David M. Armstrong (armstrong-dm)
Contributions to Philosophie.ch
No contributions yet
Bibliography
Armstrong, David M. 1954. “Berkeley’s Puzzle about the Water that seems both Hot and Cold.” Analysis 15: 44–46.
Armstrong, David M. 1955. “Illusions of Sense.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33: 88–106.
Armstrong, David M. 1960. Berkeley’s Theory of Vision: A Critical Examination of Bishop Berkeley’s Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1961. Perception and the Physical World. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Armstrong, David M. 1962. Bodily Sensations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Armstrong, David M. 1963a. “Max Deutscher (1963) and Perception.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41(2): 246–249.
Armstrong, David M. 1963b.“Vesey (1963) on Sensations of Heat.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41(3): 359–362.
Armstrong, David M. 1963c. “Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible?” The Philosophical Review 72: 417–432.
Armstrong, David M. 1963d. “Absolute and Relative Motion.” Mind 72: 209–223.
Armstrong, David M. 1964.“Vesey (1964) on Bodily Sensations.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42(2): 247–248.
Armstrong, David M. 1965a. “The Freedom of the Will.” The Pluralist 2: 21–25.
Armstrong, David M. 1965b. “A Theory of Perception.” in Scientific Psychology; Principles and Approaches, edited by Benjamin B. Wolman and Ernest Nagel, pp. 489–505. New York: Basic Books.
Armstrong, David M. 1966. “The Nature of Mind.” Arts (Proceedings of the Sydney University Arts Association) 3: 37–48. Reprinted in Borst (1970, 67–72), in Armstrong (1980a, 1–15), in Block (1980, 191–199) and in Hoy and Oaklander (1991, 234–241).
Armstrong, David M. 1968a. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reissued as Armstrong (2023).
Armstrong, David M. 1968b. “The Headless Woman Illusion and the Defence of Materialism.” Analysis 29(2): 48–49, doi:10.1093/analys/29.2.48.
Armstrong, David M. 1968c. “The Secondary Qualities.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46: 225–241.
Armstrong, David M. 1969a. “Does Knowledge Entail Belief?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70: 21–36.
Armstrong, David M. 1969b. “Dispositions are Causes.” Analysis 30: 138–140.
Armstrong, David M. 1969c. “Colour Realism and the Argument from Microscopes.” in Contemporary Philosophy in Australia, edited by Robert Brown and C. D. Rollins, pp. 119–131. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 104–118).
Armstrong, David M. 1971. “Meaning and Communication.” The Philosophical Review 80: 427–447.
Armstrong, David M. 1972. “Materialism, Properties and Predicates.” The Monist 56: 163–176.
Armstrong, David M. 1973a. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570827.
Armstrong, David M. 1973b. “Epistemological Foundations for a Materialist Theory of Mind.” Philosophy of Science 40: 178–193. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 32–54).
Armstrong, David M. 1973c. “Acting and Trying.” Philosophical Papers 2: 1–15. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 68–88).
Armstrong, David M. 1973d. “Language and Mind.” in Linguistics and Mind, pp. 1–10. Sydney: Sydney University Extension Board.
Armstrong, David M. 1974. “Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52(3): 191–201.
Armstrong, David M. 1975. “Towards a Theory of Properties: Work in Progress on the Problem of Universals.” Philosophy 50: 145–155.
Armstrong, David M. 1976a. “Incorrigibility, Materialism and Causation.” Philosophical Studies 30: 125–128.
Armstrong, David M. 1976b. “Immediate Perception.” in Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, edited by Robert S. Cohen, Paul K. Feyerabend, and Marx W. Wartofsky, pp. 23–35. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 39. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 119–131).
Armstrong, David M. 1976c. “Modern Materialism and the Mind.” Proceedings of the Russell Society (Sydney University) 1: 44–55.
Armstrong, David M. 1976d. “The Nature of Tradition.” in Liberty and Politics. Studies in Social Theory, edited by Owen Harries, pp. 7–19. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 89–103).
Armstrong, David M. 1977a. “The Causal Theory of the Mind.” Neue Hefte für Philosophie 11: 82–95. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 16–31).
Armstrong, David M. 1977b. “The Problem of Universals.” Proceedings of the Russell Society (Sydney University) 2: 11–22.
Armstrong, David M. 1977c. “Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy.” in Ist systematische Philosophie möglich? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1975, edited by Dieter Henrich, pp. 411–425. Hegel-Studien, Beiheft n. 17. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 149–165).
