Peter van Inwagen (vaninwagen)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

van Inwagen, Peter. 1972. “Lehrer on Determinism, Free Will, and Evidence.” Philosophical Studies 23: 351–357.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1974. “A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism.” Theoria 40: 9–22.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1975. “The incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 27(3): 185–199, doi:10.1007/bf01624156.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1977a. “Creatures of Fiction.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14: 299–308. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 37–56).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1977b. “Reply to Narveson (1977).” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 89–98.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1977c. “Reply to Gallois (1977).” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 107–111.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1977d. “Ontological Arguments.” Noûs 11: 375–395. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 22–41).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1978a. “Ability and Responsibility.” The Philosophical Review 87: 201–224.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1978b. “The Possibility of Resurrection.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(2): 114–121. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1998a, 45–52) and in Rea (2009b, 321–327).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1978c. “A Definition of Chisholm’s Notion of Immanent Causation.” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 7: 567–581.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1979. “Laws and Counterfactuals.” Noûs 13: 439–453.
van Inwagen, Peter, ed. 1980a. Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Philosophical Studies Series n. 19. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3528-5.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1980b. “Indexicality and Actuality.” The Philosophical Review 89: 403–426. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 165–185).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1980c. “Review of Prior and Fine (1977).” Noûs 14: 251–259.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1980d. “Philosophers and the Words ‘Human Body’ .” in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, edited by Peter van Inwagen, pp. 283–300. Philosophical Studies Series n. 19. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3528-5.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1980e. “Compatibilism and the Burden of Proof.” Analysis 40: 98–100.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1981a. “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62: 123–137. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 75–94).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1981b. “Why I Don’t Understand Substitutional Quantification.” Philosophical Studies 39: 281–285. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 32–36).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1983a. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1983b. “Fiction and Metaphysics.” Philosophy and Literature 7: 67–77.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1984. “Dennett on ‘Could Have Done Otherwise’ .” The Journal of Philosophy 81: 565–567.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1985a. “Plantinga on Trans-World Identity.” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen, pp. 101–120. Profiles n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 186–205), doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1985b. “On Two Arguments for Compatibilism.” Analysis 45: 161–163.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1985c. “Compatibilistic Reflections.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63: 349–353.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1985d. “Review of Chisholm (1981).” Noûs 19: 122–129.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1986a. “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11: Studies in Essentialism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 185–213. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 206–242).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1986b. “Review of Lewis (1983).” Mind 95: 246–257.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1987a. “When are Objects Parts?” in Philosophical Perspectives 1: Metaphysics, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 21–47. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1987b. “Review of Bouwsma (1984).” Faith and Philosophy 4: 103–108. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1998a, 111–116).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1988a. “On Always Being Wrong.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: Realism and Antirealism, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 95–111. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1988b. “How to Reason About Vague Objects.” Philosophical Topics 16(1): 255–284.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1988c. “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy.” Philosophical Topics 16(2): 161–188. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 96–124).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1988d. “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God.” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris, pp. 241–278. University of Notre Dame Studies in Religion n. 5. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 222–259) and in McCall and Rea (2009, 217–248).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1988e. “The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God.” in Divine and Human Actions. Essays in the Metaphysics of Theism, edited by Thomas V. Morris, pp. 211–235. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 42–65) and in Rea (2009b, 104–125).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1989. “When is the Will Free?” in Philosophical Perspectives 3: Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 399–422. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1990a. Material Beings. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, doi:10.7591/9781501713033.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1990b. “Four-Dimensional Objects.” Noûs 24: 245–255. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 111–121).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1991a. “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 135–165. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 66–95) and in Howard-Snyder (1996, 151–174).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1991b. “Searle on Ontological Commitment.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 345–358. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1991c. “Determinism.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1991d. “Entia Successiva.” in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language n. 2. München: Philosophia Verlag.