Hannes Leitgeb (leitgeb)
Mentioned on the following portal pages
Stanford Encyclopedia of PhilosophyCited in the following articles
Weakly Discerning Vertices in a Plenitude of Graphs, How to Adopt a Logic, Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Antecedents, A Note on Accuracy-Dominance Vindications of ConsistencyContributions to Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Duca, Simone and Leitgeb, Hannes. 2012. “How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?” Mind 121(481): 1–36.
Halbach, Volker, Leitgeb, Hannes and Welch, Philip D. 2003. “Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived As Predicates.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 32(2): 179–223.
Hieke, Alexander and Leitgeb, Hannes, eds. 2009a. Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 11. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Hieke, Alexander and Leitgeb, Hannes, eds. 2009b. Reduction. Between the Mind and the Brain. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 12. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Horsten, Leon and Leitgeb, Hannes. 2009. “How Abstraction Works.” in Proceedings of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium: Reduction – Abstraction – Analysis, edited by Alexander Hieke and Hannes Leitgeb, pp. 217–226. Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (new series) n. 11. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2001a. “Nonmonotonic Reasoning by Inhibition Nets.” Artificial Intelligence 128(1–2): 161–201.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2001b. “Theories of Truth which Have No Standard Models.” Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 68(1): 69–87.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2002a. “What is a Self-Referential Sentence? Critical Remarks on the Alleged (Non-)Circularity of Yablo’s Paradox.” Logique et Analyse 45(177–178): 3–14.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2002b. “Metaworlds: A Possible-Worlds Semantics for Truth.” in Principles of Truth, edited by Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten, pp. 129–152. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. Second edition, with small corrections: Halbach and Horsten (2004).
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2002c. “Review of Williamson (2000).” Grazer Philosophische Studien 65: 195–205. “Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence,” ed. by Marc Slors and Sven Walter.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2003. “Metaphysical Modalities in Scientific Language: A Roadmap of (Im-)Possibilities.” in Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic, edited by Hans Rott and Vı́tezslav Horák, pp. 187–220. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2005a. “What Truth Depends on.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 34(2): 155–192.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2005b. “How Similarities Compose.” in The Compositionality of Meaning and Content. Volume I: Foundational Issues, edited by Markus Werning, Edouard Machery, and Gerhard Schurz, pp. 147–168. Linguistics and Philosophy n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, doi:10.1515/9783110323627.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2007a. “On the Metatheory of Field’s ‘Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge’ [on Field (2007)].” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 159–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.003.0006.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2007b. “What Theories of Truth should be Like (but Cannot be).” Philosophy Compass 2(2): 276–290.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2007c. “A New Analysis of Quasianalysis.” The Journal of Philosophical Logic 36(2): 181–226.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2007d. “Towards a Logic of Type-Free Modality and Truth.” in Logic Colloquium 2005: Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Held in Athens, Greece, July 28 – August 3, 2005, edited by Costas Dimitracopoulos, Ludomir Newelski, Dag Normann, and John R. Steel, pp. 68–84. Lecture Notes in Logic n. 28. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2008a. “An Impossibility Result on Semantic Resemblance.” Dialectica 62(3): 293–306.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2008b. “On the Probabilistic Convention T.” The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(2): 218–224.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2009. “On Formal and Informal Provability.” in New Waves in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Otávio Bueno and Øystein Linnebo, pp. 263–299. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2010. “Sleeping Beauty and Eternal Recurrence.” Analysis 70(2): 203–205.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2011a. “Logic in General Philosophy of Science: Old Things and New Things.” Synthese 179(2): 339–350.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2011b. “New Life for Carnap’s Aufbau?” Synthese 180(2): 265–299.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2011c. “God – Moore = Ramsey (A Reply to Chalmers and Hájek (2007)).” Topoi 30(1): 47–51, doi:10.1007/s11245-010-9088-x.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2012. “From Type-Free Truth to Type-Free Probability.” in New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian K. Russell, pp. 84–94. New Waves in Philosophy. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2013. “Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All That.” Metaphilosophy 44(3): 267–275.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2014a. “A Way Out of the Preface Paradox?” Analysis 74(1): 11–15.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2014b. “The Review Paradox: On the Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction.” Noûs 48(4): 781–793.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2014c. “The Stability Theory of Belief.” The Philosophical Review 123(2): 131–171.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2015. “The Humean Thesis on Belief.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 89: 143–185.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2016a. “Probability in Logic.” in The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 681–704. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.001.0001.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2016b. “Abstraction Grounded: A Note on Abstraction and Truth.” in Abstractionism. Essays in Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rossberg, pp. 269–282. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199645268.001.0001.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2017a. The Stability of Belief. How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732631.001.0001.
Leitgeb, Hannes. 2017b. “Imaging All The People.” Episteme 14(4): 463–479.
Leitgeb, Hannes and Carus, André W. 2020. “Rudolf Carnap.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/carnap/.
Leitgeb, Hannes and Hieke, Alexander. 2004. “Circular Languages.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 13(3): 341–371.
Leitgeb, Hannes and Ladyman, James. 2008. “Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology.” Philosophia Mathematica 16(3): 388–396, doi:10.1093/philmat/nkm039.
Leitgeb, Hannes and Pettigrew, Richard. 2010a. “An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.” Philosophy of Science 77(2): 201–235, doi:10.1086/651317.
Further References
Chalmers, David J. and Hájek, Alan. 2007. “Ramsey + Moore = God.” Analysis 67(2): 170–172, doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00670.x.
Field, Hartry. 2007. “Solving the Paradoxes, Escaping Revenge.” in Revenge of the Liar. New Essays on the Paradox, edited by J. C. Beall, pp. 78–144. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199233915.003.0004.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001.