Armstrong, David M. 1977d. “Remarks read at the Conference [reply to Bieri (1977)].” in Ist systematische Philosophie möglich? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1975, edited by Dieter Henrich, pp. 437–441. Hegel-Studien, Beiheft n. 17. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
Armstrong, David M. 1978a. Nominalism & Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1978b. A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1978c. “What is Consciousness?” Proceedings of the Russell Society (Sydney University) 3: 65–76. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 55–67).
Armstrong, David M. 1979a. “Perception, Sense Data and Causality.” in Perception and Identity: Essays Presented To A.J. Ayer, with his Replies to them, edited by Graham F. Macdonald, pp. 84–96. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in Armstrong (1980a, 132–148).
Armstrong, David M. 1979b. “Three Types of Consciousness.” Brain and Mind, Ciba Foundation Series 69: 235–241.
Armstrong, David M. 1979c. “Laws of Nature.” Proceedings of the Russell Society (Sydney University) 4: 46–61.
Armstrong, David M. 1980a. The Nature of Mind, and other Essays. St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1980b. “Identity Through Time.” in Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, edited by Peter van Inwagen, pp. 67–78. Philosophical Studies Series n. 19. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., doi:10.1007/978-94-017-3528-5.
Armstrong, David M. 1980c. “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt (1980).” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61(4): 440–449. Reprinted in Mellor and Oliver (1997, 101–111).
Armstrong, David M. 1982a. “Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals, and As Universals.” Philosophical Topics 13(1): 7–24.
Armstrong, David M. 1982b. “Metaphysics and Supervenience.” Crı́tica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofı́a 14(42): 3–18.
Armstrong, David M. 1983a. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reissued as Armstrong (2016), doi:10.1017/cbo9781139171700.
Armstrong, David M. 1983b. “Recent Work on the Relation of Mind and Brain.” in Contemporary Philosophy: A new survey. Volume 4: Philosophy of Mind, edited by Guttorm Fløistad, pp. 45–79. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Armstrong, David M. 1983c. “Do Things Have Temporal Parts?” Proceedings of the Russell Society (Sydney University) 8: 25–35.
Armstrong, David M. 1984a. “Reply to Stich (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 237–243. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984b. “Reply to Earman (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 262–268. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984c. “Reply to Lycan (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 243–250. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984d. “Reply to Aune (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 250–256. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984e. “Reply to Sanford (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 225–233. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984f. “Reply to Rosenthal (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 233–237. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984g. “Reply to Tweedale (1984).” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 256–262. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1984h. “Self-Profile.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 3–54. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1986a. “In Defence of Structural Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64(1): 85–88, doi:10.1080/00048408612342261.
Armstrong, David M. 1986b. “The Nature of Possibility.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16(4): 575–594.
Armstrong, David M. 1987a. “Smart and Secondary Qualities.” in Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart, edited by Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan, and Jean Norman, pp. 1–15. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Armstrong, David M. 1987b. “Comments on Swoyer (1987) and Forge (1987).” in Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, edited by John Forge, pp. 311–318. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1988a. “Are Quantities Relations? A Reply to Bigelow and Pargetter (1988).” Philosophical Studies 54(3): 305–316, doi:10.1007/BF00646273.
Armstrong, David M. 1988b. “Reply to van Fraassen (1987).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66: 224–229.
Armstrong, David M. 1988c. “Are Dispositions Ultimate? Reply to Franklin (1986).” The Philosophical Quarterly 38(150): 84–86.
Armstrong, David M. 1988d. “Can a Naturalist Believe in Universals?” in Science in Reflection. The Israel Colloquium: Studies in History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science. Volume 3, edited by Edna Ullmann-Margalit, pp. 103–115. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science n. 110. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1989a. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9781139172226.
Armstrong, David M. 1989b. Universals: An Opiniated Introduction. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1989c. “C.B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality and Conditionals.” in Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C.B. Martin, edited by John Heil, pp. 7–15. Philosophical Studies Series n. 47. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1991a. “Classes are States of Affairs.” Mind 100: 189–200.
Armstrong, David M. 1991b. “Arda Denkel’s Resemblance Nominalism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 41(165): 478–482.
Armstrong, David M. 1991c. “What Makes Induction Rational?” Dialogue. Revue canadienne de philosophie / Canadian Philosophical Review 30: 503–511.
