Richard H. Feldman (feldman-rh)
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Bibliography
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996a.
“Epistemology.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Donald M. Borchert. London:
MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996b.
“Evidentialism.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Donald M. Borchert. London:
MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1998. “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.”
Philosophical Studies 89: 1–29. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman
(2004a, 135–158).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2001.
“Internalism Defended.” American
Philosophical Quarterly 38(1): 1–18. Reprinted in Kornblith (2001) and
in Conee and
Feldman (2004a, 53–80).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H., eds. 2004a. Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004b. “Afterword [to Conee and Feldman
(2001)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited
by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 81–82. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004c. “Afterword [to Feldman and Conee
(1985)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited
by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 101–108. Oxford: Oxford University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004d. “Afterword [to Conee and Feldman
(1998)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited
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Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2008.
“Evidence.” in Epistemology: New
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011a. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 283–284. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011b. “Ad
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011c. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 287–288. Sydney: Sydney University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011d. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 289–291. Sydney: Sydney University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011e. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 292–293. Sydney: Sydney University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011f. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 294–295. Sydney: Sydney University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011g. “Ad
Fumerton
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and its Discontents, pp. 296–297. Sydney: Sydney University
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Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011h. “Ad
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(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 298. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011i. “Ad
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and its Discontents, pp. 299–301. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011j. “Ad
Goldman
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 302–305. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011k. “Ad
Lehrer
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 306–307. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011l. “Ad
Steup
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 308–309. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011m. “Ad
Baehr
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 310–313. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011n. “Ad
Axtell
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 314–315. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011o. “Ad
Williamson
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 316–320. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011p. “Ad
Dougherty
(2011).” in Evidentialism
and its Discontents, pp. 321–323. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. 1977. “Belief and Inscriptions.” Philosophical
Studies 32(4): 349–353.
Feldman, Richard H. 1981. “Fallibilism and Knowing that One Knows.”
The Philosophical Review 90: 266–282.
Feldman, Richard H. 1985. “Reliability and Justification.” The
Monist 68: 159–174.
Feldman, Richard H. 1986. “Review of Stroud (2001).” The
Philosophical Review 95(2): 305–308.
Feldman, Richard H. 1988a.
“Epistemic Obligations.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, edited
by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 235–256.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214076.
Feldman, Richard H. 1988b.
“Having Evidence.” in Philosophical
Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 83–104. Philosophical Studies
Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted
in Conee and
Feldman (2004a, 219–240).
Feldman, Richard H. 1990. “Klein on Certainty and Canonical Beliefs [on Klein
(1990)].” in Doubting:
Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael
D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 121–126. Philosophical Studies
Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Feldman, Richard H. 1995a. “In Defence of Closure.” The
Philosophical Quarterly 45(181): 487–494.
Feldman, Richard H. 1995b.
“Authoritarian Epistemology.”
Philosophical Topics 23(1): 147–169. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman
(2004a, 111–134).
Feldman, Richard H. 1999a. “Contextualism and Skepticism.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology,
edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 91–114.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Feldman, Richard H. 1999b. “Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology.”
in The Blackwell Guide to
Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa, pp. 170–186. Blackwell Philosophy
Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164863.
Feldman, Richard H. 2000. “The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 60(3): 667–695. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman
(2004a, 166–195).
Feldman, Richard H. 2001a.
“Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions.”
Philosophical Studies 103(1): 61–85.
Feldman, Richard H. 2001b.
“Naturalized Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study
of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
Feldman, Richard H. 2002a.
“Epistemological Duties.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited
by Paul K. Moser, pp. 362–384.
Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. 2002b. “Review of Hetherington
(2001).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
8(6).
Feldman, Richard H. 2003.
Epistemology. Foundations of
Philosophy Series. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004a. “Foundational Beliefs and Empirical
Possibilities.” in Philosophical Issues 14:
Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 132–148. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004b. “In Search of Internalism and Externalism.”
in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard
Schantz, pp. 143–156. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2.
Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004c. “Freedom and Contextualism.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph
Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 255–276. Topics
in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
MIT Press.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004d.
“Foundational Justification.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John
Greco, pp. 42–58. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers. Reprinted as “The Justification of Introspective
Beliefs” in Conee and Feldman (2004a,
199–218), doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004e. “Afterword [to Feldman (1988b)].” in
Evidentialism. Essays in
Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 241. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. 2004f. “Comments on DeRose (2004).”
Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 23–33.
Feldman, Richard H. 2005. “Respecting the Evidence.” in
Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology,
edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 95–119.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Feldman, Richard H. 2006a. “Epistemological Puzzles about
Disagreement.” in Epistemology
Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 216–236. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.003.0013.
Feldman, Richard H. 2006b. “Bonjour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic
Beliefs [on BonJour and Sosa
(2003)].” Philosophical Studies 131(3):
713–728.
Feldman, Richard H. 2007. “Review Essay on Hawthorne (2004).”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(1): 211–226.
Feldman, Richard H. 2009. “Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and
Disagreement.” Episteme 6(3): 294–312.
Feldman, Richard H. 2010.
“Contextualism.” in A
Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, 2nd ed., pp. 12–21. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444315080.
Feldman, Richard H. 2014. “Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.” in
The Ethics of Belief, edited by
Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 284–300. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. 2003. “Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency.”
Philosophical Studies 112(2): 135–145.
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 1985.
“Evidentialism.” Philosophical
Studies 48: 15–34. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a,
83–100).
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2002. “Typing
Problems.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 65(1): 98–105.
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2004. “Making Sense of Skepticism.” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited
by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 277–306. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. and Cullison, Andrew. 2014.
“Evidentialism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology,
edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 105–119.
Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2008. “Roderick
Chisholm.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/chisholm/.
Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2015. “Roderick
Chisholm.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/chisholm/.
Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2019. “Roderick
Chisholm.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/chisholm/.
Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2023. “Roderick
Chisholm.” in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The
Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/chisholm/.
Feldman, Richard H. and Warfield, Ted A., eds. 2010a.
Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. and Warfield, Ted A. 2010b.
“Introduction.” in
Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 1–9. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. and Wierenga, Edward R. 1979.“Thalberg (1978) on the Irreducibility
of Events.” Analysis 38(1): 12–16.
Further References
Axtell, Guy. 2011. “From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue
Responsibilism.” in Evidentialism
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Baehr, Jason. 2011. “Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue.” in
Evidentialism and its Discontents,
pp. 88–101. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2011. “Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin
Objection.” in Evidentialism and
its Discontents, pp. 123–134. Sydney: Sydney University
Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest. 2003. Epistemic
Justification. Great Debates in
Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
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its Discontents, pp. 226–231. Sydney: Sydney University
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