William G. Lycan (lycan)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bar-On, Dorit, Horisk, Claire and Lycan, William G. 2000. “Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.” Philosophical Studies 101(1): 1–28. Reprinted in Armour-Garb and Beall (2005, 321–343).
Bar-On, Dorit, Horisk, Claire and Lycan, William G. 2005. “Postscript to [the reprint of] Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan (2000).” in Deflationary Truth, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall, pp. 344–352. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1973. “Invited Inferences and Other Unwelcome Guests.” Papers in Linguistics 6: 453–506.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1975. “Knowing Who.” Philosophical Studies 28: 299–344.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1978. The Myth of Semantic Presupposition. 310 Lindley Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 46405: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1980a. “Who, Me?” The Philosophical Review 89(3): 427–466.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1980b. “A Performadox in Truth-Conditional Semantics.” Linguistics and Philosophy 4(1): 71–100.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G., eds. 1986a. Knowing Who. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Boër, Steven E. and Lycan, William G. 1986b. “Castañeda’s Theory of Knowing.” in Hector-Neri Castañeda, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 215–236. Profiles n. 6. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Geis, Michael L. and Lycan, William G. 1993. “Nonconditional Conditionals.” Philosophical Topics 21(2): 35–56.
Heck, Richard Kimberley and Lycan, William G. 1979. “Frege’s Horizontal.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9: 479–492. Originally published under the name “Richard G. Heck, Jr.” and “William G. Lycan” .
Lycan, William G. 1970a. “Transformational Grammar and the Russell-Strawson Dispute.” Metaphilosophy 1(4): 335–337.
Lycan, William G. 1970b. “Hintikka and Moore’s Paradox.” Philosophical Studies 21(1–2): 9–14.
Lycan, William G. 1970c. “Identifiability-Dependence and Ontological Priority.” The Personalist 51: 503–513.
Lycan, William G. 1973. “Inverted Spectrum.” Ratio 15: 315–319.
Lycan, William G. 1974a. “Kripke and the Materialists.” The Journal of Philosophy 71: 677–689.
Lycan, William G. 1974b. “Mental States and Putnam’s Functionalist Hypothesis.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52: 48–62.
Lycan, William G. 1976a. “Eternal Existence and Necessary Existence.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 17: 287–290.
Lycan, William G. 1976b. “Quine’s Materialism.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 6: 101–130.
Lycan, William G. 1977. “Evidence One Does Not Possess.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55(2): 114–126.
Lycan, William G. 1979a. “The Trouble with Possible Worlds.” in The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, edited by Michael J. Loux, pp. 274–316. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Revised and (partly) reprinted in Lycan (1994, 3–23).
Lycan, William G. 1979b. “Semantic Competence and Funny Functors.” The Monist 62: 209–222. Revised and (partly) reprinted in Lycan (1994, 203–233).
Lycan, William G. 1979c. “A New Lilliputian Argument against Machine Functionalism.” Philosophical Studies 35: 279–287.
Lycan, William G. 1981a. “Psychological Laws.” Philosophical Topics 12(1): 9–38.
Lycan, William G. 1981b. “Form, Function and Feel.” The Journal of Philosophy 78: 24–50.
Lycan, William G. 1981c. “Logical Atomism and Ontological Atoms.” Synthese 46: 207–229.
Lycan, William G. 1982. “Toward a Homuncular Theory of Believing.” Cognition and Brain Theory 4: 139–159.
Lycan, William G. 1983. “The Moral of the New Lilliputian Argument.” Philosophical Studies 43: 277–280.
Lycan, William G. 1984a. Logical Form in Natural Language. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lycan, William G. 1984b. “Armstrong’s Theory of Knowing.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 139–160. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1984c. “A Syntactically Motivated Theory of Conditionals.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9: Causation and Causal Theories, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 437–455. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Lycan, William G. 1985a. “In Defense of the Necessity of Identity.” The Journal of Philosophy 82(10): 572–574.
