Neil W. Tennant (tennant-nw)
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tennant.9(at)osu.edu
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Bibliography
Altham, J. E. J. and Tennant, Neil W. 1975. “Sortal Quantification.” in Formal Semantics of Natural Language, edited by Edward L. Keenan, pp. 46–58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCarty, David Charles and Tennant, Neil W. 1987. “Skolem’s Paradox and Constructivism.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 16(2): 165–202. Reprinted in Shapiro (1996).
Schilcher, F. and Tennant, Neil W. 1984. Philosophy, Evolution, and Human Nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Tennant, Neil W. 1977. “Continuity and Identity.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 6(2): 223–231.
Tennant, Neil W. 1978. Natural Logic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1979a. “Entailment and proofs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79: 167–189.
Tennant, Neil W. 1979b. “Language Games and Intuitionism.” Synthese 42: 297–314.
Tennant, Neil W. 1979c. “La barre de Scheffer dans la logique des séquents et des syllogismes.” Logique et Analyse 22(88): 505–514.
Tennant, Neil W. 1980a. “On \(\in\) and \(\exists\).” Analysis 40: 5–7.
Tennant, Neil W. 1980b. “A Proof-Theoretic Approach to Entailment.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 9(2): 185–209.
Tennant, Neil W. 1981a. “Is this a Proof I See Before Me?” Analysis 41: 115–119.
Tennant, Neil W. 1981b. “Formal Games and Forms for Games.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4(2): 311–311.
Tennant, Neil W. 1982. “Proof and Paradox.” Dialectica 36(2–3): 265–296.
Tennant, Neil W. 1983a. “A Defence of Arbitrary Objects.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 57: 79–89.
Tennant, Neil W. 1983b. “Evolutionary Epistemology.” in Proceedings of the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by Paul Weingartner and Johannes Czermak, pp. 168–173. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 9. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Tennant, Neil W. 1984a. “Were Those Disproofs I Saw Before Me?” Analysis 44: 97–105.
Tennant, Neil W. 1984b. “Intentionality, Syntactic Structure, and the Evolution of Language.” in Minds, Machines, and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, edited by Christopher Hookway, pp. 73–103. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1984c. “In Defence of Evolutionary Epistemology.” Theoria 50: 32–48.
Tennant, Neil W. 1984d. “Perfect Validity, Entailment, Paraconsistency.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 43: 179–198.
Tennant, Neil W. 1985a. “Weir and Those ‘Disproofs’ I Saw before Me.” Analysis 45: 208–212.
Tennant, Neil W. 1985b. “Minimal Logic is Adequate for Popperian Science.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36: 325–329.
Tennant, Neil W. 1985c. “How is Meaning Possible? [review of Blackburn (1984)].” Philosophical Books 26(2): 65–82.
Tennant, Neil W. 1987a. Anti-Realism and Logic: Truth as Eternal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1987b. “Natural Deduction and Sequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Relevant Logic.” The Journal of Symbolic Logic 52: 665–680.
Tennant, Neil W. 1987c. “Conventional Necessity and the Contingency of Convention.” Dialectica 41(1–2): 79–95.
Tennant, Neil W. 1987d. “Holism, Molecularity and Truth.” in Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, edited by Barry Taylor, pp. 31–58. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series n. 25. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Tennant, Neil W. 1988. “Theories, Concepts and Rationality in an Evolutionary Account of Science.” Biology and Philosophy 3(2): 224–231.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994a. “Intuitionistic Mathematics Does Not Need ‘Ex Falso Quodlibet’ .” Topoi 13: 127–134.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994b. “Carnap and Quine.” in Logic, Language and the Structure of Scientific Theories, edited by Nathan Salmón. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994c. “Changing the Theory of Theory Change: Towards a Computational Approach.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45: 865–889.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994d. “The Transmission of Truth and the Transitivity of Deduction.” in What is a Logical System?, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, pp. 161–177. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994e. “Automated Deduction and Artificial Intelligence.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White, pp. 273–286. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Tennant, Neil W. 1994f. “Logic and Its Place in Nature.” in Kant and Contemporary Epistemology. Papers from an international workshop held at the Florence Center for the History and Philosophy of Science, May 27-30, 1992, edited by Paolo Parrini, pp. 101–114. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science n. 54. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tennant, Neil W. 1995a. “On Paradox without Self-Reference.” Analysis 55(3): 199–207.
