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Richard H. Feldman (feldman-rh)

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Bibliography

    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996a. Epistemology.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996b. Evidentialism.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1998. The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 89: 1–29. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 135–158).
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2001. Internalism Defended.” American Philosophical Quarterly 38(1): 1–18. Reprinted in Kornblith (2001) and in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 53–80).
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H., eds. 2004a. Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004b. Afterword [to Conee and Feldman (2001)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 81–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004c. Afterword [to Feldman and Conee (1985)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 101–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004d. Afterword [to Conee and Feldman (1998)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 159–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2008. Evidence.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 83–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011a. Ad Bergmann (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 283–284. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011b. Ad Greco (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 285–286. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011c. Ad DeRose (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 287–288. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011d. Ad Pritchard (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 289–291. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011e. Ad Rysiew (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 292–293. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011f. Ad Swinburne (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 294–295. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011g. Ad Fumerton (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 296–297. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011h. Ad Huemer (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 298. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011i. Ad Kvanvig (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 299–301. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011j. Ad Goldman (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 302–305. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011k. Ad Lehrer (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 306–307. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011l. Ad Steup (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 308–309. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011m. Ad Baehr (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 310–313. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011n. Ad Axtell (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 314–315. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011o. Ad Williamson (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 316–320. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011p. Ad Dougherty (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 321–323. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1977. Belief and Inscriptions.” Philosophical Studies 32(4): 349–353.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1981. Fallibilism and Knowing that One Knows.” The Philosophical Review 90: 266–282.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1985. Reliability and Justification.” The Monist 68: 159–174.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1986. Review of Stroud (2001).” The Philosophical Review 95(2): 305–308.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1988a. Epistemic Obligations.” in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 235–256. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214076.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1988b. Having Evidence.” in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 83–104. Philosophical Studies Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 219–240).
    Feldman, Richard H. 1990. Klein on Certainty and Canonical Beliefs [on Klein (1990)].” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 121–126. Philosophical Studies Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1995a. In Defence of Closure.” The Philosophical Quarterly 45(181): 487–494.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1995b. Authoritarian Epistemology.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 147–169. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 111–134).
    Feldman, Richard H. 1999a. Contextualism and Skepticism.” in Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 91–114. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Feldman, Richard H. 1999b. Methodological Naturalism in Epistemology.” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, edited by John Greco and Ernest Sosa, pp. 170–186. Blackwell Philosophy Guides. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.1002/9781405164863.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2000. The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 667–695. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 166–195).
    Feldman, Richard H. 2001a. Skeptical Problems, Contextualist Solutions.” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 61–85.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2001b. Naturalized Epistemology.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2001/entries/epistemology-naturalized/.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2002a. Epistemological Duties.” in The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, edited by Paul K. Moser, pp. 362–384. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195130057.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2002b. Review of Hetherington (2001).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8(6).
    Feldman, Richard H. 2003. Epistemology. Foundations of Philosophy Series. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004a. Foundational Beliefs and Empirical Possibilities.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 132–148. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004b. In Search of Internalism and Externalism.” in The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 143–156. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, doi:10.1515/9783110915273.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004c. Freedom and Contextualism.” in Freedom and Determinism, edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier, pp. 255–276. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy n. 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004d. Foundational Justification.” in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by John Greco, pp. 42–58. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Reprinted as “The Justification of Introspective Beliefs” in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 199–218), doi:10.1002/9780470756140.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004e. Afterword [to Feldman (1988b)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 241. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2004f. Comments on DeRose (2004).” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 23–33.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2005. Respecting the Evidence.” in Philosophical Perspectives 19: Epistemology, edited by John Hawthorne, pp. 95–119. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2006a. Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.” in Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Cade Hetherington, pp. 216–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199273317.003.0013.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2006b. Bonjour and Sosa on Internalism, Externalism, and Basic Beliefs [on BonJour and Sosa (2003)].” Philosophical Studies 131(3): 713–728.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2007. Review Essay on Hawthorne (2004).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(1): 211–226.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2009. Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.” Episteme 6(3): 294–312.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2010. Contextualism.” in A Companion to Epistemology, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup, 2nd ed., pp. 12–21. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, doi:10.1002/9781444315080.
    Feldman, Richard H. 2014. Evidence of Evidence is Evidence.” in The Ethics of Belief, edited by Jonathan D. Matheson and Rico Vitz, pp. 284–300. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686520.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. 2003. Reasons Explanations and Pure Agency.” Philosophical Studies 112(2): 135–145.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 1985. Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48: 15–34. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 83–100).
    Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2002. Typing Problems.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 98–105.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2004. Making Sense of Skepticism.” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 277–306. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Cullison, Andrew. 2014. Evidentialism.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 105–119. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2008. Roderick Chisholm.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/chisholm/.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2015. Roderick Chisholm.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/chisholm/.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2019. Roderick Chisholm.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/chisholm/.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Feldman, Fred. 2023. Roderick Chisholm.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/chisholm/.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Warfield, Ted A., eds. 2010a. Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Warfield, Ted A. 2010b. Introduction.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 1–9. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
    Feldman, Richard H. and Wierenga, Edward R. 1979.Thalberg (1978) on the Irreducibility of Events.” Analysis 38(1): 12–16.

Further References

    Axtell, Guy. 2011. From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 71–87. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Baehr, Jason. 2011. Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 88–101. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Bergmann, Michael. 2011. Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 123–134. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    BonJour, Laurence and Sosa, Ernest. 2003. Epistemic Justification. Great Debates in Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    DePoe, John M. 2011. Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism.” Philosophical Studies 152(3): 347–359.
    DeRose, Keith. 2004. Single Scoreboard Semantics.” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 1–21.
    DeRose, Keith. 2011. Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 81–110.
    Dougherty, Trent. 2011. In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 226–231. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Fumerton, Richard A. 2011. Evidentialism and Truth.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 179–191. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Goldman, Alvin I. 2011. Commentary on Lyons (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(3): 457–466.
    Greco, John. 2011. Evidentialism about Knowledge.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 167–178. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Hawthorne, John. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001.
    Hetherington, Stephen Cade. 2001. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247349.001.0001.
    Huemer, Michael. 2011. Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 1–13.
    Klein, Peter D. 1990. Epistemic Compatibilism and Canonical Beliefs.” in Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism, edited by Michael D. Roth and Glenn Ross, pp. 99–119. Philosophical Studies Series n. 48. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
    Kornblith, Hilary, ed. 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
    Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011. The Rational Significance of Reflective Assent.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 34–54. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Lehrer, Keith. 2011. Art, Self and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304985.001.0001.
    Lyons, Jack C. 2009. Perception and Basic Belief: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001.
    Pritchard, Duncan. 2011. Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 235–253. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Rysiew, Patrick. 2011. Surveys, Intuitions, Knowledge Attributions, Comments on DeRose (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 111–120.
    Steup, Matthias. 2011. Evidentialist Anti-skepticism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 105–122. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
    Stroud, Barry. 2001. The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism & the Metaphysics of Colour. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0195151887.001.0001.
    Swinburne, Richard, ed. 2011. Free Will and Modern Science. Proceedings of the British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001.
    Thalberg, Irving. 1978. The Irreducibility of Events.” Analysis 38(1): 1–9.
    Williamson, Timothy. 2011. Improbable Knowing.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 147–164. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.