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1992. “There is no such thing as Addition.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17: The Wittgenstein Legacy, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 138–159. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993a. Metaphysics. 1st ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993b. “Critical Study of Unger (1990).” Noûs 27: 373–379.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993c. “Naı̈ve Mereology, Admissible Valuations, and Other Matters.” Noûs 27: 229–234.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993d. “Précis of van Inwagen, Peter (1990a).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 683–686.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993e. “Reply to Reviewers.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 709–719.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993f. “Genesis and Evolution.” in Reasoned Faith. Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, edited by Eleonore Stump, pp. 93–127. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 128–162).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993g. “Critical Studies of the New Testament and the User of the New Testament.” in Hermes and Athena: Biblical Studies and Philosophical Theology, edited by Eleonore Stump and Thomas P. Flint, pp. 159–190. University of Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy of Religion n. 7. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 163–190).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1993h. “Review of Leslie (1989).” Faith and Philosophy 10: 439–443. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1998a, 105–110).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1994a. “Composition as Identity.” in Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 207–220. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 95–110).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1994b. “When the Will is Not Free.” Philosophical Studies 75: 95–113.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1994c. “Not by Confusion of Substance, but by Unity of Person.” in Reason and the Christian Religion: Essays in Honor of Richard Swinburne, edited by Alan G. Padgett, pp. 201–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 260–280).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1995a. God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1995b. “Dualism and Materialism: Athens and Jerusalem?” Faith and Philosophy 12: 475–488. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1998a, 53–68).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1995c. “Der Einfluss der Metaphysik auf andere Bereiche der Philosophie: Eine Fallstudie.” in Metaphysik. Neue Zugänge zu alten Fragen, edited by Johannes L. Brandl, Alexander Hieke, and Peter M. Simons, pp. 253–264. Conceptus-Studien n. 11. Sankt Augustin b. Bonn: Academia Verlag. Proceedings of the 3rd congress of the Österreichische Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Salzburg 1994.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1995d. “Non Est Hick.” in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith. Essays in Honor of William P. Alston, edited by Thomas D. Senor, pp. 253–264. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1995a, 191–218).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1995e. “Introduction [to Part I: Chance, Evil, and Modal Skepticism].” in God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, pp. 11–21. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1996a. “Why is there Anything at All?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 70: 95–110. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 57–71).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1996b. “ ‘It is Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and For Anyone, to Believe Anything Upon Insufficient Evidence’ .” in Faith, Freedom and Rationality. Philosophy of Religion Today, edited by Jeffrey Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (1998a, 29–44).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1996c. “Reflections on the Chapters by Draper (1996), Russell (1996), and Gale (1996).” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, pp. 219–243. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1997a. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1997b. “Against Middle Knowledge.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21: Philosophy of Religion, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 225–236. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1997c. “Materialism and the Psychological-Continuity Account of Personal Identity.” in Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 305–319. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 144–161), doi:10.1111/0029-4624.31.s11.14.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1997d. “Fischer on Moral Responsibility.” The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 373–381.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1997e. “A Reply to Professor Hick.” Faith and Philosophy 14: 299–302.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998a. The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998b. “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.” in Metaphysics: The Big Questions, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 365–373. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998c. “Modal Epistemology.” Philosophical Studies 92(3): 67–84. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 243–258), doi:10.1023/a:1004229808144.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998d. “The Nature of Metaphysics.” in Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics, edited by Stephen Laurence and Cynthia Macdonald, pp. 11–21. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998e. “Meta-Ontology.” Erkenntnis 48(2–3): 233–250. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 13–31), doi:10.1023/A:1005323618026.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998f. “Of ‘Of Miracles’ .” in The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics, pp. 89–104. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998g. “Probability and Evil.” in The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics, pp. 69–88. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Extensive revision of parts of van Inwagen, Peter (1996c).
van Inwagen, Peter. 1998h. “Ontological Arguments.” in Philosophy of Religion. A Guide to the Subject, edited by Brian Davies, pp. 54–58. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1999a. “Christian Belief and Platonic Rationality.” in The Rationality of Theism, edited by Godehard Brüntrup and Ronald K. Tacelli, pp. 145–159. Studies in Philosophy and Religion n. 19. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1999b. “Moral Responsibility, Determinism, and the Ability to Do Otherwise.” The Journal of Ethics 3: 341–343.