Tennant, Neil W. 1995b. “Paradoxes of Pure Curiosity.” Theory and Decision 38(3): 321–330.
Tennant, Neil W. 1995c. “On Negation, Truth, and Warranted Assertibility.” Analysis 56: 98–104.
Tennant, Neil W. 1996a. “The Law of Excluded Middle Is Synthetic A Priori, If Valid.” Philosophical Topics 24(1): 205–230, doi:10.5840/philtopics19962416.
Tennant, Neil W. 1996b. “Delicate Proof Theory.” in Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, edited by B. Jack Copeland, pp. 351–385. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tennant, Neil W. 1996c. “The Withering Away of Formal Semantics?” Mind and Language 11(4): 302–318.
Tennant, Neil W. 1997a. The Taming of the True. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251605.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 1998a. “Critical Notice of Priest (1995).” Philosophical Books 39(1): 20–38.
Tennant, Neil W. 1998b. “The Full Price of Truth.” Analysis 58: 221–228.
Tennant, Neil W. 1999a. “Negation, Absurdity and Contrariety.” in What is Negation?, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich Theodor Wansing, pp. 199–222. Applied Logic Series n. 13. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tennant, Neil W. 1999b. “Radical Interpretation, Logic, and Conceptual Schemes.” in Interpretations and Causes. New Perspectives on Donald Davidson’s Philosophy, edited by Mario De Caro, pp. 71–94. Synthese Library n. 285. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Tennant, Neil W. 2000a. “Anti Realist Aporias.” Mind 109: 825–854.
Tennant, Neil W. 2000b. “Deductive Versus Expressive Power: A Pre-Gödelian Predicament.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(5): 257–277.
Tennant, Neil W. 2000c. “What is Naturalism in Mathematics, Really?” Philosophia Mathematica 8(3): 316–338.
Tennant, Neil W. 2001a. “On Turing Machines Knowing Their Own Gödel Sentences.” Philosophia Mathematica 9(1): 72–79.
Tennant, Neil W. 2001b. “Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson (2000).” Ratio 14(4): 263–280.
Tennant, Neil W. 2001c. “Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79.
Tennant, Neil W. 2002a. “The Emperor’s New Concepts.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 345–377. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Tennant, Neil W. 2002b. “Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena.” Mind 111: 551–582.
Tennant, Neil W. 2003. “Frege’s Content Principle and Relevant Deducibility.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 32(3): 245–258.
Tennant, Neil W. 2004a. “A General Theory of Abstraction Operators.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54(214): 105–133.
Tennant, Neil W. 2004b. “An Anti-Realist Critique of Dialetheism.” in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 355–384. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2005a. “Review of Peacocke (2004).” The Journal of Philosophy 102(3): 155–162.
Tennant, Neil W. 2005b. “Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland (2005).” Mind 114(453): 89–96.
Tennant, Neil W. 2005c. “Relevance in Reasoning.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, edited by Stewart Shapiro, pp. 696–726. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195148770.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2007a. “Existence and Identity in Free Logic: A Problem for Inferentialism?” Mind 116(464): 1055–1078.
Tennant, Neil W. 2007b. “Logic, Mathematics, and the Natural Sciences.” in Philosophy of Logic, edited by Dale Jacquette, 1st ed., pp. 1145–1162. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 5. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Tennant, Neil W. 2007c. “Mind, Mathematics and the Ignorabimusstreit.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(4): 745–773.
Tennant, Neil W. 2008. “Carnap, Gödel, and the Analyticity of Arithmetic.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(1): 100–112.
Tennant, Neil W. 2009a. “Revamping the Restriction Strategy.” in, pp. 223–239.
