Earl Conee (conee)

Mentioned on the following portal pages

Contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Bodansky, Eva and Conee, Earl. 1981. “Isolating Intrinsic Value.” Analysis 41: 51–53. Reprinted in Rønnow-Rasmussen and Zimmerman (2005, 11–14).
Conee, Earl. 1983. “Review of Regan (1980).” The Journal of Philosophy 80: 415–424.
Conee, Earl. 1984. “A Defense of Pain.” Philosophical Studies 46: 239–248.
Conee, Earl. 1985a. “Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties.” The Philosophical Quarterly 35(140): 296–302.
Conee, Earl. 1985b. “The Possibility of Absent Qualia.” The Philosophical Review 83: 345–366.
Conee, Earl. 1988a. “Why Solve the Gettier Problem?” in Philosophical Analysis: A Defense By Example, edited by David F. Austin, pp. 55–58. Philosophical Studies Series n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Conee, Earl. 1988b. “The Basic Nature of Epistemic Justification.” The Monist 71: 345–366. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 37–52).
Conee, Earl. 1991. “The Possibility of Power Beyond Possibility.” in Philosophical Perspectives 5: Philosophy of Religion, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 447–473. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Conee, Earl. 1992. “The Truth Connection.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52: 657–669. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 242–253).
Conee, Earl. 1994. “Phenomenal Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 136–150. Reprinted in Ludlow, Nagasawa and Stoljar (2004, 197–215).
Conee, Earl. 1995a. “Isolation and Beyond.” Philosophical Topics 23(1): 129–146.
Conee, Earl. 1995b. “Supervenience and Intentionality.” in Supervenience: New Essays, edited by Elias E. Savellos and Ümit D. Yalçin, pp. 273–292. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Conee, Earl. 1996. “Plantinga’s Naturalism.” in Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge, edited by Jonathan L. Kvanvig, pp. 183–197. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Conee, Earl. 1998. “Seeing the Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58(4): 847–857.
Conee, Earl. 2001a. “Comments on Lycan (2001).” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 55–59.
Conee, Earl. 2001b. “Heeding Misleading Evidence.” Philosophical Studies 103(2): 99–120. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 259–276).
Conee, Earl. 2002a. “Review of Adler (2002).” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 10(15).
Conee, Earl. 2002b. “Innocuous Infallibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64(2): 406–408.
Conee, Earl. 2004a. “First Things First.” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 11–36. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl. 2004b. “Afterword [to Conee (1992)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 254–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl. 2004c. “Externalism, Internalism, and Skepticism.” in Philosophical Issues 14: Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 78–90. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Conee, Earl. 2005a. “The Comforts of Home [on Williamson (2000)].” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(2): 444–451.
Conee, Earl. 2005b. “Contextualism Contested.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 88–106. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 60–68).
Conee, Earl. 2005c. “Contextualism Contested Some More.” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Matthias Steup, 1st ed., pp. 120–127. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014, 75–78).
Conee, Earl. 2007a. “Disjunctivism and Anti-Skepticism.” in Philosophical Issues 17: The Metaphysics of Epistemology, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 16–36. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Conee, Earl. 2007b. “Externally Enhanced Internalism.” in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, edited by Sanford C. Goldberg, pp. 51–67. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conee, Earl. 2009a. “Criterial Problems [on Sosa (2007)].” Philosophical Studies 143(3): 417–426.
Conee, Earl. 2009b. “Peerage.” Episteme 6(3): 313–323.
Conee, Earl. 2010. “Rational Disagreement Defended.” in Disagreement, edited by Richard H. Feldman and Ted A. Warfield, pp. 69–90. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226078.001.0001.
Conee, Earl. 2011. “Modal Realism, Counterpart Theory, and the Possibility of Multiversal Rectitude.” Analysis 71(4): 680–684.
Conee, Earl. 2013a. “The Specificity of the Generality Problem.” Philosophical Studies 163(3): 751–762.
Conee, Earl. 2013b. “Seeming Evidence.” in Seemings and Justification. New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, edited by Christopher Tucker, pp. 52–69. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199899494.001.0001.
Conee, Earl. 2013c. “Conceiving Absolute Greatness.” in The Puzzle of Existence. Why Is There Something Rather than Nothing?, edited by Tyron Craig Goldschmidt, pp. 110–127. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 6. London: Routledge.
Conee, Earl. 2014a. “Moral by Virtue of Virtue.” in Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, volume IV, edited by Mark Timmons, pp. 53–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198722144.001.0001.
Conee, Earl. 2014b. “The Nature of Knowledge.” in The Bloomsbury Companion to Epistemology, edited by Andrew Cullison, pp. 21–41. Bloomsbury Companions. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Conee, Earl. 2015. “Debasing Skepticism Refuted.” Episteme 12(1): 1–11.
Conee, Earl. 2016. “A Mysterious Case of Missing Value.” Philosophic Exchange 45(3).
Conee, Earl. 2017a. “Good to Know.” Philosophical Studies 174(2): 311–331.
Conee, Earl. 2017b. “Factual Evidence Without Knowledge.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98: 536–552.
Conee, Earl. 2018. “Vindicating the Absent Qualia Objection.” Ratio 31(1): 19–34.
Conee, Earl. 2020. “Evidential Support and Best Explanations.” in Philosophical Issues 30: Perceptual Evidence, edited by Matthew McGrath and Susanna Schellenberg, pp. 71–85. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1111/phis.12172.
Conee, Earl. 2021. “Higher-Order Defeat and Withholding Judgment.” Ergo 7(19): 537–553, doi:10.3998/ergo.1117.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996a. “Epistemology.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1996b. “Evidentialism.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 1998. “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism.” Philosophical Studies 89: 1–29. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 135–158).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2001. “Internalism Defended.” American Philosophical Quarterly 38(1): 1–18. Reprinted in Kornblith (2001) and in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 53–80).
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H., eds. 2004a. Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004b. “Afterword [to Conee and Feldman (2001)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 81–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004c. “Afterword [to Feldman and Conee (1985)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 101–108. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2004d. “Afterword [to Conee and Feldman (1998)].” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 159–165. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2008. “Evidence.” in Epistemology: New Essays, edited by Quentin Smith, pp. 83–104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264933.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011a. “Ad Bergmann (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 283–284. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011b. “Ad Greco (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 285–286. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011c. “Ad DeRose (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 287–288. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011d. “Ad Pritchard (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 289–291. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011e. “Ad Rysiew (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 292–293. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011f. “Ad Swinburne (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 294–295. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011g. “Ad Fumerton (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 296–297. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011h. “Ad Huemer (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 298. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011i. “Ad Kvanvig (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 299–301. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011j. “Ad Goldman (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 302–305. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011k. “Ad Lehrer (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 306–307. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011l. “Ad Steup (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 308–309. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011m. “Ad Baehr (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 310–313. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011n. “Ad Axtell (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 314–315. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011o. “Ad Williamson (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 316–320. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard H. 2011p. “Ad Dougherty (2011).” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 321–323. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 1985. “Evidentialism.” Philosophical Studies 48: 15–34. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman (2004a, 83–100).
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2002. “Typing Problems.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65(1): 98–105.
Feldman, Richard H. and Conee, Earl. 2004. “Making Sense of Skepticism.” in Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, edited by Earl Conee and Richard H. Feldman, pp. 277–306. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199253722.001.0001.
Sider, Theodore and Conee, Earl. 2005. Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Further References