van Inwagen, Peter. 1999c. “Some Remarks on Plantinga’s Advice.” Faith and Philosophy 16: 164–172.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2000a. “Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time.” The Monist 83(3): 437–459. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2001a, 122–143) and in Bottani, Giaretta and Carrara (2002, 387–412).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2000b. “Free Will Remains a Mystery.” in Philosophical Perspectives 14: Action and Freedom, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 1–19. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. The Eight Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, doi:10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.1.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2000c. “Quantification and Fictional Discourse.” in Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence, edited by Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, pp. 235–247. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 108. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2000d. “Double Dactyls.” Mind 109: 23–24.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001a. Ontology, Identity, and Modality. Essays in Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001b. “ ‘It is nonsensical to speak of the Total Number of Objects’ .” in Proceedings of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age, edited by Uwe Meixner and Peter M. Simons, pp. 61–71. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 28. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001c. “ ‘I am Elizabeth Anscombe’ is Not an Identity Proposition.” Metaphysica 2(1): 5–8.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001d. “Introduction.” in Ontology, Identity, and Modality. Essays in Metaphysics, pp. 1–10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001e. “Can Variables Be Explained Away?” Facta Philosophica 4(1): 4–9. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 116–120).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2001f. “The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils.” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74: 65–80.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002a. Metaphysics. 2nd ed. Dimensions of Philosophy Series. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Revised edition of van Inwagen, Peter (1993a).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002b. “ ‘Carnap’ and ‘The Polish Logician’ .” Acta Analytica 17(28): 7–17.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002c. “What do we Refer to When we Say ‘I’?” in The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by Richard M. Gale, pp. 175–189. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Published simultaneously in Howard-Snyder and Moser (2002, 24–32), doi:10.1002/9780470998984.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002d. “The Number of Things.” in Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 176–196. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002e. “Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 205–222. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002f. “Why Vagueness is a Mystery.” Acta Analytica 17(29): 11–17.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2002g. “What is the Problem of the Hiddenness of God?” in Divine Hiddenness, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, pp. 24–32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2003a. “Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Entities.” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 131–157. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199284221.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2003b. “Three Persons in One Being. On Attempts to Show that the Doctrine of the Trinity is Self-Contradictory.” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, edited by Melville Y. Stewart, pp. 83–98. Studies in Philosophy and Religion n. 24. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Rea (2009a, 61–75).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2003c. “The Compatibility of Darwinism and Design.” in God and Design: The Teleological Argument and Modern Science, edited by Neil A. Manson, pp. 347–362. London: Routledge.
van Inwagen, Peter, ed. 2004a. Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004b. “Freedom to Break the Laws.” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28: The American Philosophers, edited by Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, pp. 334–350. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2004.00099.x.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004c. “The Self: The Incredulous Stare Articulated.” Ratio 17(4).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004d. “What is Naturalism? What is Analytical Philosophy?” in Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism, edited by Antonella Corradini, Sergio Galvan, and Edward Jonathan Lowe, pp. 74–88. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 27. London: Routledge.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004e. “Van Inwagen on Free Will.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 213–230. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004f. “A Theory of Properties.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume I, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 107–138. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 153–182), doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267729.003.0005.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004g. “Introduction.” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by Peter van Inwagen, pp. vii–. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004h. “The Argument from Evil.” in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by Peter van Inwagen, pp. 55–73. Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2004i. “Can Science Disprove the Existence of God?” Philosophic Exchange 34: 39–53.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2005a. “The Problem of Evil.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, edited by William J. Wainwright, pp. 188–219. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195138090.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2005b. “Human Destiny.” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by William E. Mann, pp. 245–265. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9780470756638.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2005c. “Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis?” in God and the Ethics of Belief. New Essays in Philosophy of Religion, edited by Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell, pp. 131–149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2006a. The Problem of Evil (the Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003). Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245604.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2006b. “Names for Relations.” in Philosophical Perspectives 20: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 453–477. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00115.x.