Gilbert H. Harman (harman-gh)
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Bibliography
Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert H., eds. 1972. Semantics of Natural Language. Synthese Library n. 40. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7.
Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert H., eds. 1975a. The Logic of Grammar. Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Co.
Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert H. 1975b. “Introduction.” in The Logic of Grammar, edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert H. Harman, pp. 1–14. Encino, California: Dickenson Publishing Co.
Davidson, Donald, Kaplan, David Michael, Kripke, Saul A., Quine, Willard van Orman, Dummett, Michael A. E., Harman, Gilbert H., Parsons, Charles and Putnam, Hilary. 1974a. “First General Discussion Session.” Synthese 27(3): 471–508.
Davidson, Donald, Kaplan, David Michael, Kripke, Saul A., Quine, Willard van Orman, Dummett, Michael A. E., Harman, Gilbert H., Parsons, Charles and Putnam, Hilary. 1974b. “Second General Discussion Section.” Synthese 27(3): 509–521.
van Fraassen, Bas C., Hughes, R. I. G. and Harman, Gilbert H. 1986. “A Problem for Relative Information Minimizers in Probability Kinematics, Continued.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37: 453–475.
Greenberg, Mark and Harman, Gilbert H. 2006. “Conceptual Role Semantics.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest LePore and Barry C. Smith, pp. 295–322. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1965. “The Inference to the Best Explanation.” The Philosophical Review 74(1): 88–95, doi:10.2307/2183532.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1967a. “A Nonessential Property.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 183–185.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1967b. “Unger on Knowledge.” The Journal of Philosophy 64: 390–395.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1967c. “Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value.” The Journal of Philosophy 64(23): 792–804. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 103–116) and in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005, 349–360).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1967d. “Scriven on the Unknowability of Psychological Laws.” Philosophical Studies 18(4): 61–63.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1968a. “An Introduction to ‘Translation and Meaning’ Chapter Two of Word and Object.” Synthese 19(1-2): 14–26. Reprinted in Davidson and Hintikka (1969, 14–26).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1968b. “Three Levels of Meaning.” The Journal of Philosophy 65: 590–602. Reprinted in Steinberg and Jacobovits (1971, 66–75).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1968c. “Quine on Meaning and Existence I.” The Review of Metaphysics 21: 121–151.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1969. “Linguistic Competence and Empiricism.” in Language and Philosophy. A Symposium, edited by Sidney Hook, pp. 143–151. New York: New York University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1970a. “Deep Structure as Logical Form.” Synthese 21(3–4): 275–297. Reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1972, 25–47).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1970b. “ ‘– is true’ ’ [on Williams (1969)].” Analysis 30(3): 98–99.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1970c. “Induction. A Discussion of the Relevance of the Theory of Knowledge to the Theory of Induction (with a Digression to the Effect that neither Deductive Logic nor th Probability Calculus has Anything to Do with Inference).” in Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, edited by Marshall Swain, pp. 83–99. Synthese Library n. 26. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-010-3390-9.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1970d. “Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy 67(21): 841–855.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1972a. “Is Modal Logic Logic?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 2(1–2): 75–84.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1972b. “Logical Form.” Foundations of Language 9: 38–65. Reprinted in Davidson and Harman (1975a, 289–307).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1973a. Thought. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1973b. “Against Universal Semantic Representation.” Unpublished manuscript, Princeton University.
