Jonathan Schaffer (schaffer-j)
Menzionato/a in queste pagine del portale
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Philosophers' Imprint, Che cos’è la Metafisica della ScienzaCitato nei seguenti articoli
Circular Paths and Infinite Descent: a Guide, Susan Stebbing on Well-Foundedness, Infinite Regresses, Ground Conditions, and Metaphysical Satisfaction, A Recipe for Non-Wellfounded but Complete Chains of Explanations (and other Determination Relations), Grounding Ground and the (In-)Escapable Ill-Foundedness of the Inclusive `Explains', Functionalism, Pluralities, and Groups, Categorial Metaphysics and the Reality of the Inference Problem, Converse Relations and the Sparse-Abundant Distinction, Actual Causation, A Puzzle for Realism about Ground, The Primitivist Response to the Inference Problem, Dispositions and Token Identity, Spacetime Functionalism, A Puzzle About Parsimony, Robinson's Regress Argument from Vagueness to Dualism, In Defence of Facts: Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem, Why Strevens' Counterexample to Lewis's 'Causation as Influence' is EffectiveContributi a Philosophie.ch
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Bibliography
Blanchard, Thomas and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Cause without Default.” in Making a Difference. Essays on the Philosophy of Causation, edited by Helen Beebee, Christopher R. Hitchcock, and Huw Price, pp. 175–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780198746911.003.0010.
Buckwalter, Wesley and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015. “Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes.” Noûs 49(2): 201–234.
Hicks, Michael Townsen and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68(2): 411–450, doi:10.1093/bjps/axv039.
Ismael, Jenann and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2020. “Quantum Holism: Nonseparability as Common Ground.” Synthese 197(10): 4131–4160.
Loewer, Barry C. and Schaffer, Jonathan, eds. 2015. A Companion to David Lewis. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Rose, David and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013. “Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief.” Philosophical Studies 166(1, supplement): 19–50.
Rose, David and Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017. “Folk Mereology Is Teleological.” in Experimental Metaphysics, edited by David Rose, pp. 135–186. Advances in Experimental Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000a. “Trumping Preemption.” The Journal of Philosophy 97(4): 165–181. Reprinted in Collins, Hall and Paul (2004, 59–74).
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000b. “Overlappings: Probability-Raising Without Causation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 40–46.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2000c. “Causation by Disconnection.” Philosophy of Science 67: 285–300.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001a. “The Individuation of Tropes.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(2): 247–257, doi:10.1080/713659225.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001b. “Knowledge, Relevant Alternatives, and Missed Clues.” Analysis 61: 202–208.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001c. “Causation, Influence, and Effluence.” Analysis 61(1): 11–19, doi:10.1093/analys/61.1.11.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2001d. “Causes as Probability Raisers of Processes.” The Journal of Philosophy 98(2): 75–92.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003a. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003b. “Is there a Fundamental Level?” Noûs 37(3): 498–517, doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00448.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003c. “Overdetermining Causes.” Philosophical Studies 114(1–2): 23–45.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003d. “The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1): 125–138.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003e. “Principled Chances.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54: 27–41.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2003f. “Perceptual Knowledge Derailed.” Philosophical Studies 112(1): 31–45.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004a. “Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85(1): 92–102, doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00189.x.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004b. “Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69(1): 138–155.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004c. “From Contextualism to Contrastivism.” Philosophical Studies 119(1–2): 73–103.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004d. “Of Ghostly and Mechanical Events [critical notice of Pietroski (2000).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68(1): 230–244.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004e. “Causes Need not Be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation.” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, edited by Christopher R. Hitchcock, pp. 197–216. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 2. Boston, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004f. “Counterfactuals, Causal Independence, and Conceptual Circularity.” Analysis 64(4): 299–309.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005a. “Quiddistic Knowledge.” Philosophical Studies 123(1): 1–32. “Reprinted” (if this is the word) in Jackson and Priest (2004, 210–230).