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2006c. “Properties.” in Knowledge and Reality. Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson, and David A. Vander Laan, pp. 15–34. Philosophical Studies Series n. 103. Dordrecht: Springer.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2006d. “Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts?” The Journal of Philosophy 103(12): 614–630. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 221–237), doi:10.5840/jphil2006103123.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2006e. “McGinn on Existence.” in Modes of Existence. Papers in Ontology and Philosophical Logic, edited by Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies, pp. 105–130. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical Research n. 5. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Papers from the conference “On what (perhaps) there is,” held May 2005 at the University of Bergamo.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2007a. “A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person.” in Persons. Human and Divine, edited by Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 199–215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2007b. “Les objets quadridimensionnels.” in Métaphysique Contemporaine: Propriétés, mondes possibles et personnes, edited by Emmanuelle Garcia and Frédéric Nef, pp. 255–268. Textes clés. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Traduction de van Inwagen, Peter (1990b) par Franck Lihoreau.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2007c. “Plantinga’s Replacement Argument.” in Alvin Plantinga, edited by Deane-Peter Baker, pp. 188–202. Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Inwagen, Peter van. 2007. “Metaphysics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/metaphysics/.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2007d. “Impotence and Collateral Damage: One Charge in Van Fraassen’s Indictment of Analytical Metaphysics.” Philosophical Topics 35(1–2): 67–82.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2008a. “McGinn on Existence.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58(230): 36–58.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2008b. “Quine’s 1946 Lecture on Nominalism.” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume IV, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 125–143. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 121–136), doi:10.1093/oso/9780199542987.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2008c. “What does an Omniscient Being Know about the Future?” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, volume I, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 216–230. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2008d. Metaphysics. 3rd ed. Dimensions of Philosophy Series. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Revised edition of van Inwagen, Peter (1993a).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2008e. “How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.” The Journal of Ethics 12(3–4): 327–341, doi:10.1007/s10892-008-9038-7.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2009a. “Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 472–506. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 87–115), doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2009b. “God and Other Uncreated Things.” in Metaphysics and God. Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, edited by Kevin Timpe, pp. 3–20. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. London: Routledge.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2009c. “Listening to Clifford’s Ghost.” in Conceptions of Philosophy, edited by Anthony O’Hear, pp. 15–35. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2009d. “Indeterminacy and Vagueness: Logic and Metaphysics.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 1(2): 1–19.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2010a. “We’re Right. They’re Wrong.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 10–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2010b. “Ontological Arguments.” in A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, edited by R. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn, 2nd ed., pp. 359–367. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2010c. “Five Questions.” in Metaphysics: 5 Questions, edited by Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 179–185. Copenhagen: Automatic Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 15–30).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2011a. “Relational vs. Constituent Ontologies.” in Philosophical Perspectives 25: Metaphysics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 389–405. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 202–220).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2011b. “A Promising Argument.” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert H. Kane, 2nd ed., pp. 475–483. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press. First edition: Kane (2002), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399691.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2012a. “Causation and the Mental.” in Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind. New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, edited by Kelly James Clark and Michael C. Rea, pp. 152–170. New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 238–258), doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766864.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2012b. “What is an Ontological Category?” in Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic, edited by Lukáš Novák, Daniel D. Novotný, Prokop Sousedı́k, and David Svoboda, pp. 11–24. Contemporary Scholasticism n. 1. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Reprinted in van Inwagen, Peter (2014a, 183–201).
van Inwagen, Peter. 2012c. “Three Versions of the Ontological Argument.” in Ontological Proofs Today, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 143–163. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 50. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2013a. “Artefakte.” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61(2): 233–249.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2013b. “C.S. Lewis’s Argument Against Naturalism.” Res Philosophica 90(1): 113–124.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014a. Existence: Essays in Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107111004.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014b. “Modes of Being and Quantification.” Disputatio 6(38): 1–24.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014c. “Dispensing with Ontological Levels: an Illustration.” Disputatio 6(38): 25–43.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014d. “Introduction: Inside and outside the Ontology Room.” in Existence: Essays in Ontology, pp. 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107111004.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014e. “Alston on Ontological Commitment.” in Existence: Essays in Ontology, pp. 137–152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781107111004.010 .