Harman, Gilbert H., ed. 1974a. On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1974b. “Meaning and Semantics.” in Semantics and Philosophy, edited by Milton K. Munitz and Peter Unger. New York: New York University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1974c. “Comment on Michael Dummett (1974).” Synthese 27(3): 401–404.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1975a. “Language, Thought, and Communication.” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume VII: Language, Mind, and Knowledge, edited by Keith Gunderson, pp. 270–298. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1975b. If and Modus Ponens. 310 Lindley Hall, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Linguistics Club.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1975c. “Moral Relativism Defended.” The Philosophical Review 84(1): 3–22. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 3–19).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1975d. “Wilfrid Sellars’ Theory of Induction.” in Action, Knowledge, and Reality: Critical Studies in Honor of Wilfrid Sellars, edited by Hector-Neri Castañeda. Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1975e. “Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.” in Innate Ideas, edited by Stephen P. Stich, pp. 165–180. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1976. “Practical Reasoning.” The Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–463.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1977a. The Nature of Morality. An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1977b. “How to Use Propositions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1978a. “Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3: Studies in Ethical Theory, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 109–121. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 39–57).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1978b. “Reasons.” in Practical Reasoning, edited by Joseph Raz, pp. 110–117. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1978c. “Is There Mental Representation?” in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IX: Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, edited by C. Wade Savage, pp. 57–64. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1978d. “What is Moral Relativism?” in Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, pp. 143–161. Philosophical Studies Series n. 13. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 20–38).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1978e. “Meaning and Theory.” The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 9(2): 9–20. Reprinted in Shahan and Swoyer (1979).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1980. “Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: Studies in Epistemology, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 163–182. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1982a. “Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Putnam (1981).” The Journal of Philosophy 79(10): 568–575.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1982b. “Conceptual Role Semantics.” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28: 242–256.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1983a. “Human Flourishing, Ethics, and Liberty.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 12: 307–332. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 151–163).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1983b. “Justice and Moral Bargaining.” Social Philosophy and Policy 1: 114–131. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 58–76).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1983c. “Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Loar (1983).” in PSA 1982: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Part II: Symposia and Invited Papers, edited by Peter D. Asquith and Thomas Nickles, pp. 654–661. East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy of Science Association.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1984a. “Is there a Single True Morality?” in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, pp. 27–48. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Reprinted in Krausz (1989, 363–386) and in Harman (2000a, 77–100).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1984b. “Logic and Reasoning.” Synthese 60: 107–127.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1986b. Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator. University of Kansas: Department of Philosophy. The Lindley Lecture for 1986.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1986c. “Willing and Intending.” in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends, edited by Richard E. Grandy and Richard Warner, pp. 363–380. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1986d. “Quine’s Grammar.” in The Philosophy of W.V. Quine, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn and Paul Arthur Schilpp, pp. 165–180. The Library of Living Philosophers n. 18. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1986e. “The Meanings of Logical Constants.” in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 125–134. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1987. “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.” in New Directions in Semantics, volume 1, edited by Ernest LePore, pp. 55–81. New York: Academic Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1988a. “Ethics and Observation.” in Essays on Moral Realism, pp. 119–125. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1988b. “The Simplest Hypothesis.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 20(59): 23–42.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1989. “Some Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science: Qualia, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem.” in Foundations of Cognitive Science, edited by Michael L. Posner, pp. 831–848. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1990a. “Immanent and Transcendent Approaches to the Theory of Meaning.” in Perspectives on Quine, edited by Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson, pp. 144–157. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1990b. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” in Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 31–52. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan and Güzeldere (1997, 663–676).
Harman, Gilbert H., ed. 1993a. Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1993b. “Meaning Holism Defended.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 46: 163–171. “Holism: A Consumer Update,” ed. by Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1993c. “Can Science Understand the Mind?” in Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, edited by Gilbert H. Harman. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1993d. “Desired Desires.” in Value, Welfare and Morality, edited by Ray G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris, pp. 138–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 117–136).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1993e. “La valeur intrinsèque.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 98: 245–255. Reprinted, as “Intrinsic Value,” in Harman (2000a, 137–149).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1994a. “Epistemology and the Diet Revolution.” in Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, edited by Michaelis S. Michael and John Hawthorne, pp. 203–214. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Published under the name “John O’Leary-Hawthorne” .
Harman, Gilbert H. 1994b. “Doubts about Conceptual Analysis.” in Philosophy in Mind: the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind, edited by Michaelis S. Michael and John Hawthorne, pp. 43–48. Philosophical Studies Series n. 60. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Published under the name “John O’Leary-Hawthorne” .
Harman, Gilbert H. 1994c. “Explaining Value.” Social Philosophy and Policy 11: 229–248. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 196–216).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1994d. “Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously.” in Grue!, edited by Douglas F. Stalker, pp. 153–171. LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1996a. “Moral Relativism.” in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, pp. 3–64. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1996b. “Response to Harman (1996a).” in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, pp. 157–187. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1996d. “Explaining Objective Color in terms of Subjective Reactions.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–17. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1996e. “Qualia and Color Concepts.” in Philosophical Issues 7: Perception, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 75–79. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1997. “Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief.” in Realism/Antirealism in Epistemology, edited by Christopher B. Kulp, pp. 123–148. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1999a. Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238029.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 1999b. “Moral Philosophy and Linguistics.” in Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 1: Ethics, edited by Klaus Brinkmann, pp. 107–115. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 217–226).
Harman, Gilbert H. 1999c. “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 315–331. Reprinted in Harman (2000a, 165–179).