Lycan, William G. 1985b. “The Paradox of Naming.” in Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective. Exploratory Essays in Current Theories and Classical Indian Theories of Meaning and Reference, edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and James L. Shaw, pp. 81–102. Synthese Library n. 178. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1986a. “Semantics and Methodological Solipsism.” in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 245–261. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1986b. “Thoughts about Things.” in The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, edited by Myles Brand and Robert M. Harnish, pp. 160–186. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press.
Lycan, William G. 1986c. “Tacit Belief.” in Belief: Form, Content and Function, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 61–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. 1987a. Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lycan, William G. 1987b. “Phenomenal Objects: A Backhanded Defense.” in Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 513–526. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1987c. “Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditions.” in New Directions in Semantics, volume 1, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 143–155. New York: Academic Press. Revised and (partly) reprinted in Lycan (1994, 203–233).
Lycan, William G. 1987d. “The Myth of the ‘Projection Problem for Presupposition’ .” Philosophical Topics 15(1): 169–175.
Lycan, William G. 1988a. Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, William G. 1988b. “Review of Ross (1981).” Linguistics and Philosophy 11(1): 107–124. Revised and reprinted in Lycan (1994, 283–303).
Lycan, William G. 1988c. “Review of Lewis (1986).” The Journal of Philosophy 85: 42–47.
Lycan, William G. 1989a. “Logical Constants and the Glory of Truth-Conditional Semantics.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 30: 390–400. Revised and reprinted in Lycan (1994, 244–247).
Lycan, William G. 1989b. “Ideas of representation.” in Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E.M. Adams, edited by David Weissbord. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G., ed. 1990a. Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1990b. “What is the ‘Subjectivity’ of the Mental?” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 109–130. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1990c. “Mental Content in Linguistic Form.” Philosophical Studies 58: 147–154.
Lycan, William G. 1991a. “Two – No, Three – Concepts of Possible Worlds.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91: 215–227. Revised and reprinted in Lycan (1994, 25–43).
Lycan, William G. 1991b. “ ‘Even’ and  ‘Even If’ .” Linguistics and Philosophy 14(2): 115–150.
Lycan, William G. 1991c. “Pot Bites Kettle: A Reply to Miller.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69: 212–213.
Lycan, William G. 1991d. “Homuncular Functionalism Meets PDP.” in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, edited by William M. Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich, and David E. Rumelhart, pp. 259–286. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Lycan, William G. 1991e. “Definition in a Quinean World.” in Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by James H. Fetzer, David Shatz, and George N. Schlesinger, pp. 111–133. Synthese Library n. 216. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1993a. “Armstrong’s New Combinatorialist Theory of Modality.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 3–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Revised and (partly) reprinted in Lycan (1994, 45–72).
Lycan, William G. 1993b. “A Deductive Argument for the Representational Theory of Thinking.” Mind and Language 8: 404–422.
Lycan, William G. 1993c. “Functionalism and Recent Spectrum Inversions.” Unpublished manuscript, University of California at Los Angeles.
Lycan, William G. 1993d. “MPP, RIP.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 411–428. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1993e. “Review of Dennett (1991).” The Philosophical Review 102(3): 424–429.
Lycan, William G. 1994. Modality and Meaning. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 53. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1995a. “A Limited Defense of Phenomenal Information.” in Conscious Experience, edited by Thomas Metzinger, pp. 243–258. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Lycan, William G. 1995b. “Consciousness as Internal Monitoring, I.” in Philosophical Perspectives 9: AI, Connectionism, and Philosophical Psychology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 1–14. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1995c. “On Sosa (1995).” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 100–103. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1996a. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lycan, William G. 1996b. “Layered Perceptual Representation.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 81–100. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1996c. “Replies to Tomberlin (1996), Tye (1996), Stalnaker (1996) and Block (1996).” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 127–142. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1996d. “Paul Churchland’s PDP Approach to Explanation.” in The Churchlands and their Critics, edited by Robert N. McCauley, pp. 104–120. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1996e. “Plantinga and Coherentism.” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 3–24. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Lycan, William G. 1997. “Folk Psychology and its Liabilities.” in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, edited by Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer, pp. 1–22. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Lycan, William G. 1998a. “In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia (Replies to Neander, Rey, and Tye.” in Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind, and Ontology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 479–487. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1998b. “Phenomenal Information Again: It is Both Real and Intrinsically Perspectival.” Philosophical Psychology 11: 239–242.