van Inwagen, Peter. 2014f. “Fictionalist Nominalism and Applied Mathematics.” The Monist 97(4): 479–502.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2015. “Against ontological structure.” in The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Gabrielle Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux, pp. 46–64. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781316181539.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2016a. “In Defense of Transcendent Universals.” in Metaphysics and Scientific Realism. Essays in Honor of David Malet Armstrong, edited by Francesco Federico Calemi, pp. 51–70. EIDE – Foundations of Ontology n. 9. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110455915.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2016b. “The Rev’d Mr Bayes and the Life Everlasting.” in Reason and Faith. Themes from Richard Swinburne, edited by Michael Bergmann and Jeffrey E. Brower, pp. 196–219. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732648.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2017a. Thinking about Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316711101.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2017b. “Concluding Meditation.” in Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John Adorno Keller, pp. 343–394. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198715702.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2017c. “The Problem of Fr** W*ll.” in Free Will and Classical Theism: The Significance of Freedom in Perfect Being Theology, pp. 3–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611200.001.0001.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2017d. Essai sur le libre arbitre. Analyse et philosophie. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2018. “I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come.” in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and James Porter Moreland, pp. 488–500. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781119468004.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2019. “Against Analytic Existence Entailments.” in The Nature of Ordinary Objects, edited by Javier Cumpa and Bill Brewer, pp. 173–197. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/9781316612897.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2020. “The Neo-Carnapians.” Synthese 197(1): 7–32.
van Inwagen, Peter. 2022. Being: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780192883964.001.0001.
Inwagen, Peter van and Sullivan, Meghan. 2014. “Metaphysics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/metaphysics/.
Inwagen, Peter van, Sullivan, Meghan and Bernstein, Sara. 2023. “Metaphysics.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/metaphysics/.
van Inwagen, Peter and Zimmerman, Dean W., eds. 1998. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
van Inwagen, Peter and Zimmerman, Dean W., eds. 2007. Persons. Human and Divine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKay, Thomas J. and van Inwagen, Peter. 1977. “Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents.” Philosophical Studies 31(5): 353–356.
Szatkowski, Mirosław and Inwagen, Peter van. 2019. “Interview with Peter Van Inwagen.” in Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? Essays in Honor of Peter van Inwagen, edited by Mirosław Szatkowski, pp. 11–32. Philosophical Analysis n. 81. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110664812.
Tomberlin, James E. and van Inwagen, Peter, eds. 1985. Alvin Plantinga. Profiles n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-009-5223-2.

Further References

Bottani, Andrea, Giaretta, Pierdaniele and Carrara, Massimiliano, eds. 2002. Individuals, Essence and Identity. Themes in Analytic Metaphysics. Topoi Library n. 4. Dordrecht: Springer, doi:10.1007/978-94-017-1866-0.
Bouwsma, Oets K. 1984. Without Proof or Evidence. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. Edited and introduced by J.L. Craft and Ronald E. Hustwit.
Chisholm, Roderick M. 1981. The First Person. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Draper, Paul. 1996. “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists.” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, pp. 12–29. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Gale, Richard M. 1996. “Some Difficulties in Theistic Treatments of Evil.” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, pp. 206–218. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Gallois, André Norman. 1977. “Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism.” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 99–105.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ed. 1996. The Evidential Argument from Evil. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel and Moser, Paul K., eds. 2002. Divine Hiddenness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Leslie, John. 1989. Universes. London: Routledge.
Lewis, David. 1983. Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195032047.001.0001.
McCall, Thomas and Rea, Michael C., eds. 2009. Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Narveson, Jan. 1977. “Compatibilism Defended.” Philosophical Studies 32(1): 83–87.
Prior, Arthur Norman and Fine, Kit. 1977. Worlds, Times and Selves. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Edited by Kit Fine; based on manuscripts by Prior with a preface and a postscript by Kit Fine.
Rea, Michael C., ed. 2009a. Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement. Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology n. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rea, Michael C., ed. 2009b. Providence, Scripture, and Resurrection. Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology n. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, Bruce. 1996. “Defenseless.” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder, pp. 193–205. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Unger, Peter. 1990. Identity, Consciousness and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.