Adler, Jonathan E. 2002. Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Axtell, Guy. 2011. “From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 71–87. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Baehr, Jason. 2011. “Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 88–101. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Bergmann, Michael. 2011. “Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 123–134. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
DePoe, John M. 2011. “Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservativism.” Philosophical Studies 152(3): 347–359.
DeRose, Keith. 2011. “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 81–110.
Dougherty, Trent. 2011. “In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 226–231. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Fumerton, Richard A. 2011. “Evidentialism and Truth.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 179–191. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Goldman, Alvin I. 2011. “Commentary on Lyons (2009).” Philosophical Studies 153(3): 457–466.
Greco, John. 2011. “Evidentialism about Knowledge.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 167–178. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Huemer, Michael. 2011. “Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 1–13.
Kornblith, Hilary, ed. 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2011. “The Rational Significance of Reflective Assent.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 34–54. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Lehrer, Keith. 2011. Art, Self and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195304985.001.0001.
Ludlow, Peter J., Nagasawa, Yujin and Stoljar, Daniel, eds. 2004. There’s Something About Mary. Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Lycan, William G. 2001. “Moore Against the New Skeptics.” Philosophical Studies 103(1): 35–53.
Lyons, Jack C. 2009. Perception and Basic Belief: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195373578.001.0001.
Pritchard, Duncan. 2011. “Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 235–253. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Regan, Donald H. 1980. Utilitarianism and Co-operation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198246091.001.0001.
Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni and Zimmerman, Michael J., eds. 2005. Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy n. 17. Berlin: Springer.
Rysiew, Patrick. 2011. “Surveys, Intuitions, Knowledge Attributions, Comments on DeRose (2011).” Philosophical Studies 156(1): 111–120.
Sosa, Ernest. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.001.0001.
Sosa, Ernest and Steup, Matthias, eds. 2005. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 1st ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Second edition: Steup, Turri and Sosa (2014).
Steup, Matthias. 2011. “Evidentialist Anti-skepticism.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 105–122. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.
Steup, Matthias, Turri, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 2014. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2nd ed. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 3. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. First edition: Sosa and Steup (2005), doi:10.1002/9781394260744.
Swinburne, Richard, ed. 2011. Free Will and Modern Science. Proceedings of the British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.5871/bacad/9780197264898.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/019925656X.001.0001.
Williamson, Timothy. 2011. “Improbable Knowing.” in Evidentialism and its Discontents, pp. 147–164. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199563500.001.0001.