Lycan, William G. 1998c. “Possible Worlds and Possibilia.” in Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, edited by Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 83–95. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G., ed. 1999. Mind and Cognition. An Anthology. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Lycan (1990a).
Lycan, William G. 2000a. Philosophy of Language. A Contemporary Introduction. 1st ed. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. London: Routledge. Second edition: Lycan (2008a).
Lycan, William G. 2000b. “The Slighting of Smell (with a Brief Word on the Slighting of Chemistry).” in Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry, edited by Nalini Bhushan and Stuart Rosenfeld, pp. 273–290. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. 2000c. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2000/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. 2001a. Real Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. 2001b. “Moore Against the New Skeptics.” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 35–53.
Lycan, William G. 2001c. “A Simple Argument for a Higher-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness.” Analysis 61: 3–4.
Lycan, William G. 2001d. “Goldman on Consciousness.” Philosophical Topics 29(1–2): 333–344.
Lycan, William G. 2001e. “The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 15: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 17–35. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 2002a. “Explanation and Epistemology.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 408–433. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2002b. “The Metaphysics of Possibilia.” in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by Richard M. Gale, pp. 303–316. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998984.
Lycan, William G. 2002c. “The Plurality of Consciousness.” Philosophic Exchange 32: 33–49.
Lycan, William G. 2003a. “Chomsky on the Mind-Body Problem.” in Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert H. Hornstein, pp. 11–28. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470690024.
Lycan, William G. 2003b. “Vs. a New A Priorist Argument for Dualism.” in Philosophical Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 130–147. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 2003c. “Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument.” in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Aleksandar Jokić and Quentin Smith, pp. 384–394. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199241286.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2003d. “The Mind-Body Problem.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen P. Stich and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 47–64. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470998762.
Lycan, William G. 2003e. “Philosophy of Mind.” in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy, edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Eric P. Tsui-James, 2nd ed., pp. 173–201. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. First edition: Bunnin and Tsui-James (1996).
Lycan, William G. 2003f. “Free Will and the Burden of Proof.” in Minds and Persons, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 107–122. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lycan, William G. 2003g. “Dretske’s Way of Introspecting.” in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, edited by Brie Gertler, pp. 15–30. Ashgate Epistemology and Mind Series. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315245997.
Lycan, William G. 2004a. “The Superiority of HOP to HOT.” in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. An Anthology, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro, pp. 93–114. Advances in Consciousness Research n. 56. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 2004b. “The Plurality of Consciousness.” in Language, Knowledge, and Representation. Proceedings of the Sixth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science (ICCS-99), edited by Jesús M. Larrazabal and Luis A. Pérez Miranda, pp. 93–102. Philosophical Studies Series n. 99. Dordrecht: Springer.
Lycan, William G. 2004c. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. 2005a. “Review of Bennett (2003).” Mind 114(453): 116–119.
Lycan, William G. 2005b. “Critical Study of Levine (2001).” Inquiry 48(5): 448–463.
Lycan, William G. 2006a. “Conditional-Assertion Theories of Conditionals.” in Content and Modality. Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, edited by Judith Jarvis Thomson and Alex Byrne, pp. 148–163. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. 2006b. “The Meaning of ‘Water’: An Unsolved Problem.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 184–199. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 2006c. “Names.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, edited by Michael Devitt and Richard Hanley, pp. 255–273. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470757031.
Lycan, William G. 2006d. “Resisting ?-ism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10–11): 65–71.
Lycan, William G. 2006e. “On the Gettier Problem problem.” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 148–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2006f. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. 2006g.“Berger (2002) on Fictional Names.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 650–655.
Lycan, William G. 2006h. “Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 189–201. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 2007a. “Stalnaker on Zombies [on Stalnaker (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 133(3): 473–479.