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005b. “Contrastive Causation.” The Philosophical Review 114(3): 327–358.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005c. “What Shifts? Tresholds, Standards, or Alternatives?” in Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, edited by Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, pp. 115–130. New York: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267408.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2005d. “Contrastive Knowledge.” in Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume I, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, pp. 235–272. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199285891.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2006. “The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.” Philosophical Studies 127(1): 87–107.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007a. “From Nihilism to Monism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(2): 175–191.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007b. “Deterministic Chance?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58(2): 113–140.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007c. “Closure, Contrast, and Answer.” Philosophical Studies 133(2): 233–255.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007d. “Knowing the Answer.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2): 383–403.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007e. “Causation and Laws of Nature: Reductionism.” in Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics, edited by Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 82–107. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy n. 10. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007f. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2007/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2007g. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008a. “Knowledge in the Image of Assertion.” in Philosophical Issues 18: Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, edited by Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, pp. 1–19. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008b. “Truthmaker Commitments.” Philosophical Studies 141(1): 7–19.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008c. “Truth and Fundamentality: on Merricks (2007).” Philosophical Books 49(4): 302–316.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2008d. “The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.” Social Epistemology 22(2): 235–245.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009a. “Spacetime the One Substance.” Philosophical Studies 145(1): 131–148.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009b. “On What Grounds What.” in Metametaphysics. New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, pp. 347–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199546046.003.0012.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009c. “The Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson’s Ordinary Objects.” Philosophical Books 50(3): 142–157.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2009d. “Knowing the Answer Redux: Replies to Brogaard (2009) and Kallestrup (2009).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 477–500.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010a. “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscous Truthmaker.” The Philosophical Quarterly 60(239): 307–324, doi:10.1111/phiq.2010.60.issue-239.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010b. “The Internal Relatedness of All Things.” Mind 119(474): 341–376.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010c. “Monism: The Priority of the Whole.” The Philosophical Review 119(1): 31–76, doi:10.1215/00318108-2009-025.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2010d. “The Debasing Demon.” Analysis 70(2): 228–237.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2011a. “Perspectives in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.” in Epistemic Modality, edited by Andy Egan and Brian Weatherson, pp. 179–226. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199591596.001.0001.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2011b. “Why the World Has Parts: Reply to Horgan and Potrč (2011).” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. 77–91. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2012a. “Grounding, Transitivity, and Contrastivity.” in Metaphysical Grounding. Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder, pp. 122–138. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139149136.005.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2012b. “Necessitarian Propositions.” Synthese 189(1): 119–162.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013a. “The Action of the Whole.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 87: 67–87.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013b. “Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability [on Sider (2011)].” Analysis 73(4): 736–751.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2013c. “Causal Contextualisms.” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw, pp. 35–63. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy n. 39. London: Routledge.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014a. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014b. “Review of Sider (2011).” The Philosophical Review 123(1): 125–129.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2014c. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015a. “Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions.” in A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry C. Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 473–490. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley; Sons, Inc., doi:10.1002/9781118398593.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015b. “What Not to Multiply Without Necessity.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93(4): 644–664, doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.992447.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016a. “Grounding in the Image of Causation.” Philosophical Studies 173(1): 49–100, doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0438-1.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016b. “Ground Rules: Lessons from Wilson.” in Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground, edited by Kenneth Aizawa and Carl Gillett, pp. 143–170. New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. London: Palgrave Macmillan, doi:10.1057/978-1-137-56216-6_6.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016c. “It is the Business of Laws to Govern.” Dialectica 70(4): 577–588, doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12165.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016d. “The Metaphysics of Causation.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/causation-metaphysics/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2016e. “Cognitive Science and Metaphysics: Partners in Debunking.” in Goldman and His Critics, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith, pp. 337–368. Philosophers and Their Critics. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan, ed. 2017a. Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017b. “Laws for Metaphysical Explanation.” in Philosophical Issues 27: Metaphysics, edited by Jonathan Schaffer, pp. 302–321. Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell. Reprinted in O’Hear (2018, 1–20), doi:10.1111/phis.12111.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017c. “Social Construction as Grounding; Or: Fundamentality for Feminists. A Reply to Barnes and Mikkola.” Philosophical Studies 174(4): 2449–2465.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2017e. “Atomism, Metaphysical.” in Handbook of Mereology, edited by Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt, Guido Imaguire, and Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, pp. 85–89. Analytica: Investigations in Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Language. München: Philosophia Verlag, doi:10.2307/j.ctv2nrzj8n.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2018. “Monism.” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford, California: The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language; Information, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/monism/.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2019. “Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein (2015).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99(3): 749–767.
Schaffer, Jonathan and Szabó, Zoltán Gendler. 2014. “Epistemic Comparativism: a Contexualist Semantics for Knowledge Ascriptions.” Philosophical Studies 168(2): 491–543, doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0141-7.
Further References
Brogaard, Berit. 2009. “What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-wh.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 439–467.
Collins, John David, Hall, Ned and Paul, Laurie A., eds. 2004. Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, doi:10.7551/mitpress/1752.001.0001.
Epstein, Brian. 2015. The Ant Trap. Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199381104.001.0001.
Horgan, Terence E. and Potrč, Matjaž. 2011. “Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.” in Spinoza on Monism, edited by Philip Goff, pp. –76. Philosophers in Depth. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham, eds. 2004. Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David Lewis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199274550.001.0001.
Kallestrup, Jesper. 2009. “Knowledge-wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(2): 468–476.
Merricks, Trenton. 2007. Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199205233.001.0001.
O’Hear, Anthony, ed. 2018. Metaphysics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement n. 82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pietroski, Paul M. 2000. Causing Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/0199252769.001.0001.
Sider, Theodore. 2011. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697908.001.0001.