Armstrong, David M. 1991d. “Intentionality, Perception, and Causality: Reflections on John Searle’s Intentionality.” in John Searle and His Critics, edited by Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, pp. 149–158. Philosophers and Their Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Armstrong, David M. 1991e. “Searle’s Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness [on Searle (1989)].” in Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, edited by Enrique Villanueva, pp. 67–71. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1992a. “Properties.” in Language, Truth and Ontology, edited by Kevin Mulligan, pp. 14–27. Philosophical Studies Series n. 51. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Armstrong, David M. 1992b. “Review of Bigelow and Pargetter (1990).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70: 225–227.
Armstrong, David M. 1993a. “A World of States of Affairs.” in Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, edited by James E. Tomberlin, pp. 429–440. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, doi:10.2307/2214133.
Armstrong, David M. 1993b. “The Identification Problem and the Inference Problem.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53: 421–422.
Armstrong, David M. 1993c. “Reply to Lewis (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 38–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993d. “Reply to Forrest (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 65–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993e. “Reply to Bigelow (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 96–100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993f. “Reply to Mellor (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 113–120. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993g. “Reply to Fales (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 144–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993h. “Reply to Smart (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 169–174. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993i. “Reply to Martin (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 186–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993j. “Reply to Menzies (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 225–233. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993k. “Reply to Jackson (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 246–248. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993l. “Reply to Campbell (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 269–274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1993m. “Reply to Lycan (1993).” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 18–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1995a. “Reacting to Meinong.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 50: 615–627. “Meinong und die Gegenstandstheorie – Meinong and the Theory of Objects,” ed. by Rudolf Haller.
Armstrong, David M. 1995b. “Categorialist versus Dispositionalist Account of Properties.” Acta Analytica 10(15): 7–19.
Armstrong, David M. 1995c. “ ‘Copula’ .” in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, 1st ed., pp. 193–194. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Page references are to the second edition.
Armstrong, David M. 1995d. “ ‘Universals’ .” in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, 1st ed., pp. 611–615. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Page references are to the second edition.
Armstrong, David M. 1995e. “Kategorialistische und dispositionalistische Theorien von Eigenschaften: Eine Gegenüberstellung [Categorialist versus Dispositionalist Account of Properties].” in Metaphysik. Neue Zugänge zu alten Fragen, edited by Johannes L. Brandl, Alexander Hieke, and Peter M. Simons, pp. 71–85. Conceptus-Studien n. 11. Sankt Augustin b. Bonn: Academia Verlag. Proceedings of the 3rd congress of the Österreichische Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Salzburg 1994.
Armstrong, David M. 1995f. “ ‘Universals and Particulars’ .” in A Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, 1st ed., pp. 615–616. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Page references are to the second edition.
Armstrong, David M. 1995g. “Reply to Rosen (1995).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(4): 626–628.
Armstrong, David M. 1995h. “Postscript to Armstrong (1977c).” in Contemporary Materialism. A Reader, edited by Paul K. Moser and J. D. Trout, pp. 48–52. London: Routledge.
Armstrong, David M. 1996a. “Laws of Nature.” in Supplement to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald M. Borchert. London: MacMillan Publishing Co. Reprinted in the second edition (borchert:2005?).
Armstrong, David M. 1996b. “Review of Casati and Varzi (1994).” The Journal of Philosophy 93: 585–586.
Armstrong, David M. 1996c. “Comments on Lierse (1996).” in Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology, edited by Peter J. Riggs, pp. 227–228. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 12. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Armstrong, David M. 1997a. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511583308.
Armstrong, David M. 1997b. “Reply to Martin (1996).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 214–217.
Armstrong, David M. 1997c. “Properties.” in Properties, edited by David Hugh Mellor and Alex Oliver, pp. 160–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1997d. “Singular Causes and Laws of Nature.” in The Cosmos of Science: Essays of Exploration, edited by John S. Earman and John D. Norton, pp. 498–514. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1999a. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Focus Series. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
Armstrong, David M. 1999b. “The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties according to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others.” Philosophical Topics 26(1–2): 25–37, doi:10.5840/philtopics1999261/243.
Armstrong, David M. 1999c. “The Open Door: Counterfactual vs. Singularist Theories of Causation.” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 175–185. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Preyer and Siebelt (2001, 163–176), doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Armstrong, David M. 1999d. “Comment on Smart (1999).” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 171–172. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Armstrong, David M. 1999e. “Comment on Ellis (1999).” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 35–38. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Armstrong, David M. 2000a. “Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truthmaking.” The Monist 83(1): 150–160.