Lycan, William G. 2007b. “Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Strategies.” in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 84–99. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. 2008a. Philosophy of Language. A Contemporary Introduction. 2nd ed. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. London: Routledge. First edition: Lycan (2000a).
Lycan, William G. 2008b. “Phenomenal Intentionalities.” American Philosophical Quarterly 45(3): 233–252.
Lycan, William G. 2009a. “Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson’s Defense of Conceptual Analysis.” in Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals. Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, edited by Ian Ravenscroft, pp. 61–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267989.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2009b. “Giving Dualism its Due.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(4): 551–563.
Lycan, William G. 2010. “What, Exactly, is a Paradox?” Analysis 70(4): 615–622.
Lycan, William G. 2011. “Epistemology and the Role of Intuitions.” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard, pp. 813–822. Routledge Philosophy Companions. London: Routledge.
Lycan, William G. 2012. “Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.” in Philosophical Perspectives 26: Philosophy of Mind, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 201–215. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Lycan, William G. 2013a. “Is Property Dualism Better off than Substance Dualism?” Philosophical Studies 164(2): 533–542.
Lycan, William G. 2013b. “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 293–305. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2013c. “Davidson’s ‘Method of Truth’ in Metaphysics.” in A Companion to Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore and Kirk A. Ludwig, pp. 141–155. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118328408.
Lycan, William G. 2014. “What does Vision Represent?” in Does Perception Have Content?, edited by Berit Brogaard, pp. 311–328. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199756018.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2015a. “A Reconsidered Defence of Haecceitism Regarding Fictional Individuals.” in Fictional Objects, edited by Stuart Brock and Anthony Everett, pp. 24–40. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735595.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2015b. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. 2018a. “Redressing Substance Dualism.” in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and James Porter Moreland, pp. 22–40. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119468004.
Lycan, William G. 2018b. “What does Taste Represent?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(1): 28–37.
Lycan, William G. 2019a. On Evidence in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829720.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2019b. “Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities.” in Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, edited by Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar, pp. 307–326. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/9196.001.0001.
Lycan, William G. 2019c. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. 2020. “Devitt and the Case for Narrow Meaning.” in Language and Reality from a Naturalistic Perspective. Themes from Michael Devitt, edited by Andrea Bianchi, pp. 267–284. Cham: Springer.
Lycan, William G. 2023. “Representational Theories of Consciousness.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/consciousness-representational/.
Lycan, William G. and Pappas, George Sotiros. 1972. “What is Eliminative Materialism?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 149–159.
Lycan, William G. and Prinz, Jesse J., eds. 2008. Mind and Cognition. An Anthology. 3rd ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Lycan (1990a).
Lycan, William G. and Schlesinger, George N. 1992. “You Bet Your Life: Pascal’s Wager Defended.” in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, edited by R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman, pp. 270–282. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lycan, William G. and Shapiro, Stewart. 1986. “Actuality and Essence.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 343–377. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Sauret, Wesley and Lycan, William G. 2014. “Attention and Internal Monitoring.” Analysis 74(3): 363–370.

Further References

Armour-Garb, Bradley and Beall, J. C., eds. 2005. Deflationary Truth. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Bennett, Jonathan. 2003. A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199258872.001.0001.
Berger, Alan. 2002. Terms and Truth. Reference Direct and Anaphoric. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Block, Ned. 1996. “Mental Paint and Mental Latex.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 19–49. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co., doi:10.2307/1522889.
Dennett, Daniel C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown; Co.
Levine, Joseph. 2001. Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Philosophy of Mind Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195132351.001.0001.
Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Ross, James Francis. 1981. Portraying Analogy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, Ernest. 1995. “Fregean Reference Defended.” in Philosophical Issues 6: Content, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 91–99. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 1996. “On a Defence of the Hegemony of Representation [on Lycan (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 101–108. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2003. Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199251487.001.0001.
Tomberlin, James E. 1996. “Perception and Possibilia [on Lycan (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 109–115. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Tye, Michael. 1996. “Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing [on Lycan (1996b)].” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 117–126. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.