Tennant, Neil W. 2009b. “Natural Logicism via the Order of Orderly Pairing.” in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. What Has Become of Them?, edited by Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, and Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, pp. 91–127. Synthese Library n. 341. Dordrecht: Springer.
Tennant, Neil W. 2009c. “Cognitive Phenomenology, Semantic Qualia, and Luminous Knowledge.” in Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 237–256. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2010a. “Harmony in a Sequent Setting.” Analysis 70(3): 462–468.
Tennant, Neil W. 2010b. “Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Cieśliński (2010).” Mind 119(474): 437–450.
Tennant, Neil W. 2010c. “Inferential Semantics for First-Order Logic: Motivating Rules of Inference from Rules of Evaluation.” in The Force of Argument. Essays in Honor of Timothy Smiley, edited by Jonathan Lear and Alex Oliver, pp. 223–258. London: Routledge.
Tennant, Neil W. 2012a. Changes of Mind. An Essay on Rational Belief Revision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2012b. “Cut for Core Logic.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 5(3): 450–479.
Tennant, Neil W. 2013a. “Logicism and Neologicism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/logicism/.
Tennant, Neil W. 2013b. “Parts, Classes and Parts of Classes: An Anti-Realist Reading of Lewisian Mereology.” Synthese 190(4): 709–742.
Tennant, Neil W., ed. 2014a. Foundational Adventures. Essays in Honour of Harvey M. Friedman. Tributes n. 22. London: King’s College Publications.
Tennant, Neil W. 2014b. “Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part I: A Problem for Realism.” Philosophia Mathematica 22(3): 308–320.
Tennant, Neil W. 2014c. “Logic, Mathematics, and the A Priori, Part II: Core Logic as Analytic, and as the Basis for Natural Logicism.” Philosophia Mathematica 22(3): 321–344.
Tennant, Neil W. 2014d. “The Logical Structure of Evolutionary Explanation and Prediction: Darwinism’s Fundamental Schema.” Biology and Philosophy 29(5): 611–655.
Tennant, Neil W. 2014e. “Aristotle’s Syllogistic and Core Logic.” History and Philosophy of Logic 35(2): 120–147.
Tennant, Neil W. 2015a. Introducing Philosophy. God, Mind, World, and Logic. London: Routledge.
Tennant, Neil W. 2015b. “A New Unified Account of Truth and Paradox.” Mind 124(494): 571–605.
Tennant, Neil W. 2017a. Core Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198777892.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2017b. “Logicism and Neologicism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/logicism/.
Tennant, Neil W. 2018. “A Logical Theory of Truth-Makers and Falsity-Makers.” in The Oxford Handbook of Truth, edited by Michael Glanzberg, pp. 355–393. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199557929.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2019. “GP’s LP.” in Graham Priest on Dialetheism and Paraconsistency, edited by Can Başkent and Thomas Macaulay Ferguson, pp. 481–506. Cham: Springer Nature, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3.
Tennant, Neil W. 2020. “Inferentialism, Logicism, Harmony, and a Counterpoint.” in Logic, Language, and Mathematics. Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited by Alexander Miller, pp. 223–250. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199278343.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2022. The Logic of Number. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192846679.001.0001.
Tennant, Neil W. 2023. “Logicism and Neologicism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/logicism/.
Tennant, Neil W. and Jackson, Frank. 1994. “Logic and Physicalism.” in Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium: Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, edited by Roberto Casati, Barry Smith, and Graham White, pp. 113–126. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 21. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Further References
Blackburn, Simon. 1984. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cieśliński, Cezary. 2010. “Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability.” Mind 119(474): 409–422.
Ketland, Jeffrey. 2005. “Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Tennant (2005b).” Mind 114(453): 75–88.
Peacocke, Christopher. 2004. The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199270724.001.0001.
Priest, Graham. 1995. Beyond the Limits of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shapiro, Stewart. 1996. The Limits of Logic: Second-Order Logic and the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem. Brookfield, Vermont: Aldershot.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. “Tennant on Knowable Truth.” Ratio 13(2): 99–114.