Armstrong, David M. 2000b. “The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties according to Shoemaker, Ellis and others.” Metaphysica 1(1): 5–20. Reprint of Armstrong (1999b), with an added final paragraph.
Armstrong, David M. 2001a. “Review of Lewis (1999).” The Philosophical Review 110(1): 77–79.
Armstrong, David M. 2001b. “Review of Mumford (1998).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(1): 246–248.
Armstrong, David M. 2001c. “Black Swans: The Formative Influences in Australian Philosophy.” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, edited by Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, pp. 11–17. Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft n. 29. Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
Armstrong, David M. 2002a. “Truth and Truthmakers.” in What is Truth?, edited by Richard Schantz, pp. 27–37. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy n. 1. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Armstrong, David M. 2002b. “Vérifacteurs pour les vérites modales.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 107(4): 491–507.
Armstrong, David M. 2003a. “Truthmakers for Modal Truths.” in Real Metaphysics – Essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, edited by Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, pp. 12–24. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy n. 15. London: Routledge.
Armstrong, David M. 2003b. “Review of Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(2): 285–286.
Armstrong, David M. 2004a. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511487552.
Armstrong, David M. 2004b. “How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, volume I, edited by Dean W. Zimmerman, pp. 139–154. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/oso/9780199267729.001.0001.
Armstrong, David M. 2004c. “Vérités et vérifacteurs.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 101–114. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Largely identical with Armstrong (2002a).
Armstrong, David M. 2004d. “Défense de la théorie des vérifacteurs: une réponse à Paul Horwich (2004).” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 129–140. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Armstrong, David M. 2004e. “Théorie combinatoire revue et corrigée.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 185–198. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin.
Armstrong, David M. 2005a. “Reply to Simons (2005) and Mumford (2005).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 271–276.
Armstrong, David M. 2005b. “Four Disputes About Properties.” Synthese 144(3): 309–320, doi:10.1007/s11229-005-5852-7.
Armstrong, David M. 2006a. “The Scope and Limits of Human Knowledge.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 159–166.
Armstrong, David M. 2006b. “Reply to Smart (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 177–178.
Armstrong, David M. 2006c. “Reply to Swinburne (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 191–192.
Armstrong, David M. 2006d. “Reply to Rissler (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 211–212.
Armstrong, David M. 2006e. “Reply to Forrest (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 229–232.
Armstrong, David M. 2006f. “Reply to Heil (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 245–248.
Armstrong, David M. 2006g. “Reply to Cheyne and Pigden (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 267–268.
Armstrong, David M. 2006h. “Reply to Efird and Stoneham (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 281–284.
Armstrong, David M. 2006i. “Reply to Friesen (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 297–300.
Armstrong, David M. 2006j. “Reply to Magalhães (2006).” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 309–310.
Armstrong, David M. 2006k. “Particulars Have Their Properties of Necessity.” in Universals, Concepts and Qualities: New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates, edited by Peter Frederick Strawson and Arindam Chakrabarti, pp. 239–248. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, doi:10.4324/9781315235325 .
Armstrong, David M. 2006l. “Review of Molnar (2003).” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(2): 485–487.
Armstrong, David M. 2007a. “Truthmakers for Negative Truths and Truths of Mere Possibility.” in Metaphysics and Truthmakers, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 99–104. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 18. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, doi:10.1515/9783110326918.99.
Armstrong, David M. 2007b. “Reply to Blum (2007).” in Metaphysics and Truthmakers, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 157–162. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 18. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, doi:10.1515/9783110326918.157.
Armstrong, David M. 2007c. “Les universaux en tant qu’Attributs.” in Métaphysique Contemporaine: Propriétés, mondes possibles et personnes, edited by Emmanuelle Garcia and Frédéric Nef, pp. 143–184. Textes clés. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Traduction d’un extrait de Armstrong (1989b) par Gaël Kervoas.
Armstrong, David M. 2009. “Questions about States of Affairs.” in States of Affairs, edited by Maria Elisabeth Reicher, pp. 39–50. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 30. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
Armstrong, David M. 2010a. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590612.001.0001.
