Hilary Kornblith (kornblith)
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Bibliography
Christensen, David and Kornblith, Hilary. 1997. “Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a priori.” Philosophical Studies 86: 1–20.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1980. “Referring to Artifacts.” The Philosophical Review 89(1): 109–114, doi:10.2307/2184866.
Kornblith, Hilary, ed. 1985a. Naturalizing Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1985b. “Ever Since Descartes.” The Monist 68: 264–276.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1993. Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground: an Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1994. “Naturalism: Both Metaphysical and Epistemological.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19: Philosophical Naturalism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 39–52. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1995. “Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 237–255.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1998a. “The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients.” in Rethinking Intuition, edited by Michael Raymond dePaul and William M. Ramsey, pp. 129–141. Studies in epistemology and cognitive theory. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1998b. “What is it like to be Me?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 48–60.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1999a. “Distrusting Reason.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23: New Directions in Philosophy, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 181–196. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1999b. “In Defense of Naturalized Epistemology.” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa, pp. 158–169. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164863.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1999c. “Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 327–346. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2000a. “The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology [on Sosa (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 24–32. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2000b. “Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the Mind [on Zagzebski (1996)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(1): 197–201.
Kornblith, Hilary, ed. 2001a. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2001b. “Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism.” in Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, edited by Abrol Fairweather and Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, pp. 231–248. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199246319.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2004a. “Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 126–134. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2004b. “Does Reliabilism Make Knowledge Merely Conditional?” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 185–200. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2004c. “Conditions on Cognitive Sanity and the Death of Internalism.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 77–88. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2005a. “Précis of Kornblith (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 399–402.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2005b. “Replies to Goldman (2005), Kusch (2005) and Talbott (2005).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 427–441.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2005c. “Social Prerequisites for the Proper Function of Individual Reason.” Episteme 1(3): 169–176.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2006a. “Appeals to Intuition and the Ambitions of Epistemology.” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 10–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2006b. “Reply to Bermúdez (2006) and BonJour (2006).” Philosophical Studies 127(2): 337–349.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2007a. “The Metaphysical Status of Knowledge.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 145–164. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2007b. “Naturalism and Intuitions.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 74: 27–49. “Philosophical Knowledge. Its Possibility and Scope,” ed. by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2007c. “How to Refer to Artifacts.” in Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and their Representation , edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, pp. 138–149. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199250981.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2008. “Knowledge Needs No Justification.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 5–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2009a. “Review of Williamson (2007).” Analysis 69(1): 109–116.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2009b. “A Reliabilist Solution to the Problem of Promiscuous Bootstrapping.” Analysis 69(2): 263–267.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2009c. “Sosa in Perspective [on Sosa (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 144(1): 127–136.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2010. “Belief in the Face of Controversy.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2011a. “Reasons, Naturalism, and Transcendental Philosophy.” in Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism, edited by Joel Smith and Peter M. Sullivan, pp. 96–119. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608553.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2011b. “Why should we Care About the Concept of Knowledge?” Episteme 8(1): 38–52.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2012. On Reflection. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563005.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2013. “Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?” in Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011, edited by Christoph Jäger and Winfried Löffler, pp. 285–304. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 19. Berlin: de Gruyter. Simultaneously published in Machuca (2013, 260–276), doi:10.1515/9783110329018.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2014. “Is there Room for Armchair Theorizing in Epistemology?” in Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory?, edited by Matthew C. Haug, pp. 195–216. London: Routledge.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2015a. A Naturalistic Epistemology. Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198712459.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2015b. “The Role of Reasons in Epistemology.” Episteme 12(2): 225–239.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2015c. “Naturalistic Defenses of Intuition.” in Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method, edited by Eugen Fischer and John Collins, pp. 151–168. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315714196.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2016a. “On Reflection.” Analysis 76(1): 39–40.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2016b. “Replies to Boghossian (2016) and Smithies (2016).” Analysis 76(1): 69–80.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2016c. “Epistemic Agency.” in Performance Epistemology. Foundations and Applications, edited by Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas, pp. 167–182. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198746942.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2016d. “Philosophical Naturalism.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne, pp. 147–158. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2017a. “Doxastic Justification Is Fundamental.” Philosophical Topics 45(1): 63–80.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2017b. “A Naturalistic Methodology.” in The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology, edited by Giuseppina D’Oro and Søren Overgaard, pp. 141–160. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316344118.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2018. “The Naturalistic Origins of Epistemic Consequentialism.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 70–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2019a. Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781108682688.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2019b. “Naturalistic Defenses of Intuition.” in Explanation in Action Theory and Historiography. Causal and Teleological Approaches, edited by Gunnar Schumann, pp. 151–168. London: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780429506048.
Kornblith, Hilary. 2019c. “Don’t Think Twice, It’s Alright.” Philosophic Exchange 48(1).
Kornblith, Hilary. 2021. Scientific Epistemology. An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780197609552.001.0001.
McLaughlin, Brian P. and Kornblith, Hilary, eds. 2016. Goldman and His Critics. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Further References
Bermúdez, José-Luis. 2006. “Knowledge, Naturalism, and Cognitive Ethology: Kornblith’s ‘Knowledge and Its Place in Nature’ [(2002)].” Philosophical Studies 127(2): 299–316.
Boghossian, Paul Artin. 2016. “Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith (2016a).” Analysis 76(1): 41–54.
BonJour, Laurence. 2006. “Kornblith on Knowledge and Epistemology [on Kornblith (2002)].” Philosophical Studies 127(2): 317–335.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2005. “Kornblith’s Naturalistic Epistemology [on Kornblith (2002)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 403–410.
Kusch, Martin. 2005. “Beliefs, Kinds and Rules: A Comment on Kornblith (2002).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(2): 411–419.
Lehrer, Keith. 2000. “Sensitivity, Indiscernibility and Knowledge [on Sosa (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 33–37. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Machuca, Diego E., ed. 2013. Disagreement and Skepticism. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 46. London: Routledge.
Smithies, Declan. 2016. “On Reflection [on Kornblith (2016a)].” Analysis 76(1): 55–69.
Sosa, Ernest. 2000. “Replies [to Tomberlin (2000), Tomberlin (2000), Kornblith (2000a), Lehrer (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 38–42. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001.
Talbott, William J. 2005. Which Rights Should Be Universal? Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195173473.001.0001.
Tomberlin, James E. 2000. “Skepticism, Tracking, and Warrant [on Sosa (2000)].” in Philosophical Issues 10: Skepticism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 19–23. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Williamson, Timothy. 2007. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Williamson (2021), doi:10.1002/9780470696675.
Williamson, Timothy. 2021. The Philosophy of Philosophy. 2nd ed. The Blackwell / Brown Lectures in Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Williamson (2007), doi:10.1002/9781119616702.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. 1996. Virtues of the Mind. An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174763.