Diana Raffman (raffman)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Hyde, Dominic and Raffman, Diana. 2018. “Sorites Paradox.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/sorites-paradox/.
Raffman, Diana. 1991. “The Meaning of Music.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 16: Philosophy and the Arts, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 360–377. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Raffman, Diana. 1994. “Vagueness without Paradox.” The Philosophical Review 103(1): 41–74.
Raffman, Diana. 1995. “On the Persistence of Phenomenology.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 293–308. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Raffman, Diana. 1996. “Vagueness and Context-Relativity.” Philosophical Studies 81: 175–192.
Raffman, Diana. 1998. “First-Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs.” in Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 363–370. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199241406.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2000. “Is Perceptual Indiscriminability Nontransitive?” Philosophical Topics 28(1): 153–176.
Raffman, Diana. 2003. “Is Twelve-Tone Music Artistically Defective?” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 27: Meaning in the Arts, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 69–87. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Raffman, Diana. 2005a. “Some Thoughts about Thinking About Consciousness [Papineau (2004)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(1): 163–170.
Raffman, Diana. 2005b. “Borderline Cases and Bivalence.” The Philosophical Review 114(1): 1–31.
Raffman, Diana. 2005c. “Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan (2005).” Philosophical Studies 122(2): 189–202.
Raffman, Diana. 2008. “From the Looks of Things: The Explanatory Failure of Representationalism.” in The Case for Qualia, edited by Edmond Leo Wright, pp. 325–340. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2010a. “Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness.” in Cuts and Clouds. Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic, edited by Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, pp. 509–522. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570386.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2010b. “Can we do without Concepts? Comments on Machery (2009).” Philosophical Studies 149(3): 423–427.
Raffman, Diana. 2011. “Music, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science.” in The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music, edited by Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania, pp. 592–602. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Raffman, Diana. 2012. “Indiscriminability and Phenomenal Continua.” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 309–322. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phpe.12017.
Raffman, Diana. 2014a. Unruly Words. A Study of Vague Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199915101.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2014b. “Disjunctivism, Discrimination, and Categorization.” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 179–197. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2015. “Similarity Spaces.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, edited by Mohan Matthen, pp. 679–693. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.001.0001.
Raffman, Diana. 2016. “Vagueness in Law: Placing the Blame Where It’s Due.” in Vagueness and Law. Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, edited by Geert Keil and Ralf Poscher, pp. 49–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raffman, Diana. 2021. “Truth, Vagueness, and Semantics.” in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, edited by Derek Henry Brown and Fiona Macpherson, pp. 69–80. Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781351048521.
Raffman, Diana and Shapiro, Stewart. 2003. “Review of Keefe (2000).” The Philosophical Review 112(2): 260.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Raffman, Diana and Asher, Nicholas, eds. 1995. Modality, Morality, and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further References

Graham, George and Horgan, Terence E. 2005. “Mary Mary, ‘Au Contraire’: Reply to Raffman (2005c).” Philosophical Studies 122(2): 203–212.
Keefe, Rosanna. 2000. Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Machery, Edouard. 2009. Doing without Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195306880.001.0001.
Papineau, David. 2004. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001.