Jonathan Schaffer (schaffer-j)

My contributions to Philosophie.ch

Bibliography

Blanchard, Thomas and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Cause without Default.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 175–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0010.
Buckwalter, Wesley and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015. “Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.” Noûs 49(2): 201–234.
Hicks, Michael Townsen and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68(2): 411–450, doi:10.1093/bjps/axv039.
Ismael, Jenann and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2020. “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground.” Synthese 197(10): 4131–4160.
Loewer, Barry C. and Schaffer, Jonathan, eds. 2015. A Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Rose, David and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013. “Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.” Philosophical Studies 166(1, supplement): 19–50.
Rose, David and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Folk Mereology Is Teleological.” in Experimental Metaphysics, edited by David Rose, pp. 135–186. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000a. “Trumping Preemption.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(4): 165–181. Reprinted in Collins, Hall and Paul (2004, 59–74).
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000b. “Overlappings: Probability-Raising Without Causation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 40–46.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000c. “Causation by Disconnection.” Philosophy of Science 67: 285–300.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001a. “The Individuation of Tropes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 247–257, doi:10.1080/713659225.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001b. “Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives, and Missed Clues.” Analysis 61: 202–208.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001c. “Causation, Influence, and Effluence.” Analysis 61(1): 11–19, doi:10.1093/analys/61.1.11.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001d. “Causes as Probability Raisers of Processes.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(2): 75–92.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003a. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003b. “Is there a Fundamental Level?” Noûs 37(3): 498–517, doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00448.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003c. “Overdetermining Causes.” Philosophical Studies 114(1–2): 23–45.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003d. “The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 125–138.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003e. “Principled Chances.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 27–41.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003f. “Perceptual Knowledge Derailed.” Philosophical Studies 112(1): 31–45.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004a. “Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85(1): 92–102, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00189.x.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004b. “Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(1): 138–155.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004c. “From Contextualism to Contrastivism.” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 73–103.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004d. “Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events [critical notice of Pietroski (2000).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 230–244.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004e. “Causes Need not Be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, edited by Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 197–216. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 2. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004f. “Counterfactuals, Causal Independence, and Conceptual Circularity.” Analysis 64(4): 299–309.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005a. “Quiddistic Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 123(1): 1–32.  “Reprinted” (if this is the word) in Jackson and Priest (2004, 210–230).
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005b. “Contrastive Causation.” The Philosophical Review 114(3): 327–358.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005c. “What Shifts? Tresholds, Standards, or Alternatives?” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, pp. 115–130. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005d. “Contrastive Knowledge.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 235–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2006. “The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.” Philosophical Studies 127(1): 87–107.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007a. “From Nihilism to Monism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 175–191.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007b. “Deterministic Chance?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58(2): 113–140.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007c. “Closure, Contrast, and Answer.” Philosophical Studies 133(2): 233–255.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007d. “Knowing the Answer.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2): 383–403.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007e. “Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 82–107. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007f. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007g. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008a. “Knowledge in the Image of Assertion.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–19. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008b. “Truthmaker Commitments.” Philosophical Studies 141(1): 7–19.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008c. “Truth and Fundamentality: on Merricks (2007).” Philosophical Books 49(4): 302–316.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008d. “The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.” Social Epistemology 22(2): 235–245.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009a. “Spacetime the One Substance.” Philosophical Studies 145(1): 131–148.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009b. “On What Grounds What.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 347–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0012.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009c. “The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects.” Philosophical Books 50(3): 142–157.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009d. “Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard (2009) and Kallestrup (2009).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 477–500.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010a. “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscous Truthmaker.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(239): 307–324, doi:10.1111/phiq.2010.60.issue-239.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010b. “The Internal Relatedness of All Things.” Mind 119(474): 341–376.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010c. “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” The Philosophical Review 119(1): 31–76, doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010d. “The Debasing Demon.” Analysis 70(2): 228–237.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2011a. “Perspectives in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 179–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2011b. “Why the World Has Parts: Reply to Horgan and Potrč (2011).” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. 77–91. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2012a. “Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity.” in Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, pp. 122–138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139149136.005.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2012b. “Necessitarian Propositions.” Synthese 189(1): 119–162.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013a. “The Action of the Whole.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87: 67–87.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013b. “Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability [on Sider (2011)].” Analysis 73(4): 736–751.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013c. “Causal Contextualisms.” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw, pp. 35–63. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 39. London: Routledge.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014a. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014b. “Review of Sider (2011).” The Philosophical Review 123(1): 125–129.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014c. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015a. “Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 473–490. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015b. “What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4): 644–664, doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.992447.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016a. “Grounding in the Image of Causation.” Philosophical Studies 173(1): 49–100, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016b. “Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 143–170. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_6.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016c. “It is the Business of Laws to Govern.” Dialectica 70(4): 577–588, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12165.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016d. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016e. “Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 337–368. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan, ed. 2017a. Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017b. “Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.” in Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics, edited by Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 302–321. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted in O’Hear (2018, 1–20), doi:10.1111/phis.12111.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017c. “Social Construction as Grounding; Or: Fundamentality for Feminists. A Reply to Barnes and Mikkola.” Philosophical Studies 174(4): 2449–2465.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017d. “The Ground Between the Gaps.” Philosophers’ Imprint 17(11).
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017e. “Atomism, Metaphysical.” in Handbook of Mereology, edited by Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt, Guido Imaguire, and Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, pp. 85–89. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzj8n.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2018. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2019. “Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein (2015).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99(3): 749–767.
Schaffer, Jonathan and Knobe, Joshua. 2012. “Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.” Noûs 46(4): 675–708.
Schaffer, Jonathan and Szabó, Zoltán Gendler. 2014. “Epistemic Comparativism: a Contexualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions.” Philosophical Studies 168(2): 491–543, doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0141-7.

Further References

Brogaard, Berit. 2009. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 439–467.
Collins, John David, Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A., eds. 2004. Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.001.0001.
Epstein, Brian. 2015. The Ant Trap. Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381104.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2011. “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. –76. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Kallestrup, Jesper. 2009. “Knowledge-wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 468–476.
Merricks, Trenton. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.001.0001.
O’Hear, Anthony, ed. 2018. Metaphysics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pietroski, Paul M. 2000. Causing Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199252769.001.0001.
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001.