Armstrong, David M. 2010b. Les universaux : une introduction partisane. Suivie de “Quatre disputes sur les propriétés” et “Les particuliers ont leurs propriétés par nécessité” . Paris: Les Éditions d’Ithaque. Traduction de Armstrong (1989b).
Armstrong, David M. 2012. “Defending Categoricalism.” in Properties, Powers and Structures. Issues in the Metaphysics of Realism, edited by Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis, and Howard Sankey, pp. 27–33. Routledge Studies in Metaphysics n. 5. New York: Routledge, doi:10.4324/9780203124482.
Armstrong, David M. 2016. What is a Law of Nature? Philosophy Classics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reissue of Armstrong (1983a), doi:10.1017/cbo9781316499030.
Armstrong, David M. 2023. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. With a new foreword by Peter Anstey, doi:10.4324/b23154.
Armstrong, David M. and Malcolm, Norman. 1984. Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers.
Armstrong, David M., Martin, Charles Burton and Place, Ullin Thomas. 1992. “A Debate on Dispositions, Their Nature and Their Role in Causation – Part II – The Martin-Armstrong-Place Debate.” Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie 26(67–68): 3–58.
Armstrong, David M., Martin, Charles Burton and Place, Ullin Thomas. 1996. Dispositions – a Debate. London: Routledge. Edited and with an introduction by Tim Crane.
Armstrong, David M. and Place, Ullin Thomas. 1991. “A Debate on Dispositions, Their Nature and Their Role in Causation – Part I – The Armstrong-Place Debate.” Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie 25(66): 3–44.
Forrest, Peter and Armstrong, David M. 1984. “An Argument Against David Lewis’ Theory of Possible Worlds.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62: 164–168.
Further References
Anderson, Curtis Anthony and Owens, Joseph, eds. 1990. Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI Lecture Notes n. 20. Stanford, California: CSLI Publications.
Aune, Bruce. 1984. “Armstrong on Universals and Particulars.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 161–169. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Bieri, Peter. 1977. “Empirical First Philosophy? Comments on Armstrong (1977c).” in Ist systematische Philosophie möglich? Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1975, edited by Dieter Henrich, pp. 427–436. Hegel-Studien, Beiheft n. 17. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
Bigelow, John C. 1993. “Sets are Haecceities.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 73–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bigelow, John C. and Pargetter, Robert. 1988. “Quantities.” Philosophical Studies 54(3): 287–304, doi:10.1007/BF00646273.
Bigelow, John C. and Pargetter, Robert. 1990. Science and Necessity. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Block, Ned, ed. 1980. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Volume I. Language and Thought. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Blum, Philipp. 2007. “A World of Truthmakers.” in Metaphysics and Truthmakers, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 105–156. Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis n. 18. Heusenstamm b. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. Published under the name of “Keller” , doi:10.1515/9783110326918.105.
Borst, Clive Verno, ed. 1970. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. London: MacMillan Publishing Co.
Campbell, Keith. 1993. “David Armstrong and Realism about Colour.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 249–268. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Casati, Roberto and Varzi, Achille C. 1994. Holes and Other Superficialities. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Cheyne, Colin and Pigden, Charles R. 2006. “Negative Truths from Positive Facts.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 249–266.
Deutscher, Max. 1963. “David Armstrong and Perception.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41(1): 80–88.
Devitt, Michael. 1980. “ ‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’ .” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 433–439. Reprinted in Mellor and Oliver (1997, 93–100).
Earman, John S. 1984. “Laws of Nature: The Empiricist Challenge.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 191–224. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Efird, David and Stoneham, Tom. 2006. “Combinatorialism and the Possibility of Nothing.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 269–280.
Ellis, Brian. 1999. “Causal Powers and Laws of Nature.” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 19–34. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Fales, Evan M. 1993. “Are Causal Laws Contingent?” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 121–143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Forge, John. 1987. “On Ellis’ Theory of Quantities.” in Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, edited by John Forge, pp. 291–310. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Forrest, Peter. 1993. “Just Like Quarks? The Status of Repeatables.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 45–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Forrest, Peter. 2006. “The Operator Theory of Instantiation.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 213–228.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1987. “Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 243–260.
Franklin, James. 1986. “Are Dispositions Reducible to Categorical Properties?” The Philosophical Quarterly 36(142): 62–64.
Friesen, Lowell. 2006. “Natural Classes of Universals: Why Armstrong’s Analysis Fails.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 285–296.
Heil, John. 2006. “The Legacy of Linguisticism.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 233–244.
