Christopher Menzel (menzel-c)

Auf folgenden Portalseiten erwähnt

Zitiert in den folgenden Artikeln

Beiträge zu Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Andersen, William and Menzel, Christopher. 2004. “Modal Rigidity in the OntoClean Methodology.” in Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the Third International Conference (FOIS-2004), edited by Achille C. Varzi and Laure Vieu, pp. 119–127. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
Bueno, Otávio, Menzel, Christopher and Zalta, Edward N. 2014. “Worlds and Propositions Set Free.” Erkenntnis 79(4): 797–820, doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9565-x.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986a. “On Set Theoretic Possible Worlds [on Bringsford (1985)].” Analysis 46(2): 68–72.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986b. “On the Iterative Explanation of the Paradoxes.” Philosophical Studies 49(1): 37–61.
Menzel, Christopher. 1986c. “A Complete, Type-free ‘Second-order’ Logic and Its Philosophical Foundations.” CSLI-86-40. Stanford, California: Center for the Study of Language; Information, http://web.stanford.edu/group/cslipublications/cslipublications/TechReports/CSLI-86-40.pdf.
Menzel, Christopher. 1990. “Actualism, Ontological Commitment and Possible World Semantics.” Synthese 85(3): 355–389.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991a. “The True Modal Logic.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 20(4): 331–374.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991b. “Structuralism and Conceptual Change in Mathematics.” in PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposium Papers, edited by Arthur I. Fine, Micky Forbes, and Linda Wessels, pp. 397–401. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Menzel, Christopher. 1991c. “Temporal Actualism and Singular Foreknowledge.” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 475–507. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993a. “Singular Propositions and Modal Logic.” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 113–148.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993b. “The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-Grained Intensional Logic.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 61–87. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214116.
Menzel, Christopher. 1993c. “Possibilism and Object Theory.” Philosophical Studies 69(2–3): 195–208.
Menzel, Christopher. 1997. “Logic for an Objective Conception of Context.” in, pp. 136–145.
Menzel, Christopher. 1999. “The Objective Conception of Context and Its Logic.” Minds and Machines 9(1): 29–56.
Menzel, Christopher. 2000a. “Review of Copeland (1996).” The Philosophical Review 109(2): 281–286.
Menzel, Christopher. 2000b. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2000/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2005. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2005/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2008. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2011. “Knowledge Representation, the World Wide Web, and the Evolution of Logic.” Synthese 182(2): 269–295.
Menzel, Christopher. 2012. “Sets and Worlds Again.” Analysis 72(2): 304–309.
Menzel, Christopher. 2013. “Possible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/possible-worlds/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2014a. “Wide Sets, ZFCU, and the Iterative Conception.” The Journal of Philosophy 111(2): 57–83.
Menzel, Christopher. 2014b. “Actualism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2015. “Review of Hale (2013).” Philosophia Mathematica 23(3): 407–428.
Menzel, Christopher. 2016a. “Problems with the Bootstrapping Objection to Theistic Activism.” American Philosophical Quarterly 53(1): 55–68.
Menzel, Christopher. 2016b. “Possible Worlds.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/possible-worlds/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2021. “Modal Set Theory.” in The Routledge Handbook of Modality, edited by Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, pp. 292–307. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Menzel, Christopher. 2022. “The Possibilism-Actualism Debate.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/possibilism-actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher. 2024a. “Pure Logic and Higher-Order Metaphysics.” in Higher-Order Metaphysics, edited by Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones, pp. 421–459. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894885.003.0013.
Menzel, Christopher. 2024b. “The Possibilism-Actualism Debate.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/possibilism-actualism/.
Menzel, Christopher and Zalta, Edward N. 2014. “The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 43(2): 333–363, doi:10.1007/s10992-012-9265-z.

Further References

Bringsford, Selmer. 1985. “Are there Set Theoretic Possible Worlds?” Analysis 45(1): 64.
Copeland, B. Jack, ed. 1996. Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, Bob. 2013. Necessary Beings. An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669578.001.0001.