Ralph Wedgwood (wedgwood-r)
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Bibliography
Byrne, Alex, Stalnaker, Robert C. and Wedgwood, Ralph, eds. 2001. Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysic for Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998a. “Same-Sex Marriage: A Philosophical Defense.” in Philosophy and Sex, edited by Robert B. Baker, Kathleen J. Wininger, and Frederick A. Elliston, 3rd ed., pp. 212–230. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998b. “The Essence of Response-Dependence.” in Response-Dependence, edited by Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet, pp. 37–60. European Review of Philosophy n. 3. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1998c. “The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6(2): 189–209.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 1999. “The A Priori Rules of Rationality.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59: 113–131.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2001a. “Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms.” The Philosophical Review 110(1): 1–30.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2001b. “Sensing Values? [on Johnston (2001)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 215–223.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002a. “Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism.” Topoi 21(1–2): 139–152.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002b. “Internalism Explained.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(2): 349–369.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002c. “Practical Reason and Desire.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80: 345–358.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2002d. “The Aim of Belief.” in Philosophical Perspectives 16: Language and Mind, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 267–297. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1111/1468-0068.36.s16.10.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2003. “Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.” in Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality, edited by Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet, pp. 201–229. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199257361.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2004. “The Metaethicists’ Mistake.” in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman and John Hawthorne, pp. 405–426. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2005. “Railton on Normativity [on Railton (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 126(3): 463–479.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006a. “The Normative Force of Reasoning.” Noûs 40(4): 660–686, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00628.x.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006b. “The Meaning of ‘Ought’ .” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume I, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 127–160. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006c. “How We Know What Ought to Be.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106: 63–86.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2006d. “The Internal and External Components of Cognition.” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, edited by Robert J. Stainton, pp. 307–325. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 7. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007a. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199251315.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007b. “Normativism Defended.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, pp. 85–102. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. second edition: McLaughlin and Cohen (2023).
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007c. “Review of Peacocke (2004).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74(3): 776–791.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2008b. “Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature.” in Morality and Self-Interest, edited by Paul Bloomfield, pp. 177–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305845.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009a. “Intrinsic Values and Reasons for Action.” in Philosophical Issues 19: Metaethics, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 321–342. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009b. “The ‘Good’ and the ‘Right’ Revisited.” in Philosophical Perspectives 23: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 499–519. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2009c. “The Normativity of the Intentional.” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, pp. 421–436. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010a.“Schroeder (2008) on Expressivism: For – or Against?” Analysis 70(1): 117–129.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010b. “The Nature of Normativity: Précis [of Wedgwood (2007a)].” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 445–448.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010c. “The Nature of Normativity: A reply to [Holton (2010), Railton (2010) and Lenman (2010).” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 479–491.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2010d. “The Moral Evil Demons.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 216–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011a. “Instrumental Rationality.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume VI, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 280–310. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011b. “Defending Double Effect.” Ratio 24(4): 384–401. Reprinted in Hooker (2012, 35–52).
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2011c. “Primitively Rational Belief-Forming Processes.” in Reasons for Belief, edited by Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, pp. 180–200. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2012a. “Outright Belief.” Dialectica 66(3): 309–329, doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01305.x.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2012b. “Justified Inference.” Synthese 189(2): 273–295.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013a. “Doxastic Correctness.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87: 217–234.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013b. “Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ .” in Philosophical Issues 23: Epistemic Agency, edited by Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva, and Baron Reed, pp. 70–92. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013c. “Review of Enoch (2011).” The Philosophical Quarterly 63(251): 389–393.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013d. “Gandalf’s Solution to the Newcomb Problem.” Synthese 190(14): 2643–2675.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013e. “The Weight of Moral Reasons.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume III, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 35–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199685905.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2013f. “A Priori Bootstrapping.” in The A Priori in Philosophy, edited by Albert Casullo and Joshua C. Thurow, pp. 226–246. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695331.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014a. “Rationality as a Virtue.” Analytic Philosophy 55(4): 319–338.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014b. “The Right Thing to Believe.” in The Aim of Belief, edited by Timothy Chan, pp. 123–139. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672134.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2014c. “Moral Disagreement among Philosophers.” in Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief. Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann and Patrick Kain, pp. 23–39. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199669776.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2015a. “The Pitfalls of ‘Reasons’ .” in Philosophical Issues 25: Normativity, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 123–143. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2015b. “An Inferentialist Conception of the A Priori.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume V, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 295–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722762.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016a. “Objective and Subjective ‘Ought’ .” in Deontic Modality, edited by Nate Charlow and Matthew Chrisman, pp. 143–168. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198717928.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016b. “Review of Scanlon (2014).” The Philosophical Quarterly 66(262): 213–217.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2016c. “Is Civil Marriage Illiberal?” in After Marriage. Rethinking Marital Relationships, edited by Elizabeth Brake, pp. 29–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205072.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017a. The Value of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017b. “The Predicament of Choice.” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume XII, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, pp. 294–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017c. “The Coherence of Thrasymachus.” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, volume 53, edited by Victor Caston, pp. 33–64. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815655.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018a. “Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic.” in Epistemic Consequentialism, edited by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Jeffrey Dunn, pp. 85–112. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018b. “A Probabilistic Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.” in Philosophical Issues 28: Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, edited by Cory Juhl and Joshua Schechter, pp. 374–398. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12130.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2018c. “The Unity of Normativity.” in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Daniel Star, pp. 23–45. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2019. “Moral Disagreement and Inexcusable Irrationality .” American Philosophical Quarterly 56(1): 97–108, doi:10.2307/45128646.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2023. Rationality and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198874492.001.0001.
Wedgwood, Ralph. 2024. “How can ‘Evidence’ be Normative?” in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence, edited by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Clayton Littlejohn, pp. 74–90. Routledge Handbooks. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9781315672687.
Further References
Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously. A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579969.001.0001.
Holton, Richard. 2010. “Comments on Wedgwood (2007a).” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 449–457.
Hooker, Brad, ed. 2012. Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118368794.
Johnston, Mark. 2001. “The Authority of Affect.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(1): 181–214.
Lenman, James. 2010. “Uggles and Muggles: Wedgwood (2007a) on Normative Thought and Justification.” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 469–477.
Peacocke, Christopher. 2004. The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199270724.001.0001.
Railton, Peter. 2003. Facts, Values, and Norms. Essays towards a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613982.
Railton, Peter. 2010. “Staying in Touch with Normative Reality [on Wedgwood (2007a)].” Philosophical Studies 151(3): 459–467.
Scanlon, Thomas Michael. 2014. Being Realistic About Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199678488.001.0001.
Schroeder, Mark. 2008. Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534654.001.0001.