Horwich, Paul. 2004. “Une critique de la théorie des vérifacteurs.” in La structure du monde: objets, propriétés, états de choses. Renouveau de la métaphysique dans l’école australienne de philosophie, edited by Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, pp. 115–127. Recherches sur la philosophie et le langage. Paris: Librairie philosophique Jean Vrin. Reprinted, in substantially revised form, as “Being and Truth,” in Horwich (2010, 299–322).
Horwich, Paul. 2010. Truth – Meaning – Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268900.001.0001.
Hoy, Ronald C. and Oaklander, L. Nathan, eds. 1991. Metaphysics: Classic and Contemporary Readings. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
Jackson, Frank. 1993. “Block’s Challenge.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 235–245. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis, David. 1993. “Many, but Almost One.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 23–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in Lewis (1999, 164–182).
Lewis, David. 1999. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, doi:10.1017/cbo9780511625343.
Lierse, Caroline. 1996. “The Jerrybuilt House of Humeanism.” in Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology, edited by Peter J. Riggs, pp. 29–48. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 12. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lycan, William G. 1984. “Armstrong’s Theory of Knowing.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 139–160. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Lycan, William G. 1993. “Armstrong’s New Combinatorialist Theory of Modality.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 3–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Revised and (partly) reprinted in Lycan (1994, 45–72).
Lycan, William G. 1994. Modality and Meaning. Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy n. 53. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Magalhães, Ernâni. 2006. “Armstrong on the Spatio-Temporality of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 301–308.
Martin, Charles Burton. 1993. “Power for Realists.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 175–185. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martin, Charles Burton. 1996. “How It Is: Entities, Absences and Voids.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(1): 57–65.
Mellor, David Hugh. 1993. “How to Believe a Conditional.” The Journal of Philosophy 90(5): 233–248.
Menzies, Peter. 1993. “Laws of Nature, Modality and Humean Supervenience.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 195–224. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Molnar, George. 2003. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen Mumford, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199204175.001.0001.
Mumford, Stephen. 1998. Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.001.0001.
Mumford, Stephen. 2005. “The True and the False [critical notice of Armstrong (2004a)].” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 263–269.
Preyer, Gerhard and Siebelt, Frank, eds. 2001. Reality and Humean Supervenience. Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Rissler, James D. 2006. “Does Armstrong Need States of Affairs?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 193–210.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosen, Gideon. 1995. “Armstrong on Classes as States of Affairs.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73(4): 613–625, doi:10.1080/00048409512346971.
Rosenthal, David M. 1984. “Armstrong’s Causal Theory of Mind.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 79–119. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Sanford, David H. 1984. “Armstrong’s Theory of Perception.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 55–78. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Searle, John R. 1989. “Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality.” Philosophical Topics 17(1): 193–209. Reprinted in Anderson and Owens (1990, 269–284) and in Villanueva (1991, 45–66).
Simons, Peter M. 2005. “Negatives, Numbers, and Necessity. Some Worries about Armstrong’s Version of Truthmaking [critical notice of Armstrong (2004a)].” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 253–261.
Smart, Jamieson John Carswell [Jack]. 1993. “Laws of Nature as a Species of Regularities.” in Ontology, Causality and Mind – Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith Campbell, and Loyd R. Reinhardt, pp. 152–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smart, Jamieson John Carswell [Jack]. 1999. “Laws and Cosmology.” in Causation and the Laws of Nature, edited by Howard Sankey, pp. 161–170. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 14. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9229-1.
Smart, Jamieson John Carswell [Jack]. 2006. “Metaphysical Illusions.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 167–176.
Stich, Stephen P. 1984. “Armstrong on Belief.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 121–138. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Swinburne, Richard. 2006. “Relations between Universals, or Divine Laws?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2): 179–190.
Swoyer, Chris. 1987. “The Metaphysics of Measurement.” in Measurement, Realism and Objectivity: Essays on Measurement in the Social and Physical Sciences, edited by John Forge, pp. 235–290. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science n. 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Tweedale, Martin Middleton. 1984. “Armstrong on Determinable and Substantival Universals.” in D.M. Armstrong, edited by Radu J. Bogdan, pp. 171–189. Profiles n. 4. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. 1963. “Armstrong on Sensations of Heat.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41(2): 250–254.
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. 1964. “Bodily Sensations.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42(2): 232–247.
Villanueva, Enrique, ed. 1991. Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness. Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Co.