)
But notice that the cases MacBride (and Fine) discuss involve
necessarily non-symmetric relations, such as on, on top
of, above, etc. So when we instantiate (13) to a necessarily non-symmetric relation, say
The real problem is now laid bare: the hyperintensionality of states
of affairs appears to undermine the intuition that in these cases, there
is only one piece of the world (e.g., one cat-mat orientation)
that accounts for the truth of the relational claims ‘
(23)
And the concern extends generally to principles such as the following, which would govern every binary relation:
(24)
(25)
In each case, a “profusion” of states of affairs will arise, for it
can be shown (a) that (
So if one accepts (13) and (23)–(25), can we
account for the intuition that there is only one piece of the world in
virtue of which the necessarily-equivalent-but-distinct states of
affairs are true when they are true? To answer this question, we shall
not invoke “decompositions” and “constituents,” for the identity for
states of affairs is given by (19). But we
can address the intuition driving MacBride, Fine, and no doubt
others, by appealing to the notion of a situation and defining
the conditions under which a state of affairs
In OT (Zalta 1993,
410), situations are defined as abstract objects that encode
only properties constructed out of states of affairs, i.e., encode only
properties
(26)
A situation, thus defined, is not a mere mereological sum because
encoding is a mode of predication; a situation is therefore
characterized by the state-of-affairs properties of the form
(27)
In what follows, therefore, we sometimes extend the notion of
encoding by saying that
Now consider some state of affairs, say
(28)
Let
(29)
Since
Two modal facts about
- A state of affairs obtains in
if and only if it is necessarily implied by , i.e.,
(30)
is modally closed in the following sense: for any states of affairs and , if obtains in and necessarily implies , then obtains in , i.e.,
(31)
The proof of (30) is straightforward and,
interestingly, relies on the object-theoretic definition for the
identity for states of affairs (19).44 Note that it immediately follows
from (30) that
The proof of (31) is left to a footnote.45
It is an immediate consequence of (30) that:
if
is necessarily non-symmetric, then obtains in , for it is necessarily equivalent to, and so necessarily implied by, ;if
is necessarily symmetric, then obtains in , for it is necessarily equivalent to, and so necessarily implied by, ; andif
is any binary relation whatsoever, then and both obtain in , since these are both necessarily equivalent to, and so necessarily implied by, .
Moreover, when
It is interesting to observe that in each of the above scenarios, any one of the necessarily equivalent states of affairs in question can be used to define the unique situation in which they all obtain. The resulting situations become identified, since it is a theorem of modal logic that necessarily equivalent states of affairs necessarily imply the same states of affairs:
(32)
To see why this fact helps us to show that the resulting situations
are all identified, consider the case of necessarily non-symmetric
This is the (provably unique) situation that makes all and only the
states of affairs necessarily implied by
But OT implies that
Finally, to account for the intuition that the situation in which the
necessarily equivalent states obtain is part of the actual
world, we turn to the principles (theorems and definitions) governing
part of, actual situations, and possible
worlds. Since “
OT then yields, as theorems (Zalta 1993, Theorem 18 and 19):
There is a unique actual world, i.e.,
Every actual situation is a part of the actual world, i.e.,
The proof of the first theorem rests on the fact that there is a
unique situation that encodes all and only the states of affairs that
obtain, i.e., there is a unique situation
So the canonical situations that exist in each of the examples validate the following claims:
When
is necessarily non-symmetric and obtains, there is a unique situation that (a) encodes all and only the states of affairs necessarily implied by , (b) is actual, (c) is a part of the actual world, and (d) makes both and true.When
is necessarily symmetric and obtains, there is a unique situation that (a) encodes all and only the states of affairs necessarily implied by , (b) is actual, (c) is a part of the actual world, and (d) makes both and true.When
is any binary relation and obtains, there is a unique situation that (a) encodes all and only the states of affairs necessarily implied by , (b) is actual, (c) is a part of the actual world, and (d) makes , , and true.
This addresses the intuition that served as the obstacle to treating
states of affairs as hyperintensional entities. It lays to rest the
claim that we don’t understand the open formula ‘
The foregoing analysis therefore preserves the conclusion that Russell developed concerning non-symmetric relations when he said (1903, para. 219) regarding the terms greater and less:
These two words have certainly each a meaning, even when no terms are mentioned as related by them. And they certainly have different meanings, and are certainly relations. Hence if we are to hold that “
is greater than ” and “ is less than ” are the same proposition, we shall have to maintain that both greater and less enter into each of these propositions, which seems obviously false.
One might reframe Russell’s point by noting that if non-synonymous relational expressions signify or denote different relations, then the simple statements we can make using those expressions signify different states of affairs. That principle has been preserved, without sacrificing any contrary intuitions.
8 Conclusion
I think relations and predication are so fundamental that they cannot be analyzed in more basic terms. They can only be axiomatized, and the most elegant formalism we have for doing so is the language of 2OL. The suggestion that the quantifiers of 2OL can’t range over relations doesn’t get any purchase against OT. The latter is a friendly extension of 2OL and provides 2OL with the additional expressive power needed to assert a precise theory of relations and states of affairs that includes plausible existence and identity conditions for these entities. OT therefore offers a natural formalism for intelligibly quantifying over relations and states of affairs and thus provides a deeper understanding of the open and quantified formulas of 2OL. So the suggestion that the quantifiers of 2OL can’t be interpreted as ranging over relations fails to engage with at least one theory that shows that they can and, without any heroic measures, do.
Edward N. Zalta
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6488-3496
Stanford University
zalta@stanford.edu
Acknowledgements
I’d like to thank Fraser MacBride and Jan Plate, who read drafts and contributed insightful comments that helped me to better understand the arguments and avoid errors of interpretation; Uri Nodelman, who read through the penultimate draft and made a number of important suggestions for improvement; Daniel Kirchner, who used his implementation of object theory in Isabelle/HOL to confirm that certain claims proposed in the paper are consistent with object theory; Chris Menzel and Bernie Linsky, for interesting discussions about the paper; and finally, the anonymous referees at Dialectica for the comments on the first submission that led to a much better final version.
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Other Articles from this Special Issue
- Jan Plate: Quo Vadis, Metaphysics of Relations? (html, pdf)
- Scott Thomas Dixon: Directionalism and Relations of Arbitrary Symmetry (html, pdf)
- Joop Leo: Reconciling Positionalism and Anti-Positionalism (html, pdf)
- Fraser MacBride: Converse Predicates and the Interpretation of Second Order Quantification (html, pdf)
- Francesco Orilia: Converse Relations and the Sparse-Abundant Distinction (html, pdf)
- Fraser MacBride and Francesco Orilia: Non-Symmetric Relation Names (html, pdf)
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