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Alan Millar (millar-a)

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Bibliography

    Bermúdez, José-Luis and Millar, Alan, eds. 2002a. Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory of Rationality. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256839.001.0001.
    Bermúdez, José-Luis and Millar, Alan. 2002b. Introduction.” in Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory of Rationality, edited by José-Luis Bermúdez and Alan Millar, pp. 1–14. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256839.001.0001.
    Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2009. Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
    Haddock, Adrian, Millar, Alan and Pritchard, Duncan, eds. 2010. Social Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 1985a. Where’s the Use in Meaning? Dialectica 39(1): 35–52.
    Millar, Alan. 1985b. What’s in a Look? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86: 83–97.
    Millar, Alan. 1991a. Reasons and Experience. Great Books in Philosophy. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198242703.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 1991b. Concepts, Experience, and Inference.” Mind 100: 495–505.
    Millar, Alan. 1996a. Sensibility and Understanding.” Inquiry 39(3–4): 459–478.
    Millar, Alan. 1996b. The Idea of Experience.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96: 75–90. Reprinted in Byrne and Logue (2009, 137–152).
    Millar, Alan. 1998. Mill on Religion.” in The Cambridge Companion to Mill, edited by John Skorupski, pp. 176–202. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Millar, Alan. 2001. Rationality and Higher-Order Intentionality.” in Naturalism, Evolution and Mind, edited by Denis M. Walsh, pp. 179–198. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 49. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Millar, Alan. 2002a. The Normativity of Meaning.” in Logic, Thought and Language, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 57–73. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Millar, Alan. 2002b. Reasons for Action and Instrumental Rationnality.” in Reason and Nature. Essays in the Theory of Rationality, edited by José-Luis Bermúdez and Alan Millar, pp. 113–132. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199256839.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2004. Understanding People. Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199254408.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2005. Travis’ Sense of Occasion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 55(219).
    Millar, Alan. 2007a. The State of Knowing.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 179–196. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Millar, Alan. 2007b. What the Disjunctivist Is Right About.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(1): 176–198.
    Millar, Alan. 2008a. Perceptual-Recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge.” in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, edited by Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 330–347. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231546.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2008b. Disjunctivism and Skepticism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, edited by John Greco, pp. 581–603. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2009a. How Reasons for Action Differ from Reasons for Belief.” in Spheres of Reason. New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, edited by Simon Robertson, pp. 140–163. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2009b. What is it that Cognitive Abilities are Abilities to Do? Acta Analytica 24(4): 223–236.
    Millar, Alan. 2010a. Knowing from Being Told.” in Social Epistemology, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 175–193. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2010b. Knowledge and Recognition.” in The Nature and Value of Knowledge. Three Investigations, pp. 91–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2011a. How Visual Perception Yields Reasons for Belief.” in Philosophical Issues 21: The Epistemology of Perception, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 332–351. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Millar, Alan. 2011b. Why Knowledge Matters.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 85: 63–81.
    Millar, Alan. 2011c. Knowledge and Reasons for Belief.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 223–243. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Millar, Alan. 2012. Scepticism, Perceptual Knowledge, and Doxastic Responsibility.” Synthese 189(2): 353–372.
    Millar, Alan. 2014a. Reasons for Belief, Perception, and Reflective Knowledge.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88: 1–19.
    Millar, Alan. 2014b. Perceptual Knowledge and Background Beliefs.” in Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, pp. 128–148. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658343.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2016a. Abilities, Competences, and Fallibility.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 62–82. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan. 2016b. Perceptual Knowledge and Well-Founded Belief.” Episteme 13(1): 43–59.
    Millar, Alan. 2017a. Berkeley’s Puzzle [Review of Campbell and Cassam (2014)].” Analysis 77(1): 232–242.
    Millar, Alan. 2017b. Perceptual Recognition and Strange Environments: Reply to Broncano-Berrocal (2016).” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117(2): 207–214.
    Millar, Alan. 2018. Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational? [Critical Notice of Siegel (2018)].” Mind 127(505): 251–263.
    Millar, Alan. 2019. Knowing by Perceiving. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198755692.001.0001.
    Millar, Alan, Haddock, Adrian and Pritchard, Duncan. 2009. Introduction.” in Epistemic Value, edited by Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 1–17. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231188.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan, Millar, Alan and Haddock, Adrian. 2010. The Nature and Value of Knowledge. Three Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001.

Further References