Harman, Gilbert H. 2000a. Explaining Value; and other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0198238045.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2000b. “Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator.” in Explaining Value; and other Essays in Moral Philosophy, pp. 181–195. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1986, doi:10.1093/0198238045.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2000d. “The Meaning of Logical Constants.” Unpublished manuscript, http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/meaning.html.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2000e. “The Nonexistence of Character Traits.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100: 223–226.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2001a. “Review of Chomsky (2000).” The Journal of Philosophy 98(5): 265–269.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2001b. “Virtue Ethics without Character Traits.” in Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysic for Judith Jarvis Thomson, edited by Alex Byrne, Robert C. Stalnaker, and Ralph Wedgwood, pp. 117–128. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2001c. “General Foundations versus Rational Insight [on BonJour (1998)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(3): 657–663.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2002c. “The Internal Critique.” in Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical, edited by Dov M. Gabbay, Ralph H. Johnson, Hans Jürgen Ohlbach, and John Woods, pp. 171–186. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2003a. “Category Mistakes in M&E.” in Philosophical Perspectives 17: Language and Philosophical Linguistics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 165–180. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2003b. “Skepticism and Foundations.” in The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, edited by Steven Luper, pp. 1–12. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2004. “Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning.” in The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, edited by Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling, pp. 45–56. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2005. “Moral Particularism and Transduction.” in Philosophical Issues 15: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 44–55. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2006. “Self-Reflexive Thoughts.” in Philosophical Issues 16: Philosophy of Language, edited by Ernest Sosa, pp. 334–345. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2007. “Epistemic Contextualism as a Theory of Primary Speaker Meaning [on Stanley (2005)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(1): 173–179.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2008. “Using a Linguistic Analogy to Study Morality.” in Moral Psychology, Volume 1. The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, pp. 345–352. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2009a. “Guilt-Free Morality.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume IV, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 203–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2009b. “Field on the Normative Role of Logic.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109(3): 333–335.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2011a. “Judith Jarvis Thomson’s Normativity [on Thomson (2008)].” Philosophical Studies 154(3): 435–441.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2011b. “Quine’s Semantic Relativity.” American Philosophical Quarterly 48(3): 283–286.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2012. “Naturalism in Moral Philosophy.” in Ethical Naturalism. Current Debates, edited by Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, pp. 8–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2014. “Indeterminacy, Relativity, and Behaviorism.” in A Companion to W.v.O. Quine, edited by Gilbert H. Harman and Ernest LePore, pp. 219–235. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2015. “Moral Relativism is Moral Realism.” Philosophical Studies 172(4): 855–863.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2016. “Moral Reasoning.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume VI, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 263–276. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198790587.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. 2017. “Toward Resolving the Liar Paradox.” in Reflections on the Liar, edited by Bradley Armour-Garb, pp. 114–115. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199896042.001.0001.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2006. “The Problem of Induction.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(3): 559–575.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2007. Reliable Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2009a. “Précis of Harman and Kulkarni (2007).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(3): 5–9.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2009b. “Response to Shafer (2009), Thagard (2009), Strevens (2009) and Hanson (2009).” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação special issue(3): 47–56.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Kulkarni, Sanjeev. 2011. “Statistical Learning Theory as a Framework for the Philosophy of Induction.” in Philosophy of Statistics, edited by Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay and Malcolm R. Forster, pp. 833–848. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science n. 7. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.
Harman, Gilbert H. and LePore, Ernest, eds. 2014a. A Companion to W.v.O. Quine. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
Harman, Gilbert H. and LePore, Ernest. 2014b. “Introduction: Life and Work.” in A Companion to W.v.O. Quine, edited by Gilbert H. Harman and Ernest LePore, pp. 1–14. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781118607992.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Sherman, Brett. 2004. “Knowledge, Assumptions, Lotteries [on Hawthorne (2004)].” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 492–500. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Sherman, Brett. 2011. “Knowledge and Assumptions.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 131–140.
Harman, Gilbert H. and Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Scott, Dana S., Harman, Gilbert H., Haugeland, John, McClelland, Jay and Newell, Allen. 1990. “The Computational Model of the Mind.” in Acting and Reflecting. The Interdisciplinary Turn in Philosophy, edited by Wilfried Sieg, pp. 39–56. Synthese Library n. 211. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Further References
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Chomsky, Noam. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, Donald and Hintikka, Jaakko, eds. 1969. Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V.O. Quine. Synthese Library n. 21. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1.
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